This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2009-06-05 |
BRION, J. |
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| We have no doubt that the elements of taking of personal property which belongs to another person without his consent have been established in the case, while the intent to gain is presumed from unlawful taking and can only be negated by special circumstances showing a different intent on the part of the perpetrator.[34] We previously held that intent to gain is a mental state whose existence is demonstrated by a person's overt acts.[35] Briones' overt acts in this case were in grabbing S/G Molina's firearm and running away with it. We stress that these pieces of evidence, showing his unlawful taking of the firearm and running away with it immediately after, were not refuted by the defense's evidence before the RTC. There is also evidence, as testified to by S/G Gual, that the firearm was not found nor retrieved after this unlawful taking. Further, these pieces of evidence defeat Briones' belated contention that he threw away the firearm immediately after he got hold of it. | |||||
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2008-07-04 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in themselves called acts mala in se; and acts which would not be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them, called acts mala prohibita. This distinction is important with reference to the intent with which a wrongful act is done. The rule on the subject is that in acts mala in se, the intent governs; but in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated?[63] When an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial.[64] | |||||
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2006-02-16 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| More importantly, COMELEC Resolution No. 2323 is a special law and a violation of which is in the nature of a mala prohibita crime. As such, regardless of petitioner's intent, mere carrying of the gun without the necessary permit is already a violation of the COMELEC resolution. It is hornbook doctrine that in mala prohibita crimes, the only inquiry is whether the law has been violated.[17] When the act is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial. We held in United States v. Go Chico[18] that:x x x [I]t is not necessary that the appellant should have acted with criminal intent. In many crimes, made such by statutory enactment, the intention of the person who commits the crime is entirely immaterial. This is necessarily so. If it were not, the statute as a deterrent influence would be substantially worthless. It would be impossible of execution. In many cases, the act complained of is itself that which produces the pernicious effect the statute seeks to avoid. In those cases the pernicious effect is produced with precisely the same force and result whether the intention of the person performing the act is good or bad. | |||||