This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2008-12-24 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| It is a well-settled rule that a client is bound by his counsel's conduct, negligence, and mistakes in handling the case; the client cannot be heard to complain that the result might have been different had his lawyer proceeded differently.[29] | |||||
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2008-11-27 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| It is a well-settled rule that a client is bound by his counsel's conduct, negligence, and mistakes in handling the case, and the client cannot be heard to complain that the result might have been different had his lawyer proceeded differently.[31] The only exceptions to the general rule -- that a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel -- which this Court finds acceptable are when the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or when the application of the rule results in the outright deprivation of one's property through a technicality.[32] These exceptions are not attendant in this case. | |||||
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2005-10-19 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| The petitioner's attempt to shift the blame to his counsel is futile. The rule in this jurisdiction is that the client is bound by the negligence or failings of his counsel.[16] A client is bound by the action of his counsel in the conduct of a case and cannot be heard to complain that the result might have been different had such counsel proceeded differently.[17] If the lawyer's mistake and negligence were to be admitted as reasons for reopening cases, there would never be an end to a suit so long as new counsel could be employed who could allege and show that prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent or experienced or learned.[18] While this rule admits of exceptions, the petitioner's sweeping justification failed to make out a case of excusable negligence for his counsel's non-appearance at the January 29, 1999 hearing. The Court notes further that the petitioner could have dispensed with the services of his counsel de parte and engaged the services of another or new counsel to represent him. He did not. | |||||
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2005-03-04 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| We note that petitioner was present during the hearing. If he believed that his counsel de parte was not competent, he could have secured the services of a new counsel. He did not. Having decided to retain the services of his counsel during the entire proceedings, petitioner must be deemed bound by any mistake committed by him. For if an accused feels that his counsel is inept, he should take action by discharging him earlier, instead of waiting until an adverse decision is rendered and thereupon blame his counsel for incompetence.[12] | |||||
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2004-09-09 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| While the application of this general rule certainly depends upon the surrounding circumstances of a given case,[12] there are exceptions recognized by this Court: "(1) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law;[13] (2) when its application will result in outright deprivation of the client's liberty or property;[14] or (3) where the interests of justice[15] so require."[16] Woefully none of these exceptions apply herein. Thus, the Court cannot "step in and accord relief"[17] to petitioner, even if it may have suffered[18] by reason of its own arrant fatuity. | |||||
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2001-08-15 |
PER CURIAM |
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| An award in the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages to each of the complainants is proper, consistent with the current case law.[68] However, no award of exemplary damages can be made considering the absence of aggravating circumstances.[69] Under Art. 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages in criminal offenses may be made only when the crime is committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. The award of actual damages in this case should likewise be disallowed. Actual damages must be proved with certainty and cannot be presumed. No evidence to sustain this award has been presented in this case. | |||||