This case has been cited 18 times or more.
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2014-02-12 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68[33] of the Family Code, among others,[34] include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.[35] In Santos v. CA[36] (Santos), the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage); (b) juridical antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage); and (c) incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved).[37] The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic of the Phils. v. CA,[38] whose salient points are footnoted hereunder.[39] These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements that the Court established in Santos.[40] Keeping with these principles, the Court, in Dedel v. CA,[41] held that therein respondent's emotional immaturity and irresponsibility could not be equated with psychological incapacity as it was not shown that these acts are | |||||
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2012-11-12 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[17] we decreed that psychological incapacity should refer to a mental incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants such as those enumerated in Article 68 of the Family Code and must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In an effort to settle the confusion that may arise in deciding cases involving nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, we then laid down the following guidelines in the later ruling in Molina,[18] viz: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. x x x. | |||||
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2011-01-24 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[45] the Court held that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. These guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified."[46] What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.[47] | |||||
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2011-01-17 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| Petitioner tried to make it appear that his family history of having a womanizer for a father, was one of the reasons why he engaged in extra-marital affairs during his marriage. However, it appears more likely that he became unfaithful as a result of a general dissatisfaction with his marriage rather than a psychological disorder rooted in his personal history. His tendency to womanize, assuming he had such tendency, was not shown to be due to causes of a psychological nature that is grave, permanent and incurable. In fact, the records show that when respondent learned of his affair, he immediately terminated it. In short, petitioner's marital infidelity does not appear to be symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of performing his spousal obligations. It has been held in various cases that sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity.[18] It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which make petitioner completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.[19] That not being the case with petitioner, his claim of psychological incapacity must fail. It bears stressing that psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Rather, it is essential that the concerned party was incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[20] the intention of the law is to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.[21] | |||||
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2010-12-08 |
BRION, J. |
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| In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[18] the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer to "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."[19] It must be confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. | |||||
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2010-12-01 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| Petitioner Noel contends that the CA failed to consider Maribel's refusal to procreate as psychological incapacity. Insofar as he was concerned, the last time he had sexual intercourse with Maribel was before the marriage when she was drunk. They never had any sexual intimacy during their marriage. Noel claims that if a spouse senselessly and constantly refuses to perform his or her marital obligations, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity rather than to stubborn refusal. He insists that the CA should not have considered the pre-marital sexual encounters between him and Maribel in finding that the latter was not psychologically incapacitated to procreate through marital sexual cooperation. He argues that making love for procreation and consummation of the marriage for the start of family life is different from "plain, simple and casual sex." He further stresses that Maribel railroaded him into marrying her by seducing him and later claiming that she was pregnant with his child. But after their marriage, Maribel refused to consummate their marriage as she would not be sexually intimate with him.[19] | |||||
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2010-08-18 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Santos v. Court of Appeals[11] solidified the jurisprudential foundation of the principle that the factors characterizing psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations are: (1) gravity, (2) juridical antecedence, and (3) incurability. We explained: The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.[12] | |||||
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2010-02-04 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| The seminal ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals[9] cites three (3) factors characterizing psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations: (1) gravity, (2) juridical antecedence, (3) incurability. We expounded on the foregoing, to wit: The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. | |||||
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2009-10-26 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| As early as 1995, in Santos v. Court of Appeals,[6] we categorically said that: Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.[7] (Emphasis supplied.) | |||||
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2009-08-14 |
BRION, J. |
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| A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides that "a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of its celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[30] the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. The defect should refer to "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage." It must be confined to "the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage." | |||||
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2009-07-03 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Santos v. Santos[32] cited the deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, which drafted the Code, to provide an insight on the import of Article 36 of the Family Code. It stated that a part of the provision is similar to the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law, which reads:Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage: | |||||
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2009-06-05 |
BRION, J. |
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| The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides that "a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[38] the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer to "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage." It must be confined to "the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage."[39] | |||||
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2009-03-31 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. On October 19, 2000, the CA rendered a Decision[38] reversing the trial court's ruling. It faulted the trial court's finding, stating that no proof was adduced to support the conclusion that Benjamin was psychologically incapacitated at the time he married Carmen since Dr. Oñate's conclusion was based only on theories and not on established fact,[39] contrary to the guidelines set forth in Santos v. Court of Appeals[40] and in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals and Molina.[41] | |||||
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2009-02-13 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision Committee that drafted the Family Code, Article 36 was based on grounds available in the Canon Law. Thus, Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero elucidated in her separate opinion in Santos v. Court of Appeals:[33] | |||||
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2007-04-13 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. In addition, as early as 1995, in Santos v. Court of Appeals,[4] we categorically said that psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. These include the obligations to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.[5] | |||||
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2005-09-21 |
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| In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[20] the term psychological incapacity was defined, thus ". . . [P]sychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated... | |||||
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2005-03-31 |
AZCUNA, J. |
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| . . . no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. . . .[18] The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the petitioner after the marriage as proof of his psychological incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Nevertheless, said courts considered these acts as willful and hence as grounds for granting moral damages. It is contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party because of an innate inability, while at the same time considering the same set of acts as willful. By declaring the petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was negated. The award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully concealed the same. No such evidence appears to have been adduced in this case. | |||||
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2004-10-27 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| It was in Santos v. Court of Appeals[42] where we declared that "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It should refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.[43] In Republic v. Court of Appeals[44] we expounded:(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state. The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity. | |||||