This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2008-06-26 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| While the absence of a written contract does not automatically confer regular status, it has been construed by this Court as a red flag in cases involving the question of whether the workers concerned are regular or project employees. In Grandspan Development Corporation v. Bernardo [31] and Audion Electric Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission ,[32] this Court took note of the fact that the employer was unable to present employment contracts signed by the workers, which stated the duration of the project. In another case, Raycor v. Aircontrol Systems, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, [33] this Court refused to give any weight to the employment contracts offered by the employers as evidence, which contained the signature of the president and general manager, but not the signatures of the employees. In cases where this Court ruled that construction workers repeatedly rehired retained their status as project employees, the employers were able to produce employment contracts clearly stipulating that the workers' employment was coterminous with the project to support their claims that the employees were notified of the scope and duration of the project. [34] | |||||
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2003-09-12 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| We note that in its Decision dated June 16, 1998, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter's dismissal of the case and directed the payment of backwages, to be reckoned from the time of the petitioners' dismissal up to the time of their actual reinstatement.[28] If the private respondent believed the aforesaid computation to be erroneous in the light of the factual circumstances obtaining between the parties, it should have assigned the same as an error when it filed its petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 114290 assailing the said NLRC judgment. The private respondent did not do so. Although the private respondent filed a motion for clarification of the decision of this Court in the said case, the said motion was, however, denied by this Court in its Resolution dated October 15, 1997[29] considering that entry of judgment had already been made. | |||||