This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2013-06-19 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| In this case, the question as to what part of the body of the accused did the police officers recover the money does not dissolve the elements of illegal sale and possession as minor inconsistencies do not negate or dissolve the eyewitnesses' positive identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime.[69] Minor inconsistencies in the narration of PO1 Castro, PO1 Labbutan and SPO4 Lucas do not detract from their essential credibility as long as their testimony on the whole is coherent and intrinsically believable.[70] | |||||
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2013-02-06 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| As held in the case of People v. Gonzaga,[42] minor inconsistencies do not negate or dissolve the eyewitnesses' positive identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime.[43] "[M]inor inconsistencies in the narration of witnesses do not detract from their essential credibility as long as their testimony on the whole is coherent and intrinsically believable. Inaccuracies may in fact suggest that the witnesses are telling the truth and have not been rehearsed. Witnesses are not expected to remember every single detail of an incident with perfect or total recall."[44] "[T]he witnesses' testimonies need only to corroborate one another on material details surrounding the actual commission of the crime."[45] | |||||
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2010-10-11 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| Furthermore, minor inconsistencies do not negate or dissolve the eyewitnesses' positive identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime.[24] "[M]inor inconsistencies in the narration of witnesses do not detract from their essential credibility as long as their testimony on the whole is coherent and intrinsically believable. Inaccuracies may in fact suggest that the witnesses are telling the truth and have not been rehearsed. x x x Witnesses are not expected to remember every single detail of an incident with perfect or total recall."[25] "The witnesses' testimonies need only to corroborate one another on material details surrounding the actual commission of the crime."[26] | |||||
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2010-09-01 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| "Further, to the extent that inconsistencies were in fact shown, they appear to [this] Court to relate to details of peripheral significance which do not negate or dissolve the positive identification [by the eyewitness of the petitioner and his co-accused] as the perpetrators of the crime."[19] | |||||
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2010-08-09 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| Besides, the inconsistencies ascribed to the prosecution witnesses involve minor details, too trivial to adversely affect their credibility. Said inconsistencies do not depart from the fact that these witnesses saw the fatal stabbing of the victim by Elizer. To the extent that inconsistencies were in fact shown, they appear to us "to relate to details of peripheral significance which do not negate or dissolve the positive identification [by said eyewitnesses of Elizer] as the perpetrator of the crime."[29] | |||||
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2010-02-05 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| In the case at bench, we have thoroughly reviewed the records and, like the appellate court, did not find any justification to disturb the findings of the trial court. Our re-examination of the testimony of PO1 Inopia follows the trial court's conclusion that his testimony was given in a straightforward and simple manner. Besides, appellant is questioning the testimony of PO1 Inopia only on matters pertaining to minor details of the incident that do not, in any way, affect her conviction. The inconsistencies ascribed to PO1 Inopia involve minor details, too trivial to adversely affect his credibility as prosecution witness,[15] and do not negate his positive identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime.[16] On the other hand, the testimony of PO1 Inopia on the circumstances that occurred on the date of the entrapment operation against the appellant - from the moment he received a confidential tip from his informer until the time the buy-bust team apprehended the appellant - deserves to be given weight and significance as it emanated from the mouth of a policeman who enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of his duty. Police officers are presumed to have acted regularly in the performance of their official functions in the absence of clear and convincing proof to the contrary or proof that they were moved by ill will.[17] | |||||
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2009-10-27 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Accused-appellant brands Doris Labini as a biased witness, thus unreliable, because she was the wife of Edwin Labini. The fact that she was the wife of the victim did not necessarily make her a partial witness. It is well-settled that mere relationship of a witness to the victim does not impair the witness' credibility. On the contrary, a witness' relationship to a victim of a crime would even make his or her testimony more credible, as it would be unnatural for a relative who is interested in vindicating the crime, to accuse somebody other than the real culprit.[34] A witness is said to be biased when his relation to the cause or to the parties is such that he has an incentive to exaggerate or give false color to his statements, or to suppress or to pervert the truth, or to state what is false.[35] To warrant rejection of the testimony of a relative or friend, it must be clearly shown that, independently of the relationship, the testimony was inherently improbable or defective, or that improper or evil motives had moved the witness to incriminate the accused falsely.[36] | |||||
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2008-08-28 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Petitioner brands Molly and Silmana Linglingen as biased witnesses, thus, unreliable, because they were town mates and co-vendors of the victim. The fact that these two witnesses were the victim's town mates and co-vendors did not necessarily make them biased witnesses. It is well-settled that the mere relationship of a witness to the victim does not impair the witness' credibility. On the contrary, a witness' relationship to a victim of a crime would even make his or her testimony more credible, as it would be unnatural for a relative, or a friend as in this case, who is interested in vindicating the crime, to accuse somebody other than the real culprit.[44] A witness is said to be biased when his relation to the cause or to the parties is such that he has an incentive to exaggerate or give false color to his statements, or to suppress or to pervert the truth, or to state what is false.[45] To warrant rejection of the testimony of a relative or friend, it must be clearly shown that, independently of the relationship, the testimony was inherently improbable or defective, or that improper or evil motives had moved the witness to incriminate the accused falsely.[46] | |||||