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GR No. 182157

2015-08-17

ANLUD METAL RECYCLING CORPORATION v. JOAQUIN ANG

SERENO, C.J.

Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court.[49] We emphasize that the viewpoint we follow must conform to the nature of reviewing a CA decision, which was rendered under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

GR No. 192898

2011-01-31

SPS. ALEXANDER TRINIDAD AND CECILIA TRINIDAD v. VICTOR ANG

BRION, J.

In addition, the cases cited by the petitioners - Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. How,[11] Roberts, Jr. v. CA,[12] and Dimatulac v. Villon[13] - were all decided prior to the amendment to Section 11 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which took effect on December 1, 2000. At the time these cases were decided, there was no 60-day limit on the suspension of arraignment.

GR No. 188197

2010-08-03

LEONARDO U. FLORES v. RAUL S. GONZALEZ

NACHURA, J.

Lim filed a motion for reconsideration of the May 31, 2006 Resolution of the Secretary of Justice. There was nothing procedurally infirm in this course of action inasmuch as there is nothing in Crespo that bars the Secretary of Justice from reviewing resolutions of his subordinates in an appeal or petition for review in criminal cases. The Secretary of Justice was merely advised in Crespo that, as far as practicable, he should not take cognizance of an appeal when the complaint or information is already filed in court.[42]

GR No. 184337

2009-08-07

HEIRS OF FEDERICO C. DELGADO v. LUISITO Q. GONZALEZ

CARPIO, J.

Sworn Statement ("Sinumpaang Salaysay") of Pesico dated 11 March 2007;[7]

GR No. 171188

2009-06-19

PEOPLE v. JESSIE B. CASTILLO

QUISUMBING, J.

There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court.[22] Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.[23]

GR No. 152889

2009-06-05

ENRIQUE V. VIUDEZ II v. CA

PERALTA, J.

Petitioner has put emphasis on his argument that the suspension of the proceedings in court, including the suspension of the implementation of a warrant of arrest pending a resolution of an appeal by the Secretary of Justice, is in consonance with jurisprudence laid down by this Court in Marcelo v. Court of Appeals, [34] Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, [35] Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,[36] Dimatulac v. Villon,[37] and Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. How.[38]

GR No. 164170

2009-04-16

MACA-ANGCOS ALAWIYA Y ABDUL v. CA

CARPIO, J.

Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Its duty in an appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the executive or judicial determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction.[32] However, in the following exceptional cases, this Court may ultimately resolve the existence or non-existence of probable cause by examining the records of the preliminary investigation.[33]

AM No. RTJ-07-2058

2009-04-07

DOLORES S. BAGO v. JUDGE ERNESTO P. PAGAYATAN

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

Once a motion to dismiss or withdraw the information is filed, the trial judge may grant or deny it, not out of subservience to the Secretary of Justice, but in faithful exercise of judicial prerogative.[18] Indeed, it bears stressing that the trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice since it is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case and it may either agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice would be an abdication of the trial court's duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case.[19]

GR NO. 168617

2007-02-19

BERNADETTE L. ADASA v. CECILLE S. ABALOS

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation. (Emphasis supplied.) To bolster her position, petitioner cites Roberts v. Court of Appeals,[6] which stated:There is nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul which bars the DOJ from taking cognizance of an appeal, by way of a petition for review, by an accused in a criminal case from an unfavorable ruling of the investigating prosecutor. It merely advised the DOJ to, "as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.) Petitioner likewise invokes Marcelo v. Court of Appeals[7] where this Court declared:

GR NO. 166888

2007-01-31

FIRST WOMEN’S CREDIT CORPORATION v. ROMMEL O. BAYBAY

CARPIO MORALES, J.

It is settled that the determination of whether probable cause exists to warrant the prosecution in court of an accused should be consigned and entrusted to the Department of Justice, as reviewer of the findings of public prosecutors.[26] The court's duty in an appropriate case is confined to a determination of whether the assailed executive or judicial determination of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction. This is consistent with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final,[27] albeit in extreme cases, exceptional circumstances have been recognized.[28] The rule is also consistent with this Court's policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and of leaving to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the exercise of determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of an information against a supposed offender.[29]

GR NO. 164268

2005-06-28

ARTEMIO T. TORRES v. SPS. DRS. EDGARDO AGUINALDO AND NELIA T. TORRES-AGUINALDO

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

The Secretary of Justice did not whimsically and capriciously exercise his discretion. His findings was grounded on sound statutory and factual basis. Chief Justice Andres Narvasa in his separate opinion in Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals[37] declared that the determination of probable cause to warrant the prosecution in court should be consigned and entrusted to the Department of Justice, as reviewer of the findings of the public prosecutors. To do otherwise is to usurp a duty that exclusively pertains to an executive official.

GR NO. 139912

2005-03-31

YUPANGCO COTTON MILLS v. RODRIGO SY MENDOZA

TINGA, J.

Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Its duty in an appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the determination of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction. This is consistent with the rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final.[75]

GR NO. 156747

2005-02-23

ALLEN A. MACASAET v. PEOPLE

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

Subsequently, on 23 September 1997, the trial court received by way of registered mail, petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and to Withdraw Plea dated 3 September 1997.[6] Petitioners argued therein that the trial court committed grave error when it denied the petitioners' Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment and/or Defer Proceedings and continued with the scheduled arraignment on 27 August 1997. According to petitioners and their co-accused, by the trial judge's denial of their Urgent Motion to Defer Arraignment and/or Defer Proceedings, he had effectively denied them their right to obtain relief from the Department of Justice. Moreover, banking on the case of Roberts, et al. v. Court of Appeals,[7] the petitioners and their fellow accused contended that since they had already manifested their intention to file a petition for review of the Resolution of the city prosecutor of Quezon City before the DOJ, it was premature for the trial court to deny their urgent motion of 21 August 1997. Finally, petitioners and their co-accused claimed that regardless of the outcome of their petition for review before the DOJ, the withdrawal of their "not guilty" pleas is in order as they planned to move for the quashal of the information against them.

	GR No. 182157 2015-08-17	ANLUD METAL RECYCLING CORPORATION v. JOAQUIN ANG SERENO, C.J.
Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court.[49] We emphasize that the viewpoint we follow must conform to the nature of reviewing a CA decision, which was rendered under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
	GR No. 192898 2011-01-31	SPS. ALEXANDER TRINIDAD AND CECILIA TRINIDAD v. VICTOR ANG BRION, J.
In addition, the cases cited by the petitioners - Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. How,[11] Roberts, Jr. v. CA,[12] and Dimatulac v. Villon[13] - were all decided prior to the amendment to Section 11 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which took effect on December 1, 2000. At the time these cases were decided, there was no 60-day limit on the suspension of arraignment.
	GR No. 188197 2010-08-03	LEONARDO U. FLORES v. RAUL S. GONZALEZ NACHURA, J.
Lim filed a motion for reconsideration of the May 31, 2006 Resolution of the Secretary of Justice. There was nothing procedurally infirm in this course of action inasmuch as there is nothing in Crespo that bars the Secretary of Justice from reviewing resolutions of his subordinates in an appeal or petition for review in criminal cases. The Secretary of Justice was merely advised in Crespo that, as far as practicable, he should not take cognizance of an appeal when the complaint or information is already filed in court.[42]
	GR No. 184337 2009-08-07	HEIRS OF FEDERICO C. DELGADO v. LUISITO Q. GONZALEZ CARPIO, J.
Sworn Statement ("Sinumpaang Salaysay") of Pesico dated 11 March 2007;[7]
	GR No. 171188 2009-06-19	PEOPLE v. JESSIE B. CASTILLO QUISUMBING, J.
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court.[22] Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.[23]
	GR No. 152889 2009-06-05	ENRIQUE V. VIUDEZ II v. CA PERALTA, J.
Petitioner has put emphasis on his argument that the suspension of the proceedings in court, including the suspension of the implementation of a warrant of arrest pending a resolution of an appeal by the Secretary of Justice, is in consonance with jurisprudence laid down by this Court in Marcelo v. Court of Appeals, [34] Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, [35] Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,[36] Dimatulac v. Villon,[37] and Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. How.[38]
	GR No. 164170 2009-04-16	MACA-ANGCOS ALAWIYA Y ABDUL v. CA CARPIO, J.
Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Its duty in an appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the executive or judicial determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction.[32] However, in the following exceptional cases, this Court may ultimately resolve the existence or non-existence of probable cause by examining the records of the preliminary investigation.[33]
	AM No. RTJ-07-2058 2009-04-07	DOLORES S. BAGO v. JUDGE ERNESTO P. PAGAYATAN CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Once a motion to dismiss or withdraw the information is filed, the trial judge may grant or deny it, not out of subservience to the Secretary of Justice, but in faithful exercise of judicial prerogative.[18] Indeed, it bears stressing that the trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice since it is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case and it may either agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice would be an abdication of the trial court's duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case.[19]
	GR NO. 168617 2007-02-19	BERNADETTE L. ADASA v. CECILLE S. ABALOS CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation. (Emphasis supplied.) To bolster her position, petitioner cites Roberts v. Court of Appeals,[6] which stated:There is nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul which bars the DOJ from taking cognizance of an appeal, by way of a petition for review, by an accused in a criminal case from an unfavorable ruling of the investigating prosecutor. It merely advised the DOJ to, "as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.) Petitioner likewise invokes Marcelo v. Court of Appeals[7] where this Court declared:
	GR NO. 166888 2007-01-31	FIRST WOMEN’S CREDIT CORPORATION v. ROMMEL O. BAYBAY CARPIO MORALES, J.
It is settled that the determination of whether probable cause exists to warrant the prosecution in court of an accused should be consigned and entrusted to the Department of Justice, as reviewer of the findings of public prosecutors.[26] The court's duty in an appropriate case is confined to a determination of whether the assailed executive or judicial determination of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction. This is consistent with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final,[27] albeit in extreme cases, exceptional circumstances have been recognized.[28] The rule is also consistent with this Court's policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and of leaving to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the exercise of determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of an information against a supposed offender.[29]
	GR NO. 164268 2005-06-28	ARTEMIO T. TORRES v. SPS. DRS. EDGARDO AGUINALDO AND NELIA T. TORRES-AGUINALDO YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
The Secretary of Justice did not whimsically and capriciously exercise his discretion. His findings was grounded on sound statutory and factual basis. Chief Justice Andres Narvasa in his separate opinion in Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals[37] declared that the determination of probable cause to warrant the prosecution in court should be consigned and entrusted to the Department of Justice, as reviewer of the findings of the public prosecutors. To do otherwise is to usurp a duty that exclusively pertains to an executive official.
	GR NO. 139912 2005-03-31	YUPANGCO COTTON MILLS v. RODRIGO SY MENDOZA TINGA, J.
Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Its duty in an appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the determination of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction. This is consistent with the rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final.[75]
	GR NO. 156747 2005-02-23	ALLEN A. MACASAET v. PEOPLE CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Subsequently, on 23 September 1997, the trial court received by way of registered mail, petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and to Withdraw Plea dated 3 September 1997.[6] Petitioners argued therein that the trial court committed grave error when it denied the petitioners' Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment and/or Defer Proceedings and continued with the scheduled arraignment on 27 August 1997. According to petitioners and their co-accused, by the trial judge's denial of their Urgent Motion to Defer Arraignment and/or Defer Proceedings, he had effectively denied them their right to obtain relief from the Department of Justice. Moreover, banking on the case of Roberts, et al. v. Court of Appeals,[7] the petitioners and their fellow accused contended that since they had already manifested their intention to file a petition for review of the Resolution of the city prosecutor of Quezon City before the DOJ, it was premature for the trial court to deny their urgent motion of 21 August 1997. Finally, petitioners and their co-accused claimed that regardless of the outcome of their petition for review before the DOJ, the withdrawal of their "not guilty" pleas is in order as they planned to move for the quashal of the information against them.

PAUL G. ROBERTS v. CA