This case has been cited 10 times or more.
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2015-04-20 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| In Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco[46] (Ortigas), a civil case which was cited in Bañares II, the Court explained the nature of dismissals without prejudice:The dismissal of the case, and the lapse of the reglementary period to reconsider or set aside the dismissal, effectively operated to remove the case from the Court's docket. Even assuming the dismissal to be without prejudice, the case could no longer be reinstated or "revived" by mere motion in the original docketed action, but only by the filing of another complaint accompanied, of course, by the payment of the corresponding filing fees prescribed by law. x x x.[47] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The Court is not oblivious to the fact that Bañares II, where criminal cases were involved, uses the phrase "file a new complaint." It must be clarified, however, that Bañares II and Ortigas merely state the rule that when an order dismissing a case without prejudice has attained finality, the case may no longer be revived by mere motion as it is no longer within the court's power to modify or amend; instead, the action must be instituted anew. Bañares II and Ortigas did not require a new complaint for preliminary investigation in order to revive a criminal case. In this regard, it must be emphasized that "complaint" in civil cases is different from a "complaint" in criminal cases. In civil cases, the complaint is the initiatory pleading filed in court,[48] whereas in criminal cases, what is filed in court is an| Information and not a complaint, which is filed before the public prosecutor for purposes of conducting a preliminary investigation. Thus, "complaint" for purposes of reviving a case must then refer to Informations where what is involved is a criminal case. | |||||
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2015-01-21 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| [t]he dismissal of the case, and the lapse of the reglementary period to reconsider or set aside the dismissal, effectively operated to remove the case from the Court's docket. Even assuming the dismissal to be without prejudice, the case could no longer be reinstated or "revived" by mere motion in the original docketed action, but only by the payment of the corresponding filing fees prescribed by law. . . . There having been a dismissal or withdrawal of the action, albeit without prejudice, and the order considering the action withdrawn having become final, revival of the case could not be done except through the commencement of a new action, i.e., by the filing of another complaint and the payment of the concomitant docketing fees.[48] | |||||
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2015-01-21 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| (1) In the WIDORA case, Molina claimed that she, together with her predecessors-in-interest, were in "open, public, adverse, continuous and uninterrupted possession"[49] of the property for more than 30 years. Subsequently, she claimed to have acquired the property through purchase from Eusebia Molina and her heirs. (2) As to possession of document of title, Molina claimed that when she purchased the property from Eusebia Molina, she had no time to attend to the property's titling since "she was so preoccupied as the sole breadwinner of the family."[50] She later changed her story and claimed that she asked President Marcos to help her.[51] Next, she claimed that she was in possession of the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 124088.[52] She again changed her story and claimed that the owner's duplicate copy was not in her possession but she had "a certification from the Land Management Bureau [and] that there [was] a record of her property in a microfilm negative."[53] (3) The quitclaim and waiver she executed in favor of the Mormons was an "implied recognition of Ortigas' ownership."[54] (4) Jurisprudence shows that the validity of Ortigas' titles had been decided upon in several cases, namely: (a) Cia. Agricola de Ultramar v. Domingo[55] (b) Ortigas v. Hon. Ruiz[56] (c) Del Rosario v. Ortigas[57] (d) Navarro v. Ortigas[58] (e) Resolution dated August 7, 1992, where this court affirmed the Court of Appeals Decision in CA G.R. SP No. 18085.[59] The Court of Appeals stated that "Widora and Molina had no more right to apply for the same lands which had already been titled in the name of Ortigas."[60] This court also held that Judge Velasco erred in dismissing the Notices of Appeal filed by Ortigas and the Office of the Solicitor General[61] and in granting Molina's Motion for Execution pending appeal.[62] | |||||
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2015-01-21 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| Ownership over the properties has been decided and passed upon with finality in the following cases: Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Judge Tirso Velasco and Dolores V. Molina,[199] Dolores V. Molina v. Hon. Presiding Judge of RTC, Quezon City, Br. 105 and Manila Banking Corporation,[200] Dolores V. Molina and Aproniano L. Timbol v. Court of Appeals and Epimaco V. Oreta,[201] Epimaco V. Oreta v. Hon. George Macli-ing, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 100, and Dolores V. Molina and Aproniano L. Timbol.[202] | |||||
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2008-12-18 |
TINGA, J. |
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| There is no doubt that the Court of Appeals does not have original jurisdiction to annul Torrens titles or to otherwise adjudicate questions over ownership of property. Its exclusive original jurisdiction is determined by law, particularly by Batas Pambansa (B.P. 129). Section 9 of that law restricts the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to special civil actions and to actions for annulment of judgments of the regional trial court.[39] Still, the Court of Appeals did acquire jurisdiction over the Barques' and the Manotoks' petitions, albeit in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction[40] over the ruling of the LRA, also pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. Thus, for the appellate court to be able to direct the cancellation of a Torrens title in the course of reviewing a decision of the LRA, the LRA itself must have statutory authority to cancel a Torrens title in the first place. | |||||
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2006-07-17 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| We have since reiterated this ruling in Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco[34] and Puzon. | |||||
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2006-03-28 |
TINGA, J. |
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| Petitioners are unable to propose any convincing legal argument or any jurisprudence that would sway the Court to their point of view. At the same time, our present ruling must be distinguished from Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco, [28] wherein it was advanced that "theoretically every final disposition of an action does not attain finality until after fifteen (15) days therefrom, x x x the plaintiff may move to withdraw and set aside his notice of dismissal and revive his action, before that period lapses." [28] That statement was made in the context of ruling that a plaintiff may move for the revival of the complaint dismissed on his instance under Section 1 of Rule 17 only within 15 days upon notice; otherwise the remedy of the plaintiff would be to file a new complaint. This observation in Ortigas does not detract from the fact that under Section 1, Rule 17 of the previous Rules, the complaint is deemed ipso facto dismissed on the day of the filing of the notice. This again is because dismissal at the instance of the plaintiff under Section 1, Rule 17 is a matter of right, and under the 1964 Rules of Civil Procedure, effective without need of any affirmative action on the part of the trial court. | |||||
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2005-12-12 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| ... [L]ands already covered by duly issued existing Torrens Titles ... cannot be the subject of petitions for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles filed by third parties without first securing by final judgment the cancellation of such existing titles. ... The courts simply have no jurisdiction over petitions by such third parties for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles over lands that are already covered by duly issued subsisting titles in the names of their duly registered owners. The very concept of stability and indefeasibility of titles covered under the Torrens System of registration rules out as anathema the issuance of two certificates of title over the same land to two different holders thereof. ...[38] The Alabang ruling was premised on the fact that the existing Torrens title was duly issued and that there is only one title subsisting at the time the petition for reconstitution was filed. In the instant case, it cannot be said that petitioners' title was duly issued much less could it be presumed valid considering the findings of the LRA and the Court of Appeals that the same is sham and spurious. | |||||
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2003-09-11 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| In the parallel case of Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco,[13] we held:His Honor was apparently incognizant of the principle that dismissals of appeals from the judgment of a Regional Trial Court by the latter are authorized only in the instances specifically set forth in Section 13, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. The succeeding provision, Section 14 of said Rule 41, provides that "(a) motion to dismiss an appeal may be filed in the (Regional Trial) Court . . . prior to the transmittal of the record to the appellate court;" and the grounds are limited to those "mentioned in the preceding section," i.e., Section 13 to wit: where "the notice of appeal, appeal bond, or record on appeal is not filed within the period of time herein provided . . ." | |||||