This case has been cited 9 times or more.
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2008-09-11 |
CORONA, J. |
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| Taking all this into consideration, the Ombudsman is in a league of its own. It is different from other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the government because the people under its jurisdiction are public officials who, through pressure and influence, can quash, delay or dismiss investigations directed against them.[21] Its function is critical because public interest (in the accountability of public officers and employees) is at stake. | |||||
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2008-09-04 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General maintains that: (1) there is no categorical pronouncement from the Court that the assailed Orders were issued by respondent Committees pursuant to their oversight function; hence, there is no reason for them "to make much" of the distinction between Sections 21 and 22, Article VI of the Constitution; (2) presidential communications enjoy a presumptive privilege against disclosure as earlier held in Almonte v. Vasquez[9] and Chavez v. Public Estates Authority (PEA)[10]; (3) the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by executive privilege, because all the elements of the presidential communications privilege are present; (4) the subpoena ad testificandum issued by respondent Committees to petitioner is fatally defective under existing law and jurisprudence; (5) the failure of the present Senate to publish its Rules renders the same void; and (6) respondent Committees arbitrarily issued the contempt order. | |||||
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2008-07-16 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| In Almonte v. Vasquez,[117] the Court recognized a common law governmental privilege against disclosure, with respect to state secrets bearing on diplomatic matters.[118] In Chavez v. PCGG,[119]the Court also recognizedtheconfidentialityof information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements subject to reasonable safeguards on the national interest.[120] It also reiterated the privilege against disclosure of state secrets bearing on diplomatic matters, as held in Almonte. Citing Chavez, Senate v. Ermita also acknowledged the states secrets privilege bearing on diplomatic matters. In PMPF v. Manglapus, the Court upheld the confidentiality of treaty negotiations. In that case, petitioners sought to compel the representatives of the President in the then ongoing negotiations of the RP-U.S. Military Bases Agreement to give them access to the negotiations, to treaty items already agreed upon, and to the R.P. and U.S. positions on items that were still being contested. | |||||
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2008-07-16 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| As noted earlier, Almonte recognized a common law governmental privilege against disclosure, with respect to state secrets bearing on military and diplomatic matters.[260] This case involved an investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman that required the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce records pertaining to their personnel. As the Court found that no military or diplomatic secrets would be disclosed by the production of these records and there was no law making them classified, it held that disclosure of the records to the Office of the Ombudsman was warranted. In arriving at this conclusion, the Court noted that the case did not concern a demand by a citizen for information under the freedom of information guarantee of the Constitution, but involved the power of the Office of the Ombudsman to obtain evidence in connection with an investigation conducted by it vis-a-vis the claim of privilege of an agency of the Government. It is thus not difficult to see that the facts and issue of Almonte starkly differ from the case of petitioner private citizens who are enforcing their constitutional right to information. Given this distinction, I submit that Almonte cannot provide the backbone for exemption of the subject JPEPA documents from disclosure. The same holds true with respect to Senate v. Ermita in which the constitutionality of E.O. 464 was at issue, and the Court ruled, viz:E.O 464 is concerned only with the demands of Congress for the appearance of executive officials in the hearings conducted by it, and not with the demands of citizens for information pursuant to their right to information on matters of public concern.[261] (emphasis supplied) | |||||
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2008-03-25 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| The 1995 case Almonte v. Vasquez[108] involved an investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman of petitioner Jose T. Almonte, who was the former Commissioner of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) and Villamor C. Perez, Chief of the EIIB's Budget and Fiscal Management Division. An anonymous letter from a purported employee of the bureau and a concerned citizen, alleging that funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed, gave rise to the investigation. The Ombudsman required the Bureau to produce all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the year 1988; and all evidence, such as vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988. Petitioners refused to comply. | |||||
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2008-03-25 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| As afore-discussed, this Court recognized in Almonte v. Vasquez[157] and Chavez v. PCGG[158] a governmental privilege against public disclosure of state secrets covering military, diplomatic and other national security matters. In U.S. v. Reynolds,[159] the U.S. Supreme Court laid down the procedure for invoking and assessing the validity of the invocation of the military secrets privilege, a privilege based on the nature and content of the information, which can be analogized to the diplomatic secrets privilege, also a content-based privilege. In Reynolds, it was held that there must be a formal claim of privilege lodged by the head of the department that has control over the matter after actual personal consideration by that officer. The court must thereafter determine whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege, without forcing a disclosure of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.[160] It was stressed that "(j)udicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive officers..."[161] It is possible for these officers "to satisfy the court, from all the circumstances of the case, that there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged. When this is the case, the occasion for the privilege is appropriate, and the court should not jeopardize the security which the privilege is meant to protect by insisting upon an examination of the evidence, even by the judge alone, in chambers."[162] It was further held that "(i)n each case, the showing of necessity which is made will determine how far the court should probe in satisfying itself that the occasion for invoking the privilege is appropriate."[163] | |||||
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2008-03-25 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| The rationale for the Presidential communications privilege is enunciated in U.S. v. Nixon.[176] As aforestated, it is based on common sense and on the principle that flows from the enumerated powers of the President and the doctrine of separation of powers under the Constitution. This rationale was recognized in both Almonte v. Vasquez and Senate v. Ermita. | |||||
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2006-12-06 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| It must be stressed that the Office of the Ombudsman is endowed with a wide latitude of investigating power, virtually free from legislative, executive and judicial instruction.[39] The Ombudsman and his deputies are designated by the Constitution as protectors of the people, who are thus required to act promptly on complaints against public officers of the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof.[40] The general investigation on the Office of the Ombudsman is precisely for the purpose of protecting those against whom a complaint is filed against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution as much as securing the State from useless and expensive trials.[41] Moreover, the reason for the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution and for the grant to it of broad investigative authority is to insulate said office from the long tentacles of officialdom that are able to penetrate the judges' and other fiscals' offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erring public officials, and through the exertion of official pressure and influence, quash, delay or dismiss investigations into malfeasances and misfeasances committed by public officers.[42] | |||||
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2002-04-11 |
DE LEON, JR., J. |
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| Clearly, there is no requirement of a pending action before the Ombudsman could wield its investigative power. The Ombudsman could resort to its investigative prerogative on its own[18] or upon a complaint filed in any form or manner. Even when the complaint is verbal or written, unsigned or unverified, the Ombudsman could, on its own, initiate the investigation.[19] Thus | |||||