This case has been cited 10 times or more.
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2015-08-24 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| The doctrine, however, is not without exceptions. Among the exceptions are: (1) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (2) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (3) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (4) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (5) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (6) where judicial intervention is urgent; (7) where the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (8) where the controverted acts violate due process; (9) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies had been rendered moot; (10) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (11) where strong public interest is involved; and (12) in quo warranto proceedings.[10] | |||||
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2015-06-23 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| The issue on whether non-compliance with the clearance requirement with the HLURB would result to the nullification of the entire mortgage contract or only a part of it is purely legal which will have to be decided ultimately by a regular court of law. It does not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and not as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts. Said question at best could be resolved only tentatively by the administrative authorities. The final decision on the matter rests not with them but with the courts of justice. Exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply, because nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be done. The issue does not require technical knowledge and experience, but one that would involve the interpretation and application of law.[14] There is, thus, no need to exhaust administrative remedies, under the premises. | |||||
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2015-04-24 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| The doctrine, however, is not without exceptions. Among the exceptions are: (1) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (2) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (3) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (4) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (5) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (6) where judicial intervention is urgent; (7) where the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (8) where the controverted acts violate due process; (9) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies had been rendered moot; (10) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (11) where strong public interest is involved; and (12) in quo warranto proceedings.[10] | |||||
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2014-01-22 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| It is true that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an ironclad rule, but recognizes exceptions, specifically: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) where the application of the doctrines may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controversial acts violate due process; (i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) where strong public interest is involved; and (l) in quo warranto proceedings.[44] | |||||
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2013-04-11 |
SERENO, C.J. |
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| Fourth, allegations of partiality and bias are questions of fact already before the COA. As the Court has clarified, "[t]here is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and not as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts."[52] | |||||
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2012-04-25 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| True, the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies are subject to certain exceptions, to wit: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) where the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) where strong public interest is involved; and (l) in quo warranto proceedings.[18] | |||||
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2012-04-25 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence.[42] It has been held, however, that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction are not ironclad rules. In the case of Republic of the Philippines v. Lacap,[43] the Court enumerated the numerous exceptions to these rules, namely: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) where the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) where strong public interest is involved; and (l) in quo warranto proceedings.[44] [Underscoring supplied] | |||||
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2012-04-25 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| The challenged decision of the HLURB is patently illegal having been rendered in excess of jurisdiction, if not with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Also, the issue on jurisdiction is purely legal which will have to be decided ultimately by a regular court of law. As the Court wrote in Vigilar v. Aquino:[45] | |||||
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2011-04-06 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| In July 1990, PNR and Kanlaon entered into contracts for the repair of three PNR station buildings and passenger shelters, namely: 1) College Station for P2,316,568.41;[6] 2) Biñan Station for P2,547,978.63;[7] and 3) Buendia Station for P1,820,534.40.[8] The total cost of the three projects was P6,685,081.44. By November 1990, Kanlaon alleged that it had already completed the three projects.[9] | |||||