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PEOPLE v. DANIELQUIJADA Y CIRCULADO

This case has been cited 10 times or more.

	GR No. 180016 2014-04-29	LITO CORPUZ v. PEOPLE PERALTA, J.
Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such application or construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or under the guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which is repugnant to its terms.[38] The Court should apply the law in a manner that would give effect to their letter and spirit, especially when the law is clear as to its intent and purpose. Succinctly put, the Court should shy away from encroaching upon the primary function of a co-equal branch of the Government; otherwise, this would lead to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation of powers by means of judicial legislation.
	GR No. 151258 2012-02-01	ARTEMIO VILLAREAL v. PEOPLE SERENO, J.
The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital ingredient in establishing the commission of the intentional felony of homicide.[129] Being mala in se, the felony of homicide requires the existence of malice or dolo[130] immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries.[131] Intent to kill - or animus interficendi - cannot and should not be inferred, unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent.[132] Furthermore, the victim's death must not have been the product of accident, natural cause, or suicide.[133] If death resulted from an act executed without malice or criminal intent - but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence - the act must be qualified as reckless or simple negligence or imprudence resulting in homicide.[134]
	GR No. 172370 2008-10-06	PEOPLE v. FLORENDA CASTRO REYES, R.T., J.
In People v. Quijada,[36] the Court, speaking through then Chief Justice Hilario Davide, aptly held:x x x Settled is the rule that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect. For, the trial court has the advantage of observing the witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood, such as the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply; or the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or the flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien. x x x[37]
	GR No. 160811 2008-04-18	RICKY BASTIAN v. CA REYES, R.T., J.
Former Chief Justice Hilario Davide's explanation in People v. Quijada[19] is likewise illuminating:Settled is the rule that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect. For, the trial court has the advantage of observing the witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood, such as the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply; or the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or the flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien.[20]
	GR NO. 173793 2007-12-04	vs. v. CONRADO M. GLINO REYES, R.T., J.
As this Court has reiterated often enough, the matter of assigning values to the testimonies of witnesses is best left to the discretion of the trial judge.[40] In People v. Quijada,[41] the Court aptly held:Settled is the rule that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect. For, the trial court has the advantage of observing the witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood, such as the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply; or the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or the flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien.
	GR NO. 170193 2007-04-04	PEOPLE v. ARIEL PAOYO CARPIO MORALES, J.
It is settled that each party has the prerogative to determine which witnesses to present and to dispense with testimony which is merely corroborative,[34] in which case the presumption in Section 3(e), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced does not apply.[35] That Malubay's sworn statement substantially jibed with the gist and import of Paz's testimony in open court that Paoyo and John Doe went to her store before proceeding to the residence of the victim is not disputed.
	GR No. 151005 2004-06-08	PEOPLE v. PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC OF MUNTINLUPA CITY PANGANIBAN, J.
Under previous rulings of this Court, "one who kills another with the use of an unlicensed firearm commits two separate offenses of (1) x x x murder under the [Revised Penal Code], and (2) aggravated illegal possession of firearm under the [second] paragraph of Section 1 of [PD] 1866 x x x."[35] In the present case, the filing of an Information for murder, after conviction for violation of Section 1 of PD 1866 -- a special law -- was in order. There was no violation of the constitutional rule proscribing double jeopardy.[36]
	GR No. 119595 2000-01-25	PEOPLE v. JOVITO BARONA YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
The bare denials and alibi interposed by accused-appellants when juxtaposed with the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses is not worthy of credence. Recognized as inherently weak defenses,[17] which is the usual refuge of scoundrels, alibi and denial must be buttressed by other convincing evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility.[18] It all the more fails where the assailants were positively identified by credible witness,[19] against whom no ulterior motive can be attributed, as in this case. Records, show that the place where accused-appellants claimed they were at the time of the incident ranges from a distance of thirty (30) meters to about a kilometer away from the place of the crime. Other than these unsubstantiated, self-serving and negative statements[20] of their alleged respective locations, no other evidence was presented to show that it was impossible for them to physically traverse the two places within a short span of time as to preclude their presence in the locus criminis. Such self-serving statements deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of witnesses who testified on positive points.[21] A distance of about five kilometers between the scene of the crime and the whereabouts of the accused has been considered as not so far as to negate physical presence at the scene of the crime.[22] With more reason then, the fact that a mere neighbor whose house is about fifty (50) meters from the locus criminis which obviously can be negotiated by mere walking negates the posture of alibi. As consistently held by the court, for alibi to prosper, there must be potent proof that the accused could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or its vicinity at the time of its commission.[23] As mentioned earlier, no such, convincing proof was presented to substantiate their proffered defenses.