This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2015-10-21 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| Accordingly, the commission of any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 49 without the copyright owner's consent constituted actionable copyright infringement. In Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[12] the Court has emphatically declared:Infringement of a copyright is a trespass on a private domain owned and occupied by the owner of the copyright, and, therefore, protected by law, and infringement of copyright, or piracy, which is a synonymous term in this connection, consists in the doing by any person, without the consent of the owner of the copyright, of anything the sole right to do which is conferred by statute on the owner of the copyright. | |||||
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2006-11-30 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[16] teaches:It is consequently clear that a judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law as of the date that law was originally passed, subject only to the qualification that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, and more so when there is a reversal thereof, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted in good faith. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) | |||||
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2005-06-29 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| The petitioner adds that a finding of probable cause to justify the issuance of a search warrant means merely a reasonable suspicion of the commission of the offense. It is not equivalent to absolute certainty or a finding of actual and positive cause.[18] He assists that the determination of probable cause does not concern the issue of whether or not the alleged work is copyrightable. He maintains that to justify a finding of probable cause in the issuance of a search warrant, it is enough that there exists a reasonable suspicion of the commission of the offense. | |||||
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2005-04-29 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Before anything else, it should be clarified that "the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue"[23] and "the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action"[24] are two different grounds for a motion to dismiss or are two different affirmative defenses. Failure to distinguish between "the lack of legal capacity to sue" from "the lack of personality to sue" is a fairly common mistake. The difference between the two is explained by this Court in Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:[25] Among the grounds for a motion to dismiss under the Rules of Court are lack of legal capacity to sue and that the complaint states no cause of action. Lack of legal capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is not in the exercise of his civil rights, or does not have the necessary qualification to appear in the case, or does not have the character or representation he claims. On the other hand, a case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action. The term "lack of capacity to sue" should not be confused with the term "lack of personality to sue." While the former refers to a plaintiff's general disability to sue, such as on account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality or any other general disqualifications of a party, the latter refers to the fact that the plaintiff is not the real party- in-interest. Correspondingly, the first can be a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the ground of lack of legal capacity to sue; whereas the second can be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the fact that the complaint, on the face thereof, evidently states no cause of action. In the present case, this Court may assume that the respondent is raising the affirmative defense that the Complaint filed by the petitioners before the trial court stated no cause of action because the petitioners lacked the personality to sue, not being the real party-in-interest. It is the respondent's contention that only the State can file an action for annulment of his certificates of title, since such an action will result in the reversion of the ownership of the Subject Property to the State. | |||||