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EDDIE DOMASIG v. NLRC

This case has been cited 5 times or more.

	GR No. 168923 2008-11-28	BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN v. CA NACHURA, J.
Even if we disregard the rule on prescription, still we cannot allow these alleged similarly situated claimants to recover because, as found by the NLRC, they were not able to present substantial evidence in support of their claims.[47] Suffice it to state at this point that the appellate court cannot substitute its own judgment or discretion for that of the labor tribunal in determining what evidence is entitled to belief.[48] We are, thus, bound to lend credence to the following findings of the NLRC:Except for claims of the 149 claimants listed in Annex "B" of the September 2, 1991 resolution, claims of the other complainants were dismissed in the same resolution either for "lack of substantial evidence in support therefor," or for their being "beyond the competence of this Commission to pass upon." Such ruling is supposed to constitute Res Judicata (sic) here. But what the 1,297 additional complainants did is to try to re-establish their claims here through mere manifestations dated July 7, 2000 and August 30, 2001. Unfortunately for them, in her report dated November 7, 2001, Arbiter Lilia Savar explained that despite the opportunity given, these so called unauthorized claimants still failed to establish their claim (sic). Explained Arbiter Savari:
	GR No. 167345 2007-11-23	E PACIFIC GLOBAL CONTACT CENTER v. MA. LOURDES CABANSAY NACHURA, J.
Oft-repeated is the rule that appellate courts accord the factual finding of the labor tribunal not only respect but also finality when supported by substantial evidence,[39] unless there is showing that the labor tribunal arbitrarily disregarded evidence before them or misapprehended evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion if properly appreciated.[40] Substantial evidence has been defined to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, and its absence is shown not by stressing that there is contrary evidence on record, direct or circumstantial, for the appellate court cannot substitute its own judgment or criterion for that of the labor tribunal in determining wherein lies the weight of evidence or what evidence is entitled to belief.[41]
	GR No. 156668 2007-11-23	KIMBERLY-CLARK v. SECRETARY OF LABOR NACHURA, J.
Finally, oft-repeated is the rule that appellate courts accord the factual findings of the labor tribunal not only respect but also finality when supported by substantial evidence,[14] unless there is showing that the labor tribunal arbitrarily disregarded evidence before it or misapprehended evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion if properly appreciated.[15] Likewise, the appellate court cannot substitute its own judgment or criterion for that of the labor tribunal in determining wherein lies the weight of evidence or what evidence is entitled to belief.[16]
	GR NO. 165881 2006-04-19	OSCAR VILLAMARIA v. VS.CA CALLEJO, SR., J.
Indeed, petitioner, as the owner of the vehicle and the holder of the franchise, is entitled to exercise supervision and control over the respondent, by seeing to it that the route provided in his franchise, and the rules and regulations of the Land Transportation Regulatory Board are duly complied with. Moreover, in a business establishment, an identification card is usually provided not just as a security measure but to mainly identify the holder thereof as a bona fide employee of the firm who issues it.[57]
	GR No. 138051 2004-06-10	JOSE Y. SONZA v. ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION CARPIO, J.
The existence of an employer-employee relationship is a question of fact. Appellate courts accord the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC not only respect but also finality when supported by substantial evidence.[15] Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[16] A party cannot prove the absence of substantial evidence by simply pointing out that there is contrary evidence on record, direct or circumstantial. The Court does not substitute its own judgment for that of the tribunal in determining where the weight of evidence lies or what evidence is credible.[17]