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PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY v. CA

This case has been cited 4 times or more.

	GR No. 211737 2016-01-13	SERGIO R. OSMEÑA III v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION VILLARAMA, JR., J.
[52] Philippine Ports Authority v. Court of Appeals, 323 Phil. 260, 291-292 (1996), citing Prado v. Veridiano II, G.R. No. 98118, December 6, 1991, 204 SCRA 654, 672.
	GR No. 166785 2008-07-28	OROPORT CARGOHANDLING SERVICES v. PHIVIDEC INDUSTRIAL AUTHORITY QUISUMBING, J.
Second. PPA was created for the purpose of, among others, promoting the growth of regional port bodies. In furtherance of this objective, PPA is empowered, after consultation with relevant government agencies, to make port regulations particularly to make rules or regulation for the planning, development, construction, maintenance, control, supervision and management of any port or port district in the country. With this mandate, the decision to bid out cargo-handling services is within the province and discretion of PPA which necessarily required prior study and evaluation. This task is best left to the judgment of PPA and cannot be set aside absent grave abuse of discretion on its part.[30] As long as the standards are set in determining the contractor and such standards are reasonable and related to the purpose for which they are used, courts should not inquire into the wisdom of PPA's choice.[31] In Philippine Ports Authority v. Court of Appeals[32] where PPA hired rival contractors to operate in a major port, we held:Entering into a contract for the operation of a floating grains terminal, notwithstanding the existence of other stevedoring contracts pertaining to the South Harbor, is undoubtedly an exercise of discretion on the part of the PPA. The exercise of such discretion is a policy decision that necessitates such procedures as prior inquiry, investigation, comparison, evaluation and deliberation. No other persons or agencies are in a better position to gauge the need for the floating grains terminal than the PPA; certainly, not the courts.[33] Since PPA has given PIA the right to manage and operate MCT, we cannot simply abrogate it.
	GR Nos. 135688-89 2007-10-18	ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO v. UEM-MARA PHILIPPINES CORPORATION CORONA, J.
It is founded on the principle that to allow the courts to determine such matters would disturb the smooth functioning of the administrative machinery.[37]
	GR NO. 159245 2006-08-31	GV DIVERSIFIED INTERNATIONAL v. CA QUISUMBING, J.
Relying on our rulings in Malaga v. Penachos, Jr.,[10] Genaro R. Reyes Construction, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[11] and Philippine Ports Authority v. Court of Appeals,[12] petitioner takes exception to the application of P.D. No. 1818. First, it points out that what P.D. No. 1818 proscribes is the issuance of preliminary injunction delaying an infrastructure project of the government. Petitioner claims the preliminary injunction issued by the RTC precisely allowed continuation of work on the project.