Lawyerly

GR No. 195307

2012-08-06

DEL CASTILLO, J.

The conduct of the victim immediately following the alleged sexual assault is of utmost importance in establishing the truth or falsity of the charge of rape.[22] In the present case, the acts of AAA after the alleged rape are totally uncharacteristic of one who has been raped. Her indifference on the lingering presence of the appellant at the scene of the alleged crime after the same happened instead of immediately reporting the incident naturally makes her testimony tainted with uncertainty. On the other hand, the actuations of appellant after the alleged rape also create a doubt as to his guilt. As testified by AAA, appellant even went to mass with AAA's brother and cousin and stayed at the house until the evening of that day having a drink with his co-workers. It is to be expected that one who is guilty of a crime would want to dissociate himself from the person of his victim, the scene of the crime, and from all other things and circumstances related to the offense which could possibly implicate him or give rise to even the slightest suspicion as to his guilt.[23] However, such did not happen in this case.

GR No. 176389

2010-12-14

ANTONIO LEJANO v. PEOPLE

ABAD, J.

The medical evidence clearly established that Carmela was raped and, consistent with this, semen specimen was found in her. It is true that Alfaro identified Webb in her testimony as Carmela's rapist and killer but serious questions had been raised about her credibility. At the very least, there exists a possibility that Alfaro had lied. On the other hand, the semen specimen taken from Carmela cannot possibly lie. It cannot be coached or allured by a promise of reward or financial support. No two persons have the same DNA fingerprint, with the exception of identical twins.[8] If, on examination, the DNA of the subject specimen does not belong to Webb, then he did not rape Carmela. It is that simple. Thus, the Court would have been able to determine that Alfaro committed perjury in saying that he did.

GR No. 157384

2009-06-05

ERLINDA I. BILDNER v. ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO

VELASCO JR., J.

The contempt power, however plenary it may seem, must be exercised judiciously and sparingly with utmost self-restraint with the end in view of utilizing it for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, not for retaliation or vindication.[25] To be sure, courts and judges, as institutions, are neither sacrosanct nor immune to public criticisms of their conduct.[26] And well-recognized is the right of citizens to criticize in a fair and respectful manner and through legitimate channels the acts of courts or judges,[27] who in turn ought to be patient and tolerate as much as possible everything which appears as hasty and unguarded expression of passion or momentary outbreak of disappointment at the outcome of a case. Even snide remarks, as People v. Godoy teaches, do not necessarily partake the nature of contumacious utterance actionable under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.[28]

GR No. 171348

2008-11-26

PEOPLE v. LARRY ERGUIZA

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

An offer of compromise from an unauthorized person cannot amount to an admission of the party himself.[59] Although the Court has held in some cases that an attempt of the parents of the accused to settle the case is an implied admission of guilt,[60] we believe that the better rule is that for a compromise to amount to an implied admission of guilt, the accused should have been present or at least authorized the proposed compromise.[61] Moreover, it has been held that where the accused was not present at the time the offer for monetary consideration was made, such offer of compromise would not save the day for the prosecution.[62]

GR No. 178067

2008-08-11

PEOPLE v. ABDELKARIM AHMAD ALKODHA

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

While it may be debated that the above reasons are too flimsy to accuse a person of a serious crime as rape, still, the private complainant was motivated by hatred and in order to get even with the accused, she filed the instant cases.[18] Accused-appellant then proceeds to argue that the application of the presumption that a young Filipina will not charge a person with rape if it is not true goes against the constitutional presumption of innocence.[19] Accused-appellant cites People v. Godoy,[20] wherein we held:The trial court, in holding for conviction, relied on the presumptio hominis that a young Filipina will not charge a person with rape if it is not true. In the process, however, it totally disregarded the more paramount constitutional presumption that an accused is deemed innocent until proven otherwise.

GR NO. 157221

2007-03-30

PEOPLE v. CESAR GALVEZ

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

The Court also recognizes that there may be instances when an offer of compromise will not amount to an admission of guilt. Thus, in People v. Godoy,[70] the Court pronounced that:...In criminal cases, an offer of compromise is generally admissible as evidence against the party making it. It is a legal maxim, which assuredly constitutes one of the bases of the right to penalize, that in the matter of public crimes which directly affect the public interest, no compromise whatever may be entered into as regards the penal action. It has long been held, however, that in such cases the accused is permitted to show that the offer was not made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of guilt or an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily ensue therefrom.[71] (Emphasis supplied).

GR NO. 139464

2005-09-09

REPUBLIC v. SPS. FELIX BAES AND RAFAELA BAES AND REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PASAY CITY

In Slade Perkins v. Director of Prisons,[4] this Court held that the power of the courts to punish respondent for contempt has "a twofold aspect, namely: First, the proper punishment of the guilty party for his disrespect to the court or its order, and the second, to compel his performance of some act or duty required of him by the court which he refuses to perform." Because of this twofold aspect, a contumacious act is either civil or criminal. In People v. Godoy,[5] citing Slade Perkins,[6] this Court defined a criminal contempt as conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect. A civil contempt is the failure to do something ordered to be done by a court or by a judge in a civil action for the benefit of the opposing party therein. The delineation line may be drawn from the purpose for which the power is exercised. Where the primary purpose is to preserve the court's authority and to punish for disobedience of its orders, the contempt is criminal. Where the primary purpose is to provide a remedy for an injured litigant and to coerce compliance with an order, the contempt is civil. Simply put, when the purpose is primarily punishment, the contempt proceedings are to be regarded as criminal and civil when the purpose is primarily compensatory or remedial. Obviously, in its criminal aspect, the action for contempt against respondent is personal to him. It cannot be passed on to his successor in office.

AM No. RTJ-04-1836

2004-07-14

DR. JAIME O. SEVILLA v. JUDGE ABRAHAM B. BORRETA

QUISUMBING, J.

Indeed, contempt is in the nature of a criminal action, but only with regard to its procedural aspect. A contempt proceeding is sui generis. While it has elements of both a civil and a criminal proceeding, it is not a criminal proceeding even though the contemptuous act involved could be a crime. It is remedial and civil in nature. It is for the enforcement of a duty. It is auxiliary to the main case as it proceeds out of the original case. It is essentially a new and independent proceeding in that it involves new issues and must be initiated by the issuance and service of a new process.[10] Contempt under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court is a special civil action that cannot be converted into a criminal action.

GR No. 134309

2000-11-17

PEOPLE v. ROBERTO MARIANO

BELLOSILLO, J.

We reiterate at the outset that the evaluation of testimonies of witnesses by the trial court is binding upon the appellate court in the absence of a clear showing that it was reached arbitrarily or that the trial court had plainly overlooked certain circumstances of substance or value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. In prosecutions for rape, this Court in the evaluation of the evidence has always been guided by the following considerations: (a) an accusation of rape can be easily made, is hard to prove, but harder to defend by the party accused, though innocent; (b) in view of the nature of the crime where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and, (c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[8] In all criminal prosecutions, without regard to the nature of the defense which the accused may raise, the burden of proof remains at all times upon the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[9]

GR No. 130969

2000-02-29

PEOPLE v. ROBERTO SAN JUAN

BELLOSILLO, J.

We also consider the fact that accused-appellant did not flee. When he went home at around 2:00 o'clock the following morning, the policemen were already there waiting for him. They invited him to the police station for questioning. A few hours thereafter, he was subjected to preliminary investigation. If Rowena was indeed telling the truth, i.e., that accused-appellant raped her and then ordered her to go home to get her necklace, the mere fact that she failed to return was a warning signal for him to immediately hide himself and not to go home. The logical post-incident impulse of a criminal is to distance himself from his victim as far and as soon as practicable to avoid discovery and apprehension.[14]

	GR No. 195307 2012-08-06	PEOPLE v. ALSHER BERMEJO LUMPAYAO DEL CASTILLO, J.
The conduct of the victim immediately following the alleged sexual assault is of utmost importance in establishing the truth or falsity of the charge of rape.[22] In the present case, the acts of AAA after the alleged rape are totally uncharacteristic of one who has been raped. Her indifference on the lingering presence of the appellant at the scene of the alleged crime after the same happened instead of immediately reporting the incident naturally makes her testimony tainted with uncertainty. On the other hand, the actuations of appellant after the alleged rape also create a doubt as to his guilt. As testified by AAA, appellant even went to mass with AAA's brother and cousin and stayed at the house until the evening of that day having a drink with his co-workers. It is to be expected that one who is guilty of a crime would want to dissociate himself from the person of his victim, the scene of the crime, and from all other things and circumstances related to the offense which could possibly implicate him or give rise to even the slightest suspicion as to his guilt.[23] However, such did not happen in this case.
	GR No. 176389 2010-12-14	ANTONIO LEJANO v. PEOPLE ABAD, J.
The medical evidence clearly established that Carmela was raped and, consistent with this, semen specimen was found in her. It is true that Alfaro identified Webb in her testimony as Carmela's rapist and killer but serious questions had been raised about her credibility. At the very least, there exists a possibility that Alfaro had lied. On the other hand, the semen specimen taken from Carmela cannot possibly lie. It cannot be coached or allured by a promise of reward or financial support. No two persons have the same DNA fingerprint, with the exception of identical twins.[8] If, on examination, the DNA of the subject specimen does not belong to Webb, then he did not rape Carmela. It is that simple. Thus, the Court would have been able to determine that Alfaro committed perjury in saying that he did.
	GR No. 157384 2009-06-05	ERLINDA I. BILDNER v. ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO VELASCO JR., J.
The contempt power, however plenary it may seem, must be exercised judiciously and sparingly with utmost self-restraint with the end in view of utilizing it for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, not for retaliation or vindication.[25] To be sure, courts and judges, as institutions, are neither sacrosanct nor immune to public criticisms of their conduct.[26] And well-recognized is the right of citizens to criticize in a fair and respectful manner and through legitimate channels the acts of courts or judges,[27] who in turn ought to be patient and tolerate as much as possible everything which appears as hasty and unguarded expression of passion or momentary outbreak of disappointment at the outcome of a case. Even snide remarks, as People v. Godoy teaches, do not necessarily partake the nature of contumacious utterance actionable under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.[28]
	GR No. 171348 2008-11-26	PEOPLE v. LARRY ERGUIZA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
An offer of compromise from an unauthorized person cannot amount to an admission of the party himself.[59] Although the Court has held in some cases that an attempt of the parents of the accused to settle the case is an implied admission of guilt,[60] we believe that the better rule is that for a compromise to amount to an implied admission of guilt, the accused should have been present or at least authorized the proposed compromise.[61] Moreover, it has been held that where the accused was not present at the time the offer for monetary consideration was made, such offer of compromise would not save the day for the prosecution.[62]
	GR No. 178067 2008-08-11	PEOPLE v. ABDELKARIM AHMAD ALKODHA CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
While it may be debated that the above reasons are too flimsy to accuse a person of a serious crime as rape, still, the private complainant was motivated by hatred and in order to get even with the accused, she filed the instant cases.[18] Accused-appellant then proceeds to argue that the application of the presumption that a young Filipina will not charge a person with rape if it is not true goes against the constitutional presumption of innocence.[19] Accused-appellant cites People v. Godoy,[20] wherein we held:The trial court, in holding for conviction, relied on the presumptio hominis that a young Filipina will not charge a person with rape if it is not true. In the process, however, it totally disregarded the more paramount constitutional presumption that an accused is deemed innocent until proven otherwise.
	GR NO. 157221 2007-03-30	PEOPLE v. CESAR GALVEZ AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
The Court also recognizes that there may be instances when an offer of compromise will not amount to an admission of guilt. Thus, in People v. Godoy,[70] the Court pronounced that:...In criminal cases, an offer of compromise is generally admissible as evidence against the party making it. It is a legal maxim, which assuredly constitutes one of the bases of the right to penalize, that in the matter of public crimes which directly affect the public interest, no compromise whatever may be entered into as regards the penal action. It has long been held, however, that in such cases the accused is permitted to show that the offer was not made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of guilt or an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily ensue therefrom.[71] (Emphasis supplied).
	GR NO. 139464 2005-09-09	REPUBLIC v. SPS. FELIX BAES AND RAFAELA BAES AND REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PASAY CITY
In Slade Perkins v. Director of Prisons,[4] this Court held that the power of the courts to punish respondent for contempt has "a twofold aspect, namely: First, the proper punishment of the guilty party for his disrespect to the court or its order, and the second, to compel his performance of some act or duty required of him by the court which he refuses to perform." Because of this twofold aspect, a contumacious act is either civil or criminal. In People v. Godoy,[5] citing Slade Perkins,[6] this Court defined a criminal contempt as conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect. A civil contempt is the failure to do something ordered to be done by a court or by a judge in a civil action for the benefit of the opposing party therein. The delineation line may be drawn from the purpose for which the power is exercised. Where the primary purpose is to preserve the court's authority and to punish for disobedience of its orders, the contempt is criminal. Where the primary purpose is to provide a remedy for an injured litigant and to coerce compliance with an order, the contempt is civil. Simply put, when the purpose is primarily punishment, the contempt proceedings are to be regarded as criminal and civil when the purpose is primarily compensatory or remedial. Obviously, in its criminal aspect, the action for contempt against respondent is personal to him. It cannot be passed on to his successor in office.
	AM No. RTJ-04-1836 2004-07-14	DR. JAIME O. SEVILLA v. JUDGE ABRAHAM B. BORRETA QUISUMBING, J.
Indeed, contempt is in the nature of a criminal action, but only with regard to its procedural aspect. A contempt proceeding is sui generis. While it has elements of both a civil and a criminal proceeding, it is not a criminal proceeding even though the contemptuous act involved could be a crime. It is remedial and civil in nature. It is for the enforcement of a duty. It is auxiliary to the main case as it proceeds out of the original case. It is essentially a new and independent proceeding in that it involves new issues and must be initiated by the issuance and service of a new process.[10] Contempt under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court is a special civil action that cannot be converted into a criminal action.
	GR No. 134309 2000-11-17	PEOPLE v. ROBERTO MARIANO BELLOSILLO, J.
We reiterate at the outset that the evaluation of testimonies of witnesses by the trial court is binding upon the appellate court in the absence of a clear showing that it was reached arbitrarily or that the trial court had plainly overlooked certain circumstances of substance or value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. In prosecutions for rape, this Court in the evaluation of the evidence has always been guided by the following considerations: (a) an accusation of rape can be easily made, is hard to prove, but harder to defend by the party accused, though innocent; (b) in view of the nature of the crime where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and, (c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[8] In all criminal prosecutions, without regard to the nature of the defense which the accused may raise, the burden of proof remains at all times upon the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[9]
	GR No. 130969 2000-02-29	PEOPLE v. ROBERTO SAN JUAN BELLOSILLO, J.
We also consider the fact that accused-appellant did not flee. When he went home at around 2:00 o'clock the following morning, the policemen were already there waiting for him. They invited him to the police station for questioning. A few hours thereafter, he was subjected to preliminary investigation. If Rowena was indeed telling the truth, i.e., that accused-appellant raped her and then ordered her to go home to get her necklace, the mere fact that she failed to return was a warning signal for him to immediately hide himself and not to go home. The logical post-incident impulse of a criminal is to distance himself from his victim as far and as soon as practicable to avoid discovery and apprehension.[14]

PEOPLE v. DANNY GODOY