This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2015-01-14 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are accorded the highest degree of respect and are considered conclusive between the parties.[15] A review of such findings by this Court is not warranted except upon a showing of highly meritorious circumstances, such as: (1) when the findings of a trial court are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when a lower court's inference from its factual findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; (5) when there is a misappreciation of facts; (6) when the findings of fact are conclusions without mention of the specific evidence on which they are based, are premised on the absence of evidence, or are contradicted by evidence on record.[16] None of these exceptions obtains in this instance. There is no reason to depart from the separate factual findings of the three (3) lower courts on the validity of Rivera's signature reflected in the Promissory Note. | |||||
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2012-09-05 |
REYES, J. |
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| In affirming the dismissal of petitioners' case for their disregard of the rules on pre-trial, we emphasize this Court's ruling in Durban Apartments Corporation v. Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation[29] on the importance and the nature of a pre-trial, to wit: Everyone knows that a pre-trial in civil actions is mandatory, and has been so since January 1, 1964. Yet to this day its place in the scheme of things is not fully appreciated, and it receives but perfunctory treatment in many courts. Some courts consider it a mere technicality, serving no useful purpose save perhaps, occasionally to furnish ground for non- suiting the plaintiff, or declaring a defendant in default, or, wistfully, to bring about a compromise. The pre-trial is not thus put to full use. Hence, it has failed in the main to accomplish the chief objective for it: the simplification, abbreviation and expedition of the trial, if not indeed its dispensation. This is a great pity, because the objective is attainable, and with not much difficulty, if the device were more intelligently and extensively handled. | |||||
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2012-04-25 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| Although it is a sound policy not to set a premium on the right to litigate,[34] we consider the grant to Paras and Inland of reasonable attorney's fees warranted. Their entitlement to attorney's fees was by virtue of their having been compelled to litigate or to incur expenses to protect their interests,[35] as well as by virtue of the Court now further deeming attorney's fees to be just and equitable.[36] | |||||