This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2008-06-26 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| The Court has also ruled that a document or writing admitted as part of the testimony of a witness does not constitute proof of the facts stated therein.[27] Here, Torres, a private individual and respondent's representative, identified the certifications but the government officials who issued the certifications did not testify on the contents of the certifications. As such, the certifications cannot be given probative value. [28] The contents of the certifications are hearsay because Torres was incompetent to testify on the veracity of the contents of the certifications.[29] Torres did not prepare the certifications, he was not an officer of CENRO or FMS-DENR, and he did not conduct any verification survey whether the land | |||||
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2004-02-05 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| On the first assigned error, while witness Marissa is the victim's sister-in-law, such relationship does not necessarily impair her credibility as a witness. This is especially so when the witness was present at the scene of the crime,[11] as in this case. Moreover, that there was a rift between Marissa's husband and appellant's uncle does not mean that she would testify falsely against appellant. To be sure, there is no proof or any indication that she was animated by improper motive in testifying against him. We have held that where there is no evidence and nothing to indicate that the principal witnesses for the prosecution were impelled by any improper motive, the presumption is that they were not and that their testimonies are thus entitled to full faith and credit.[12] We thus sustain the credibility of Marissa whom the trial court found to have positively identified appellant as the one who stabbed Nathaniel dela Cruz. Once again, we must reiterate the familiar rule that the task of taking on the issue of credibility is a function properly lodged with the trial court, whose findings are entitled to great weight and accorded the highest respect by the reviewing courts, unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked or misappreciated such as would alter the conviction of the appellant.[13] There is no such fact of substance and value in this case. | |||||