Lawyerly

GR No. 155227-28

2011-02-09

EMILIANA G. PEÑA v. SPS. ARMANDO TOLENTINO AND LETICIA TOLENTINO

BERSAMIN, J.

Indeed, the settled rule in this jurisdiction, according to Mon v. Court of Appeals,[34] is that a party cannot change his theory of the case or his cause of action on appeal. This rule affirms that "courts of justice have no jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in issue." Thus, a judgment that goes beyond the issues and purports to adjudicate something on which the court did not hear the parties is not only irregular but also extrajudicial and invalid.[35] The legal theory under which the controversy was heard and decided in the trial court should be the same theory under which the review on appeal is conducted. Otherwise, prejudice will result to the adverse party. We stress that points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the lower court will not be ordinarily considered by a reviewing court, inasmuch as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.[36] This would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process.[37]

GR No. 169227

2010-07-05

PHILIPPINE RURAL RECONSTRUCTION MOVEMENT v. VIRGILIO E. PULGAR

BRION, J.

As a factual matter, this issue should have been raised at the earliest opportunity before the Labor Arbiter, to allow both parties to present their evidence. The rule is well-settled that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the trial court need not be, and ordinarily will not be considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal[28] because this would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.[29]

GR No. 158312

2008-11-14

JOHN DY v. PEOPLE

QUISUMBING, J.

During the joint pre-trial conference of this case, Dy admitted that he issued the checks, and that the signatures appearing on them were his.[29] The facts reveal that the checks were issued in blank because of the uncertainty of the volume of products to be retrieved, the discount that can be availed of, and the deduction for bad orders. Nevertheless, we must stress that what the law punishes is simply the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating thereto.[30] If inquiry into the reason for which the checks are issued, or the terms and conditions of their issuance is required, the public's faith in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes will certainly erode.[31]

GR No. 142399

2008-03-12

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES v. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

Petitioner PAL maintains that in extending the grant of the 13th month pay or mid-year bonus to employees who are not covered by the CBA, the Court of Appeals, in effect, "modified or altered the terms of said agreement and expanded its coverage to non-regular employees who are not covered by the bargaining unit."[29] The issue on modification or alteration of the CBA, however, was raised by petitioner PAL rather belatedly and invoked for the first time on appeal. This being the case, We are barred from taking cognizance of and resolving the issue for it would be violative of the proscription against the presentation of new issues on appeal. To do otherwise would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.[30]

GR No. 154438

2007-09-05

ALICIA F. RICAFORTE v. LEON L. JURADO

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

Also, in Cruz v. Court of Appeals,[30] we held: It is now settled that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 applies even in cases where dishonored checks are issued merely in the form of a deposit or a guarantee. The enactment in question does not make any distinction as to whether the checks within its contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or merely to guarantee the said obligation. In accordance with the pertinent rule of statutory construction, inasmuch as the law has not made any distinction in this regard, no such distinction can be made by means of interpretation or application. Furthermore, the history of the enactment of subject statute evinces the definite legislative intent to make the prohibition all-embracing, without making any exception from the operation thereof in favor of a guarantee. This intent may be gathered from the statement of the sponsor of the bill (Cabinet Bill No. 9) which was enacted later into Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, when it was introduced before the Batasan Pambansa, that the bill was introduced to discourage the issuance of bouncing checks, to prevent checks, from becoming 'useless scraps of paper' and to restore respectability to checks, all without distinction as to the purpose of the issuance of the checks. The legislative intent as above said is made all the more clear when it is considered that while the original text of Cabinet Bill No. 9, supra, had contained a proviso excluding from the coverage of the law a check issued as a mere guarantee, the final version of the bill as approved and enacted by the Committee on the Revision of Laws in the Batasan deleted the abovementioned qualifying proviso deliberately for the purpose of making the enforcement of the act more effective (Batasan Record, First Regular Session, December 4, 1978, Volume II, pp. 1035-1036).

GR No. 141181

2007-04-27

SAMSON CHING v. CLARITA NICDAO

CALLEJO, SR., J.

Under the foregoing circumstances, the MCTC declared that the conviction of respondent Nicdao was warranted. It stressed that the mere act of issuing a worthless check was malum prohibitum; hence, even if the checks were issued in the form of deposit or guarantee, once dishonored, the same gave rise to the prosecution for and conviction of BP 22.[26] The decretal portion of the MCTC decision reads: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the accused is found guilty of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in 11 counts, and is hereby ordered to pay the private complainant the amount of P20,950,000.00 plus 12% interest per annum from date of filing of the complaint until the total amount had been paid. The prayer for moral damages is denied for lack of evidence to prove the same. She is likewise ordered to suffer imprisonment equivalent to 1 year for every check issued and which penalty shall be served successively.SO ORDERED.[27] Incidentally, on January 11, 1999, the MCTC likewise rendered its judgment in Criminal Cases Nos. 9458-9471 and convicted respondent Nicdao of the fourteen (14) counts of violation of BP 22 filed against her by Nuguid.

GR No. 146424

2005-11-18

ALBINO JOSEF v. PEOPLE**

CORONA, J.

Regarding petitioner's allegation of good faith, suffice it to say that such a claim is immaterial, the offense in question being malum prohibitum.[15] The gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a bad check and therefore, whether or not malice and intent attended such issuance is unimportant.[16]

GR No. 149275

2004-09-27

VICKY C. TY v. PEOPLE

TINGA, J.

The knowledge of the payee of the insufficiency or lack of funds of the drawer with the drawee bank is immaterial as deceit is not an essential element of an offense penalized by B.P. 22. The gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a bad check, hence, malice and intent in the issuance thereof is inconsequential.[48]

GR No. 106804

2004-08-12

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. CA

CARPIO, J.

We cannot fault the Court of Appeals for not considering NPC's objections against the subsistence of Pobre's claim for damages. NPC neither included this issue in its assignment of errors nor discussed it in its appellant's brief. NPC also failed to question the trial court's 8 January 1985 Order in the petition for certiorari[12] it had earlier filed with the Court of Appeals. It is only before this Court that NPC now vigorously assails the preservation of Pobre's claim for damages. Clearly, NPC's opposition to the existence of Pobre's claim for damages is a mere afterthought. Rules of fair play, justice and due process dictate that parties cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal.[13]

GR No. 143584

2004-03-10

SPS. ANTONIO AND SOLEDAD CONSING v. CA

CARPIO, J.

We will not allow Antonio and Soledad to adopt a new defense at this very late stage of the case. To permit them to do so would not only be unfair to the other party but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.[13] Thus, we will not delve into Antonio and Soledad's new claim that PNB should be liable to SPCMA because PNB managed their farm. The fact that Antonio and Soledad are introducing this unsubstantiated claim for the very first time is proof that this defense is just an afterthought.

	GR No. 155227-28 2011-02-09	EMILIANA G. PEÑA v. SPS. ARMANDO TOLENTINO AND LETICIA TOLENTINO BERSAMIN, J.
Indeed, the settled rule in this jurisdiction, according to Mon v. Court of Appeals,[34] is that a party cannot change his theory of the case or his cause of action on appeal. This rule affirms that "courts of justice have no jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in issue." Thus, a judgment that goes beyond the issues and purports to adjudicate something on which the court did not hear the parties is not only irregular but also extrajudicial and invalid.[35] The legal theory under which the controversy was heard and decided in the trial court should be the same theory under which the review on appeal is conducted. Otherwise, prejudice will result to the adverse party. We stress that points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the lower court will not be ordinarily considered by a reviewing court, inasmuch as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.[36] This would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process.[37]
	GR No. 169227 2010-07-05	PHILIPPINE RURAL RECONSTRUCTION MOVEMENT v. VIRGILIO E. PULGAR BRION, J.
As a factual matter, this issue should have been raised at the earliest opportunity before the Labor Arbiter, to allow both parties to present their evidence. The rule is well-settled that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the trial court need not be, and ordinarily will not be considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal[28] because this would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.[29]
	GR No. 158312 2008-11-14	JOHN DY v. PEOPLE QUISUMBING, J.
During the joint pre-trial conference of this case, Dy admitted that he issued the checks, and that the signatures appearing on them were his.[29] The facts reveal that the checks were issued in blank because of the uncertainty of the volume of products to be retrieved, the discount that can be availed of, and the deduction for bad orders. Nevertheless, we must stress that what the law punishes is simply the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating thereto.[30] If inquiry into the reason for which the checks are issued, or the terms and conditions of their issuance is required, the public's faith in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes will certainly erode.[31]
	GR No. 142399 2008-03-12	PHILIPPINE AIRLINES v. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Petitioner PAL maintains that in extending the grant of the 13th month pay or mid-year bonus to employees who are not covered by the CBA, the Court of Appeals, in effect, "modified or altered the terms of said agreement and expanded its coverage to non-regular employees who are not covered by the bargaining unit."[29] The issue on modification or alteration of the CBA, however, was raised by petitioner PAL rather belatedly and invoked for the first time on appeal. This being the case, We are barred from taking cognizance of and resolving the issue for it would be violative of the proscription against the presentation of new issues on appeal. To do otherwise would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.[30]
	GR No. 154438 2007-09-05	ALICIA F. RICAFORTE v. LEON L. JURADO AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Also, in Cruz v. Court of Appeals,[30] we held: It is now settled that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 applies even in cases where dishonored checks are issued merely in the form of a deposit or a guarantee. The enactment in question does not make any distinction as to whether the checks within its contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or merely to guarantee the said obligation. In accordance with the pertinent rule of statutory construction, inasmuch as the law has not made any distinction in this regard, no such distinction can be made by means of interpretation or application. Furthermore, the history of the enactment of subject statute evinces the definite legislative intent to make the prohibition all-embracing, without making any exception from the operation thereof in favor of a guarantee. This intent may be gathered from the statement of the sponsor of the bill (Cabinet Bill No. 9) which was enacted later into Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, when it was introduced before the Batasan Pambansa, that the bill was introduced to discourage the issuance of bouncing checks, to prevent checks, from becoming 'useless scraps of paper' and to restore respectability to checks, all without distinction as to the purpose of the issuance of the checks. The legislative intent as above said is made all the more clear when it is considered that while the original text of Cabinet Bill No. 9, supra, had contained a proviso excluding from the coverage of the law a check issued as a mere guarantee, the final version of the bill as approved and enacted by the Committee on the Revision of Laws in the Batasan deleted the abovementioned qualifying proviso deliberately for the purpose of making the enforcement of the act more effective (Batasan Record, First Regular Session, December 4, 1978, Volume II, pp. 1035-1036).
	GR No. 141181 2007-04-27	SAMSON CHING v. CLARITA NICDAO CALLEJO, SR., J.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the MCTC declared that the conviction of respondent Nicdao was warranted. It stressed that the mere act of issuing a worthless check was malum prohibitum; hence, even if the checks were issued in the form of deposit or guarantee, once dishonored, the same gave rise to the prosecution for and conviction of BP 22.[26] The decretal portion of the MCTC decision reads: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the accused is found guilty of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in 11 counts, and is hereby ordered to pay the private complainant the amount of P20,950,000.00 plus 12% interest per annum from date of filing of the complaint until the total amount had been paid. The prayer for moral damages is denied for lack of evidence to prove the same. She is likewise ordered to suffer imprisonment equivalent to 1 year for every check issued and which penalty shall be served successively.SO ORDERED.[27] Incidentally, on January 11, 1999, the MCTC likewise rendered its judgment in Criminal Cases Nos. 9458-9471 and convicted respondent Nicdao of the fourteen (14) counts of violation of BP 22 filed against her by Nuguid.
	GR No. 146424 2005-11-18	ALBINO JOSEF v. PEOPLE** CORONA, J.
Regarding petitioner's allegation of good faith, suffice it to say that such a claim is immaterial, the offense in question being malum prohibitum.[15] The gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a bad check and therefore, whether or not malice and intent attended such issuance is unimportant.[16]
	GR No. 149275 2004-09-27	VICKY C. TY v. PEOPLE TINGA, J.
The knowledge of the payee of the insufficiency or lack of funds of the drawer with the drawee bank is immaterial as deceit is not an essential element of an offense penalized by B.P. 22. The gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a bad check, hence, malice and intent in the issuance thereof is inconsequential.[48]
	GR No. 106804 2004-08-12	NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. CA CARPIO, J.
We cannot fault the Court of Appeals for not considering NPC's objections against the subsistence of Pobre's claim for damages. NPC neither included this issue in its assignment of errors nor discussed it in its appellant's brief. NPC also failed to question the trial court's 8 January 1985 Order in the petition for certiorari[12] it had earlier filed with the Court of Appeals. It is only before this Court that NPC now vigorously assails the preservation of Pobre's claim for damages. Clearly, NPC's opposition to the existence of Pobre's claim for damages is a mere afterthought. Rules of fair play, justice and due process dictate that parties cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal.[13]
	GR No. 143584 2004-03-10	SPS. ANTONIO AND SOLEDAD CONSING v. CA CARPIO, J.
We will not allow Antonio and Soledad to adopt a new defense at this very late stage of the case. To permit them to do so would not only be unfair to the other party but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.[13] Thus, we will not delve into Antonio and Soledad's new claim that PNB should be liable to SPCMA because PNB managed their farm. The fact that Antonio and Soledad are introducing this unsubstantiated claim for the very first time is proof that this defense is just an afterthought.

ROBERTO CRUZ v. CA