This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2008-02-29 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria. If, as may happen in many cases, a person sustains actual damage, that is, harm or loss to his person or property, without sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act or omission which the law does not deem an injury, the damage is regarded as damnum absque injuria.[15] | |||||
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2006-12-06 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Furthermore, respondent's palpable display of bad faith in claiming a superior right to the property over petitioner's son entitles petitioner to damages resulting therefrom. In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries which he sustained, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it.[13] In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, the act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful.[14] | |||||
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2005-03-18 |
CORONA, J. |
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| This case is one of damnun absque injuria or damage without injury. "Injury" is the legal invasion of a legal right while "damage" is the hurt, loss or harm which results from the injury.[22] In BPI Express Card Corporation v. Court of Appeals,,[23] the Court turned down the claim for damages of a cardholder whose credit card had been cancelled by petitioner corporation after several defaults in payment. We held there that there can be damage without injury where the loss or harm is not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In that instance, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone since the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to legal injury or wrong.[24] Indeed, lack of malice in the conduct complained of precludes recovery of damages.[25] | |||||
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2005-02-18 |
TINGA, J. |
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| The initiatory Complaint filed by Pereña deserves close scrutiny. Immediately, it can be seen that it is not only an action for damages, but also one for injunction. An action for injunction will require judicial determination whether there exists a right in esse which is to be protected, and if there is an act constituting a violation of such right against which injunction is sought. At the same time, the mere fact of injury alone does not give rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, there must be damnum et injuria-that act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful.[34] | |||||
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2005-01-14 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The law on damages prescribes that in order that one can have redress for an act which caused him damage, the act must not only be hurtful, it must also be wrongful.[10] There must be damnum et enjuria.[11] All in all, in order to recover moral damages, the claimant must prove the following: (1) there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) there must be a culpable act or omission factually established; (3) the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.[12] In herein case, the factual issue of whether or not the issuance by petitioner Estolas of Memorandum Order No. 30 was wrongful has been passed upon with finality by the MSPB way back in 1988 following our ruling in Acena v. Civil Service Commission.[13] It should be recalled that the MSPB Order set aside its earlier order dismissing respondent Acena's complaint for illegal dismissal because the CSC "through the Chairman has already rendered its final determination on the matter."[13] The relevant portions of the CSC resolution[14] being adverted to by the MSPB are quoted hereunder:Records show that then RTC President Lydia N. Profeta issued on December 9, 1985 an appointment to Mr. Acena as Associate Professor and the same was received in the Commission National Capital Region Office on January 6, 1986. Thereafter, on January 9, 1986, Mr. Acena wrote RTC President Profeta that he prefers to remain as Administrative Officer because this Commission might approve his appointment as temporary because he does not possess a masteral degree. He asked that his appointment as Associate Professor be withdrawn and that he will refund whatever he received as salary of Associate Professor in excess of his salary as Administrative Officer. In a letter dated January 13, 1986, RTC President Profeta wrote Mr. Acena that his appointment as Associate Professor was withdrawn. The letter of Mr. Acena and the letter of President Profeta were received on April 8, 1986 by the National Capital Region. On April 10, 1986 by way of a 1st indorsement, the said appointment of Mr. Acena as Associate Professor, together with other appointments, were returned without action by the National Capital Region to the RTC. | |||||