This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2012-04-25 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| It must be stressed, however, that indirect contempt proceedings partake of the nature of a criminal prosecution; hence, strict rules that govern criminal prosecutions also apply to a prosecution for criminal contempt; the accused is to be afforded many of the protections provided in regular criminal cases; and proceedings under statutes governing them are to be strictly construed.[23] Moreover, in contempt proceedings, if the answer to the contempt charge is satisfactory, the contempt proceedings end.[24] | |||||
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2011-03-23 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| In the meantime, on September 11, 1996, this Court rendered its Decision[8] on the Petition of Paredes-Garcia, granting her prayer to set aside Judge Cruz's contempt order. The prayer in Paredes-Garcia's Reply that the Petition be treated as an administrative case against Judge Cruz was not passed upon by the Court. | |||||
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2008-08-20 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Second, if the answer to the contempt charge is satisfactory, the contempt proceedings end.[17] Even if we consider the 19 November 1999 Order sufficient to charge petitioners with indirect contempt, petitioners still could not be punished for contempt because Judge Cruz-Avisado found petitioners' explanation satisfactory. Only in cases of clear and contumacious refusal to obey should the power to punish for contempt be exercised.[18] Absent any finding that petitioners contumaciously refused to comply with the orders of the RTC, Judge Cruz-Avisado had no reason to punish petitioners for indirect contempt. | |||||
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2007-03-22 |
GARCIA, J. |
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| In several cases, the Court had set aside technicalities in the Rules in order to give way to justice and equity. The Court can overlook the short delay in the filing of pleading if strict compliance with the Rules would mean sacrificing justice to technicality. The imminence of a person being deprived unjustly of his liberty due to a procedural lapse of counsel is a strong and compelling reason to warrant suspension of the Rules.[10] A healthy respect for petitioner's rights should caution courts against motu proprio dismissals of appeals, especially in criminal cases where the liberty of the accused is at stake. The rules allowing motu proprio dismissals of appeals merely confer a power and do not impose a duty; and the same are not mandatory but merely directory which thus require a great deal of circumspection, considering all the attendant circumstances.[11] Courts are not exactly impotent to enforce their orders, including those requiring the filing of appellant's brief. This is precisely the raison d"etre for the courts" inherent contempt power.[12] Motu proprio dismissals of appeals are thus not always called for. Although the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural, right, it is an essential part of the judicial system and courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of this prerogative, but instead, afford every party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities.[13] More so must this be in criminal cases where, as here, the appellant is an indigent who could ill-afford the services of a counsel de parte. | |||||