This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2010-07-07 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| We should remind AAVA that the Court of Appeals, the court that was first to reexamine the case at bar, affirmed the Decision of the Office of the President, which had set aside the HLURB ruling. The authority of the HLURB is certainly subordinate to that of the Office of the President and the acts of the former may be set aside by the latter. Furthermore, while it is true that courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies,[29] it should be noted that the HLURB and the then MMC were both tasked to regulate the rezoning of the Metropolitan Manila area. The then Municipality of Muntinlupa submitted Resolution No. 94-179 to both the HLURB and the MMC for their appropriate action. The MMC approved Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179, and this approval should be given more weight than the disapproval of the HLURB since it was the MMC itself which issued the Uniform Guidelines for the Rezoning of the Metropolitan Manila Area (MMC Resolution No. 12, Series of 1991), the issuance alleged by AAVA to have been violated by the Municipality of Muntinlupa. | |||||
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2007-01-25 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Nonetheless, we see no reason to disregard the determinations made by Sole Arbitrator Lazatin. As has been discussed above, the contention of PNCC that it may legally deduct certain accommodations from the contract price as contained in the Bill of Quantities attached to the Contract Amendment has no leg to stand on. Furthermore, in the absence of any showing of grave abuse of discretion, this Court must sustain the factual findings of the Sole Arbitrator as sustained by the Court of Appeals, this being in accordance with the established principle that determination of certain questions of fact falling within the peculiar technical expertise of an administrative agency, must be accorded great respect, if not finality by this Court. A long line of cases establishes the basic rule that the court will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.[14] The CIAC, having been duly constituted by law as the quasi-judicial agency accorded with jurisdiction to resolve disputes arising from contracts involving construction in the Philippines,[15] this Court must confer finality to its findings as they are supported by the evidence in this case. | |||||
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2006-06-27 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| It is a doctrine of long-standing that courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of the government agency entrusted with regulation of activities coming under the special and technical training and knowledge of such agency.[5] For the exercise of administrative discretion is a policy decision and a matter that best be discharged by the government agency concerned and not by the courts.[6] In this case, there is no showing that the HDMF arbitrarily, whimsically or capriciously denied petitioner's application for renewal of its waiver. It conducted the necessary investigation, comparison, evaluation, and deliberation of petitioner's retirement plan vis-à-vis the Fund. This Court thus holds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it affirmed the denial of petitioner's application for renewal of waiver by the HDMF. | |||||
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2006-05-05 |
AZCUNA, J. |
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| Based on the above, it is clear that the ARBA and its members have committed acts to justify the revocation of the collective CLOA that had been issued by the DAR to the latter. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction, however, does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.[44] | |||||
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2004-11-10 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| In closing, we restate the rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.[54] | |||||