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CARMELA CUIZON* Y MONTALBAN v. CA AND SPS. GERARDO AND MARIA PARAY

This case has been cited 6 times or more.

	GR No. 179792 2010-03-05	LNS INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER SERVICES v. ARMANDO C. PADUA DEL CASTILLO, J.
There is likewise no basis for the POEA, DOLE, and the CA's conclusion that it was petitioner that endorsed respondent's documents to Sharikat. Other than respondent's self-serving claim, there is no proof whatsoever that petitioner endorsed respondent's application papers to Sharikat. Bare allegations which are not supported by any evidence, documentary or otherwise, sufficient to support a claim, fall short to satisfy the degree of proof needed.[19] On the other hand, petitioner's denial of these allegations was corroborated by the withdrawal form proffered as evidence, the existence and due execution of which were not disputed by respondent. In addition, if respondent's allegations were to be believed, we find it rather odd that LNS would require him to fill up the withdrawal form if the intention of LNS was to endorse the papers to Sharikat. If LNS allowed respondent to withdraw all his documents, then there is nothing left for LNS to endorse to Sharikat.
	GR No. 156132 2006-10-16	CITIBANK v. MODESTA R. SABENIANO CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Accordingly, this Court gives the Deeds of Assignment grave importance in establishing the authority given by the respondent to petitioner Citibank to use as security for her loans her money her market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance, represented by PNs No. 8167 and 8169, later to be rolled-over as PNs No. 20138 and 20139. These Deeds of Assignment constitute the law between the parties, and the obligations arising therefrom shall have the force of law between the parties and should be complied with in good faith.[129] Standard clauses in all of the Deeds provide that -
	GR NO. 152347 2006-06-21	UNION BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. SPS. ALFREDO ONG AND SUSANA ONG AND JACKSON LEE GARCIA, J.
For a contract to be rescinded for being in fraud of creditors, both contracting parties must be shown to have acted maliciously so as to prejudice the creditors who were prevented from collecting their claims.[16] Again, in this case, there is no evidence tending to prove that the spouses Ong and Lee were conniving cheats. In fact, the petitioner did not even attempt to prove the existence of personal closeness or business and professional interdependence between the spouses Ong and Lee as to cast doubt on their true intent in executing the contract of sale. With the view we take of the evidence on record, their relationship vis-à-vis the subject Greenhills property was no more than one between vendor and vendee dealing with each other for the first time. Any insinuation that the two colluded to gyp petitioner bank is to read in a relationship something which, from all indications, appears to be purely business.
	GR NO. 133168 2006-03-28	REPUBLIC v. BENJAMIN GUERRERO GARCIA, J.
Well-settled is the rule that the party alleging fraud or mistake in a transaction bears the burden of proof.[17] The circumstances evidencing fraud are as varied as the people who perpetrate it in each case. It may assume different shapes and forms; it may be committed in as many different ways.[18] Thus, the law requires that fraud be established, not just by preponderance of evidence, but by clear and convincing evidence.[19]
	GR No. 123586 2004-08-12	SPS. BEDER MORANDARTE AND MARINA FEBRERA v. CA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
The State, as the party alleging that fraud and misrepresentation attended the application for free patent, bears the burden of proof. The circumstances evidencing fraud and misrepresentation are as varied as the people who perpetrate it in each case. It assumes different shapes and forms and may be committed in as many different ways.[32] Therefore, fraud and misrepresentation are never presumed but must be proved by clear and convincing evidence;[33] mere preponderance of evidence not even being adequate.[34]
	GR No. 147349 2004-02-13	MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY v. ALA INDUSTRIES CORPORATION PANGANIBAN, J.
The lower court was without power to relieve petitioner from an obligation it had voluntarily assumed, simply because the Agreement later turned out to be unwise, disastrous or foolish.[46] It had no authority to impose upon the parties a judgment different from or against the terms and conditions of their Compromise Agreement.[47] It could not alter a contract by construction or make a new one for the parties; "its duty is confined to the interpretation of the one which they have made for themselves without regard to its wisdom or folly as the court cannot supply material stipulations or read into the contract words which it does not contain."[48] It could not even set aside its judgment without declaring in an incidental hearing that the Agreement was vitiated by any of the grounds enumerated in Article 2038 of the Civil Code.[49] Above all, neither the Agreement nor the court's approval of it was ever questioned or assailed by the parties.