Lawyerly

GR No. 205357

2014-09-02

PERALTA, J.

Once again the Court is asked to draw a carefully drawn balance in the incessant conflicts between rights and regulations, liberties and limitations, and competing demands of the different segments of society. Here, we are confronted with the need to strike a workable and viable equilibrium between a constitutional mandate to maintain free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, together with the aim of ensuring equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates,[2] on one hand, and the imperatives of a republican and democratic state,[3] together with its guaranteed rights of suffrage,[4] freedom of speech and of the press,[5] and the people's right to information,[6] on the other.

GR No. 204819

2014-04-08

JAMES M. IMBONG v. PAQUITO N. OCHOA

MENDOZA, J.

In Iglesia Ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals,[284] this court reiterated the rule that: x x x the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty-bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare. A laissez faire policy on the exercise of religion can be seductive to the liberal mind but history counsels the Court against its blind adoption as religion is and continues to be a volatile area of concern in our country today. Across the sea and in our shore, the bloodiest and bitterest wars fought by men were caused by irreconcilable religious differences.[285]

GR No. 203335

2014-02-18

JOSE JESUS M. DISINI v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

ABAD, J.

Informational privacy has two aspects: the right not to have private information disclosed, and the right to live freely without surveillance and intrusion.[91] In determining whether or not a matter is entitled to the right to privacy, this Court has laid down a two-fold test. The first is a subjective test, where one claiming the right must have an actual or legitimate expectation of privacy over a certain matter. The second is an objective test, where his or her expectation of privacy must be one society is prepared to accept as objectively reasonable.[92]

GR No. 164785

2010-03-15

ELISEO F. SORIANO v. MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA

VELASCO JR., J.

Petitioner would next have the Court adopt a hands-off approach to the conflict between him and the Iglesia Ni Cristo. In support of his urging, he cites Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals.[7]

GR No. 164785

2009-04-29

ELISEO F. SORIANO v. MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA

VELASCO JR., J.

"The use of the mails by private persons is in the nature of a privilege which can be regulated in order to avoid its abuse. Persons possess no absolute right to put into the mail anything they please, regardless of its character."[63]

GR No. 168338

2008-02-15

FRANCISCO CHAVEZ v. RAUL M. GONZALES

PUNO, C.J.

Given that deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is the hostility against all prior restraints on speech, and any act that restrains speech is presumed invalid,[58] and "any act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows,"[59] it is important to stress not all prior restraints on speech are invalid. Certain previous restraints may be permitted by the Constitution, but determined only upon a careful evaluation of the challenged act as against the appropriate test by which it should be measured against.

GR No. 168338

2008-02-15

FRANCISCO CHAVEZ v. RAUL M. GONZALES

PUNO, C.J.

On the other hand, a governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny in light of its inherent and invasive impact. Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster,[65] with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.

GR No. 168338

2008-02-15

FRANCISCO CHAVEZ v. RAUL M. GONZALES

PUNO, C.J.

Unless the government can overthrow this presumption, the content-based restraint will be struck down.[66]

GR No. 168338

2008-02-15

FRANCISCO CHAVEZ v. RAUL M. GONZALES

PUNO, C.J.

With respect to content-based restrictions, the government must also show the type of harm the speech sought to be restrained would bring about especially the gravity and the imminence of the threatened harm otherwise the prior restraint will be invalid. Prior restraint on speech based on its content cannot be justified by hypothetical fears, "but only by showing a substantive and imminent evil that has taken the life of a reality already on ground."[67] As formulated, "the question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree."[68]

GR No. 168338

2008-02-15

FRANCISCO CHAVEZ v. RAUL M. GONZALES

PUNO, C.J.

Thus, when the prior restraint partakes of a content-neutral regulation, it is subjected to an intermediate review. A content-based regulation,[73] however, bears a heavy presumption of invalidity and is measured against the clear and present danger rule. The latter will pass constitutional muster only if justified by a compelling reason, and the restrictions imposed are neither overbroad nor vague.[74]

GR No. 168338

2008-02-15

FRANCISCO CHAVEZ v. RAUL M. GONZALES

PUNO, C.J.

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated;[48] (b) the balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of type of situation;[49] and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high."[50]

GR NO. 155282

2005-01-17

MOVIE v. ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

Petitioner MTRCB through the Solicitor General, contends inter alia: first, all television programs, including "public affairs programs, news documentaries, or socio-political editorials," are subject to petitioner's power of review under Section 3 (b) of P.D. No. 1986 and pursuant to this Court's ruling in Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Court of Appeals;[25] second, television programs are more accessible to the public than newspapers, thus, the liberal regulation of the latter cannot apply to the former; third, petitioner's power to review television programs under Section 3(b) of P. D. No. 1986 does not amount to "prior restraint;" and fourth, Section 3(b) of P. D. No. 1986 does not violate respondents' constitutional freedom of expression and of the press.

	GR No. 205357 2014-09-02	GMA NETWORK v. COMELEC PERALTA, J.
Once again the Court is asked to draw a carefully drawn balance in the incessant conflicts between rights and regulations, liberties and limitations, and competing demands of the different segments of society. Here, we are confronted with the need to strike a workable and viable equilibrium between a constitutional mandate to maintain free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, together with the aim of ensuring equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates,[2] on one hand, and the imperatives of a republican and democratic state,[3] together with its guaranteed rights of suffrage,[4] freedom of speech and of the press,[5] and the people's right to information,[6] on the other.
	GR No. 204819 2014-04-08	JAMES M. IMBONG v. PAQUITO N. OCHOA MENDOZA, J.
In Iglesia Ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals,[284] this court reiterated the rule that: x x x the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty-bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare. A laissez faire policy on the exercise of religion can be seductive to the liberal mind but history counsels the Court against its blind adoption as religion is and continues to be a volatile area of concern in our country today. Across the sea and in our shore, the bloodiest and bitterest wars fought by men were caused by irreconcilable religious differences.[285]
	GR No. 203335 2014-02-18	JOSE JESUS M. DISINI v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE ABAD, J.
Informational privacy has two aspects: the right not to have private information disclosed, and the right to live freely without surveillance and intrusion.[91] In determining whether or not a matter is entitled to the right to privacy, this Court has laid down a two-fold test. The first is a subjective test, where one claiming the right must have an actual or legitimate expectation of privacy over a certain matter. The second is an objective test, where his or her expectation of privacy must be one society is prepared to accept as objectively reasonable.[92]
	GR No. 164785 2010-03-15	ELISEO F. SORIANO v. MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA VELASCO JR., J.
Petitioner would next have the Court adopt a hands-off approach to the conflict between him and the Iglesia Ni Cristo. In support of his urging, he cites Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals.[7]
	GR No. 164785 2009-04-29	ELISEO F. SORIANO v. MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA VELASCO JR., J.
"The use of the mails by private persons is in the nature of a privilege which can be regulated in order to avoid its abuse. Persons possess no absolute right to put into the mail anything they please, regardless of its character."[63]
	GR No. 168338 2008-02-15	FRANCISCO CHAVEZ v. RAUL M. GONZALES PUNO, C.J.
Given that deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is the hostility against all prior restraints on speech, and any act that restrains speech is presumed invalid,[58] and "any act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows,"[59] it is important to stress not all prior restraints on speech are invalid. Certain previous restraints may be permitted by the Constitution, but determined only upon a careful evaluation of the challenged act as against the appropriate test by which it should be measured against.
	GR No. 168338 2008-02-15	FRANCISCO CHAVEZ v. RAUL M. GONZALES PUNO, C.J.
On the other hand, a governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny in light of its inherent and invasive impact. Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster,[65] with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.
	GR No. 168338 2008-02-15	FRANCISCO CHAVEZ v. RAUL M. GONZALES PUNO, C.J.
Unless the government can overthrow this presumption, the content-based restraint will be struck down.[66]
	GR No. 168338 2008-02-15	FRANCISCO CHAVEZ v. RAUL M. GONZALES PUNO, C.J.
With respect to content-based restrictions, the government must also show the type of harm the speech sought to be restrained would bring about especially the gravity and the imminence of the threatened harm otherwise the prior restraint will be invalid. Prior restraint on speech based on its content cannot be justified by hypothetical fears, "but only by showing a substantive and imminent evil that has taken the life of a reality already on ground."[67] As formulated, "the question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree."[68]
	GR No. 168338 2008-02-15	FRANCISCO CHAVEZ v. RAUL M. GONZALES PUNO, C.J.
Thus, when the prior restraint partakes of a content-neutral regulation, it is subjected to an intermediate review. A content-based regulation,[73] however, bears a heavy presumption of invalidity and is measured against the clear and present danger rule. The latter will pass constitutional muster only if justified by a compelling reason, and the restrictions imposed are neither overbroad nor vague.[74]
	GR No. 168338 2008-02-15	FRANCISCO CHAVEZ v. RAUL M. GONZALES PUNO, C.J.
Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated;[48] (b) the balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of type of situation;[49] and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high."[50]
	GR NO. 155282 2005-01-17	MOVIE v. ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
Petitioner MTRCB through the Solicitor General, contends inter alia: first, all television programs, including "public affairs programs, news documentaries, or socio-political editorials," are subject to petitioner's power of review under Section 3 (b) of P.D. No. 1986 and pursuant to this Court's ruling in Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Court of Appeals;[25] second, television programs are more accessible to the public than newspapers, thus, the liberal regulation of the latter cannot apply to the former; third, petitioner's power to review television programs under Section 3(b) of P. D. No. 1986 does not amount to "prior restraint;" and fourth, Section 3(b) of P. D. No. 1986 does not violate respondents' constitutional freedom of expression and of the press.

IGLESIA NI CRISTO v. CA