This case has been cited 15 times or more.
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2013-09-18 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| Patently, this responsive pleading of Villena demonstrates that he did not know the elementary rules on jurisdiction. Fundamental is the rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law and is not within the courts, let alone the parties themselves, to determine or conveniently set aside.[18] It cannot be waived except for those judicially recognizable grounds like estoppel. And it is not mooted by an action of a court in an erroneously filed case. It has been held in a plethora of cases that when the law or procedure is so elementary, not to know, or to act as if one does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law, even without the complainant having to prove malice or bad faith.[19] | |||||
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2013-06-05 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| The significance of the proper service of the summons on the defendant in an action in personam cannot be overemphasized. The service of the summons fulfills two fundamental objectives, namely: (a) to vest in the court jurisdiction over the person of the defendant;and (b) to afford to the defendant the opportunity to be heard on the claim brought against him.[19] As to the former, when jurisdiction in personam is not acquired in a civil action through the proper service of the summons or upon a valid waiver of such proper service, the ensuing trial and judgment are void.[20] If the defendant knowingly does an act inconsistent with the right to object to the lack of personal jurisdiction as to him, like voluntarily appearing in the action, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.[21] As to the latter, the essence of due process lies in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence the defendant may have in support of his defense.With the proper service of the summons being intended to afford to him the opportunity to be heard on the claim against him, he may also waive the process.[22] In other words, compliance with the rules regarding the service of the summons is as much an issue of due process as it is of jurisdiction.[23] | |||||
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2012-03-14 |
SERENO, J. |
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| At the outset, we rule that petitioner Republic is not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the lower court, even if the former raised the jurisdictional question only on appeal. The rule is settled that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.[18] Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law.[19] It cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court.[20] Consequently, questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable even if raised for the first time on appeal.[21] | |||||
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2011-11-28 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Petitioner counters that under this Court's ruling in the leading case of La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[41] a party may file a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over its person, and at the same time raise affirmative defenses and pray for affirmative relief, without waiving its objection to the acquisition of jurisdiction over its person.[42] | |||||
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2011-01-31 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| In La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[15] it was held that R.A. No. 876 explicitly confines the court's authority only to the determination of whether or not there is an agreement in writing providing for arbitration. In the affirmative, the statute ordains that the court shall issue an order summarily directing the parties to proceed with the arbitration in accordance with the terms thereof. If the court, upon the other hand, finds that no such agreement exists, the proceedings shall be dismissed. | |||||
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2010-09-29 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| Kukan International Corp. and Michael Chan are jointly and severally liable to pay the amount awarded to plaintiff pursuant to the decision of November [28], 2002 which has long been final and executory. | |||||
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2010-05-05 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| The doctrine of estoppel cannot be applied in this case as an exception to the statute of limitations on the assessment of taxes considering that there is a detailed procedure for the proper execution of the waiver, which the BIR must strictly follow. As we have often said, the doctrine of estoppel is predicated on, and has its origin in, equity which, broadly defined, is justice according to natural law and right.[22] As such, the doctrine of estoppel cannot give validity to an act that is prohibited by law or one that is against public policy.[23] It should be resorted to solely as a means of preventing injustice and should not be permitted to defeat the administration of the law, or to accomplish a wrong or secure an undue advantage, or to extend beyond them requirements of the transactions in which they originate.[24] Simply put, the doctrine of estoppel must be sparingly applied. | |||||
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2010-03-15 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| In refuting the contention of petitioner, respondent cited La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals[45] where we held that even if a party "challenges the jurisdiction of the court over his person, as by reason of absence or defective service of summons, and he also invokes other grounds for the dismissal of the action under Rule 16, he is not deemed to be in estoppel or to have waived his objection to the jurisdiction over his person."[46] | |||||
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2009-10-12 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| Moreover, the leading La Naval Drug Corp. v. Court of Appeals[26] applies to the instant case. Said case elucidates the current view in our jurisdiction that a special appearance before the court--challenging its jurisdiction over the person through a motion to dismiss even if the movant invokes other grounds--is not tantamount to estoppel or a waiver by the movant of his objection to jurisdiction over his person; and such is not constitutive of a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. | |||||
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2008-06-12 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| In De Rossi v. NLRC,[20] citing La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[21]the Court stated: Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit is yet another matter. Whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the action shall be dismissed. This defense may be interposed at any time, during appeal or even after final judgment. Such is understandable, as this kind of jurisdiction is conferred by law and not within the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside. | |||||
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2007-08-14 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Moreover, even though the petitioner raised other grounds in its Motion to Dismiss aside from lack of jurisdiction over its person, the same is not tantamount to its voluntary appearance or submission to the authority of the court a quo. While in De Midgely v. Ferandos,[40] it was held that, in a Motion to Dismiss, the allegation of grounds other than lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, including a prayer "for such other reliefs as" may be deemed "appropriate and proper" amounted to voluntary appearance, such ruling must be deemed superseded by the declaration of this Court in La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals[41] that estoppel by jurisdiction must be unequivocal and intentional. It would be absurd to hold that petitioner unequivocally and intentionally submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court by seeking other reliefs to which it might be entitled when the only relief that it could properly ask from the trial court is the dismissal of the complaint against it.[42] Thus, the allegation of grounds other than lack of jurisdiction with a prayer "for such other reliefs" as may be deemed "appropriate and proper" cannot be considered as unequivocal and intentional estoppel. Most telling is Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which expressly provides:SEC. 20. Voluntary appearance. - The defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.[43] (Emphasis supplied.) | |||||
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2007-01-22 |
TINGA, J. |
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| Climax-Arimco adds that an application to compel arbitration under Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 876 confers on the trial court only a limited and special jurisdiction, i.e., a jurisdiction solely to determine (a) whether or not the parties have a written contract to arbitrate, and (b) if the defendant has failed to comply with that contract. Respondent cites La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[22] which holds that in a proceeding to compel arbitration, "[t]he arbitration law explicitly confines the court's authority only to pass upon the issue of whether there is or there is no agreement in writing providing for arbitration," and "[i]n the affirmative, the statute ordains that the court shall issue an order 'summarily directing the parties to proceed with the arbitration in accordance with the terms thereof.'"[23] Climax-Arimco argues that R.A. No. 876 gives no room for any other issue to be dealt with in such a proceeding, and that the court presented with an application to compel arbitration may order arbitration or dismiss the same, depending solely on its finding as to those two limited issues. If either of these matters is disputed, the court is required to conduct a summary hearing on it. Gonzales's proposition contradicts both the trial court's limited jurisdiction and the summary nature of the proceeding itself. | |||||
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2005-07-29 |
TINGA, J. |
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| On the other hand, the cases of Dy v. NLRC,[27] La Naval Drug v. CA,[28] De Rossi vs. CA[29] and Union Motors Corporation v. NLRC[30] buttress the position of petitioner that jurisdiction is conferred by law and lack of jurisdiction may be questioned at any time even on appeal. | |||||
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2005-03-28 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| In this regard, petitioners should be reminded of the provision in the Rules of Court that a defendant's voluntary appearance in an action shall be equivalent to service of summons.[12] Further, the lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either expressly or impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If he does not wish to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion, and object thereto.[13] | |||||
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2004-05-31 |
TINGA, J, |
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| In contrast, jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the court by virtue of the party's or accused's voluntary submission to the authority of the court or through the exercise of its coercive processes.[6] To prevent the loss or waiver of this defense, the accused must raise the lack of jurisdiction seasonably by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court; otherwise, he shall be deemed to have submitted himself or his person to that jurisdiction.[7] In other words, jurisdiction over the person is waivable unlike jurisdiction over the subject-matter which is neither subject to agreement nor conferred by consent of the parties. | |||||