This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2015-10-14 |
BRION, J. |
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| However, where the issue of ownership is raised by any of the parties to an ejectment case, the courts may provisionally pass upon the same in order to determine who has the better right to possess the property. We stress that the adjudication of the issue of ownership is merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property.[36] | |||||
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2013-12-11 |
SERENO, C.J. |
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| Dionisio was then well aware that this temporary arrangement may be terminated at any time. Respondents cannot now refuse to vacate the property or eventually demand reimbursement of necessary and useful expenses under Articles 448 and 546 of the New Civil Code, because the provisions apply only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof.[52] Persons who occupy land by virtue of tolerance of the owners are not possessors in good faith.[53] Thus, the directive of the RTC for respondents to demolish their residential house on Lot No. 5053-H was also proper. | |||||
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2013-04-17 |
SERENO, C.J. |
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| The sole issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties. Where the issue of ownership is raised by any of the parties, the courts may pass upon the same in order to determine who has the right to possess the property. The adjudication is, however, merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property. Since the issue of ownership was raised in the unlawful detainer case, its resolution boils down to which of the parties' respective evidence deserves more weight.[24] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted.) | |||||
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2012-06-20 |
REYES, J. |
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| The point of inquiry is whether the respondents have the right to evict the petitioners from the subject property and this should be resolved in the respondents' favor. Between the petitioners' unsubstantiated self-serving claim that their father inherited the contested portion of Lot No. 3517 and the respondents' Torrens title, the latter must prevail. The respondents' title over such area is evidence of their ownership thereof. That a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein and that a person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to the possession thereof[16] are fundamental principles observed in this jurisdiction. Alternatively put, the respondents' title and that of their predecessors-in-interest give rise to the reasonable presumption that the petitioners have no right over the subject area and that their stay therein was merely tolerated. The petitioners failed to overcome this presumption, being inadequately armed by a narration that yearns for proof and corroboration. The petitioners harped that the subject area was their father's share in his parents' estate but the absence of any evidence that such property was indeed adjudicated to their father impresses that their claim of ownership is nothing but a mere afterthought. In fact, Lot No. 3517 was already registered in Maria's name when Jose Sr. built the house where the petitioners are now presently residing. It is rather specious that Jose Sr. chose inaction despite Maria's failure to cause the registration of the subject area in his name and would be contented with a bungalow that is erected on a property that is supposedly his but registered in another's name. That there is allegedly an unwritten agreement between Maria and Virginia that Jose Sr.'s and the petitioners' possession of the subject area would remain undisturbed was never proven, hence, cannot be the basis for their claim of ownership. Rather than proving that Jose Sr. and the petitioners have a right over the disputed portion of Lot No. 3517, their possession uncoupled with affirmative action to question the titles of Maria and the respondents show that the latter merely tolerated their stay. | |||||
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2012-02-08 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| The long inaction of Duran, et al. to assert their rights over the subject case should be brought to bear against them. Thus, We held in Esmaquel v. Coprada:[58] | |||||
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2012-01-18 |
SERENO, J. |
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| It is settled in jurisprudence that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be the subject of collateral attack.[27] Such attack must be direct and not by a collateral proceeding.[28] It is a well-established doctrine that the title represented by the certificate cannot be changed, altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding.[29] Considering that this is an unlawful detainer case wherein the sole issue to be decided is possession de facto rather than possession de jure, a collateral attack by herein respondents on petitioner's title is proscribed. | |||||
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2011-07-20 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Ejectment cases - forcible entry and unlawful detainer - are summary proceedings designed to provide expeditious means to protect actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved. The only question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even matter if a party's title to the property is questionable. [13] In an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for resolution is physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties. Where the issue of ownership is raised by any of the parties, the courts may pass upon the same in order to determine who has the right to possess the property. The adjudication is, however, merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property. [14] | |||||