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IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS v. COMELEC

This case has been cited 10 times or more.

	GR No. 210164 2015-08-18	ROMMEL C. ARNADO v. COMELEC DEL CASTILLO, J.
Aggrieved, Arnado filed a Verified Motion for Reconsideration.[12] He argued that the Comelec Second Division erred in applying Maquiling claiming that the said case is not on all fours with the present controversy; that Capitan's Petition was filed beyond the 25-day reglementary period reckoned from the filing of the CoC sought to be cancelled; and, that the Comelec must uphold the sovereign will of the people of Kauswagan who expressed, thru the ballots, their overwhelming support for him as their mayor. Arnado prayed that the Comelec Second Division's September 6, 2013 Resolution be reversed and that he be declared as eligible to run for mayor ofKauswagan.
	GR No. 207264 2013-10-22	REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES v. COMELEC PEREZ, J.
The PBOC, a subordinate body under the direct control and supervision of the COMELEC,[21] cannot simply disregard a COMELEC En Banc Resolution brought before its attention and hastily proceed with the proclamation by reasoning that it has not officially received the resolution or order.
	GR No. 193261 2012-04-24	MEYNARDO SABILI v. COMELEC SERENO, J.
Petitioner's argument that Palomares's affidavit was a "declaration against interest" is, strictly speaking, inaccurate and irrelevant. A declaration against interest, under the Rules of Civil Procedure, refers to a "declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify against the interest of a declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true."[80] A declaration against interest is an exception to the hearsay rule.[81] As such, it pertains only to the admissibility of, not the weight accorded to, testimonial evidence.[82]
	GR No. 191938 2010-10-19	ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA v. COMELEC BRION, J.
THE CASE OF VELASCO SHOULD BE APPLIED STRICTLY TO THE PRESENT CASE.[5]
	GR No. 191124 2010-04-27	LUIS A. ASISTIO v. THELMA CANLAS TRINIDAD-PE AGUIRRE NACHURA, J.
Domicile is not easily lost. To successfully effect a transfer thereof, one must demonstrate: (1) an actual removal or change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and (3) acts which correspond with that purpose.[36] There must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.[37]
	GR No. 179695 2008-12-18	MIKE A. FERMIN v. COMELEC NACHURA, J.
For not being a citizen of the Philippines; For being a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country; For lack of the required age; For lack of residence; For not being a registered voter; For not being able to read and write; In case of a party-list nominee, for not being a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days immediately preceding the day of the election. [Emphasis supplied.] We disagree. A COMELEC rule or resolution cannot supplant or vary the legislative enactments that distinguish the grounds for disqualification from those of ineligibility, and the appropriate proceedings to raise the said grounds. In other words, Rule 25 and COMELEC Resolution No. 7800 cannot supersede the dissimilar requirements of the law for the filing of a petition for disqualification under Section 68, and a petition for the denial of due course to or cancellation of CoC under Section 78 of the OEC.[46] As aptly observed by the eminent constitutionalist, Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, in his separate opinion in Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections: [47]
	GR No. 154096 2008-08-22	IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA v. CA VELASCO JR., J.
And this brings us to the final point. Irene was a resident during the period material of Forbes Park, Makati City. She was not a resident of Brgy. Lacub, Batac, Ilocos Norte, although jurisprudence[44] has it that one can have several residences, if such were the established fact. The Court will not speculate on the reason why petitioner Irene, for all the inconvenience and expenses she and her adversaries would have to endure by a Batac trial, preferred that her case be heard and decided by the RTC in Batac. On the heels of the dismissal of the original complaints on the ground of improper venue, three new personalities were added to the complaint doubtless to insure, but in vain as it turned out, that the case stays with the RTC in Batac.
	GR Nos. 163619-20 2005-11-17	IN MATTER OF PETITION FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF TESS DUMPIT-MICHELENA v. CARLOS BOADO CARPIO, J.
The concept of residence in determining a candidate's qualification is already a settled matter. For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile.[15] In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives,[16] this Court declared:x x x The term "residence" has been understood as synonymous with domicile not only under the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution.
	GR No. 161434 2004-03-03	MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON v. COMELEC VITUG, J.
There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish regime but "subjects of Spain" or "Spanish subjects."[13] In church records, the natives were called 'indios', denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship became highly codified during the 19th century but their sheer number made it difficult to point to one comprehensive law. Not all of these citizenship laws of Spain however, were made to apply to the Philippine Islands except for those explicitly extended by Royal Decrees.[14]