You're currently signed in as:
User

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO v. SECRETARY OF FINANCE

This case has been cited 16 times or more.

2012-02-28
BRION, J.
Similarly, the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282, in his Very Urgent Motion to Issue Clarificatory Resolution, argues that since motions for reconsideration were filed by the aggrieved parties challenging our October 18, 2011 decision in the present case, the TRO we initially issued on September 13, 2011 should remain subsisting and effective. He further argues that any attempt by the Executive to implement our October 18, 2011 decision pending resolution of the motions for reconsideration "borders on disrespect if not outright insolence"[39] to this Court.
2012-02-28
BRION, J.
In support of this theory, the petitioner cites Samad v. COMELEC,[40] where the Court held that while it had already issued a decision lifting the TRO, the lifting of the TRO is not yet final and executory, and can also be the subject of a motion for reconsideration. The petitioner also cites the minute resolution issued by the Court in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,[41]  where the Court reproached the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for manifesting its intention to implement the decision of the Court, noting that the Court had not yet lifted the TRO previously issued.[42]
2011-10-18
BRION, J.
The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,[19] explained the effect of the President's certification of necessity in the following manner: The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.
2011-10-18
BRION, J.
A basic rule in constitutional construction is that the words used should be understood in the sense that they have in common use and given their ordinary meaning, except when technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails.[15] As this Court explained in People v. Derilo,[16] "[a]s the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, its language should be understood in the sense that it may have in common. Its words should be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed."
2011-03-08
CARPIO, J.
As regards respondent's invocation of separation of powers, the Court reiterates that "the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people."[20] Thus, it has been held that "the power of judicial review is not so much power as it is [a] duty imposed on this Court by the Constitution and that we would be remiss in the performance of that duty if we decline to look behind the barriers set by the principle of separation of powers."[21] The Court, therefore, is not precluded from resolving the legal issues raised by the mere invocation by respondent of the doctrine of separation of powers. On the contrary, the resolution of the legal issues falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court.
2009-04-15
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Anent the issue of regressivity, it may be conceded that the assailed law imposes an excise tax on cigarettes which is a form of indirect tax, and thus, regressive in character. While there was an attempt to make the imposition of the excise tax more equitable by creating a four-tiered taxation system where higher priced cigarettes are taxed at a higher rate, still, every consumer, whether rich or poor, of a cigarette brand within a specific tax bracket pays the same tax rate. To this extent, the tax does not take into account the person's ability to pay. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the assailed law may be declared unconstitutional for being regressive in character because the Constitution does not prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes but merely provides that Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation. As we explained in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance:[19]
2009-04-02
TINGA, J.
If the goods or properties are acquired through donation, the acquisition would not be subject to VAT but to donor's tax under Section 98 instead.[33] It is the donor who would be liable to pay the donor's tax,[34] and the donation would be exempt if the donor's total net gifts during the calendar year does not exceed P100,000.00.[35]
2008-09-16
NACHURA, J.
Moreover, Smart's franchise was granted with the express condition that it is subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal.[48] As held in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance: [49]
2008-02-15
PUNO, C.J.
Much has been written on the philosophical basis of press freedom as part of the larger right of free discussion and expression. Its practical importance, though, is more easily grasped. It is the chief source of information on current affairs. It is the most pervasive and perhaps most powerful vehicle of opinion on public questions. It is the instrument by which citizens keep their government informed of their needs, their aspirations and their grievances. It is the sharpest weapon in the fight to keep government responsible and efficient. Without a vigilant press, the mistakes of every administration would go uncorrected and its abuses unexposed. As Justice Malcolm wrote in United States v. Bustos:[52]
2007-07-17
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,[20] this Court declared that Sections 11, 12, and 13 of Article II; Section 13 of Article XIII; and Section 2 of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution are not self-executing provisions. In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,[21] the Court referred to Section 1 of Article XIII and Section 2 of Article XIV of the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights. These provisions, which merely lay down a general principle, are distinguished from other constitutional provisions as non self-executing and, therefore, cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts; they do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights.[22]
2005-09-01
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Moreover, as far back as 1994 or more than ten years ago, in the case of Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance,[23] the Court already made the pronouncement that "[i]f a change is desired in the practice [of the Bicameral Conference Committee] it must be sought in Congress since this question is not covered by any constitutional provision but is only an internal rule of each house." [24] To date, Congress has not seen it fit to make such changes adverted to by the Court. It seems, therefore, that Congress finds the practices of the bicameral conference committee to be very useful for purposes of prompt and efficient legislative action.
2005-09-01
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Moreover, as far back as 1994 or more than ten years ago, in the case of Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance,[23] the Court already made the pronouncement that "[i]f a change is desired in the practice [of the Bicameral Conference Committee] it must be sought in Congress since this question is not covered by any constitutional provision but is only an internal rule of each house." [24] To date, Congress has not seen it fit to make such changes adverted to by the Court. It seems, therefore, that Congress finds the practices of the bicameral conference committee to be very useful for purposes of prompt and efficient legislative action.
2005-09-01
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
E.O. No. 273 was followed by R.A. No. 7716 or the Expanded VAT Law,[16] R.A. No. 8241 or the Improved VAT Law,[17] R.A. No. 8424 or the Tax Reform Act of 1997,[18] and finally, the presently beleaguered R.A. No. 9337, also referred to by respondents as the VAT Reform Act.