Lawyerly

GR No. 209287

2014-07-01

MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO v. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III

BERSAMIN, J.

The Court has cogently observed in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.[46] that "[s]tanding is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest."

GR No. 201112

2012-06-13

ARCHBISHOP FERNANDO R. CAPALLA v. COMELEC

PERALTA, J.

In G.R. No. 201418, petitioners Tanggulang Demokrasya (Tan Dem), Inc., Evelyn L. Kilayko, Teresita D. Baltazar, Pilar L. Calderon and Elita T. Montilla pray that the Court annul Resolution No. 9376 and the March 30, 2012 Deed of Sale, and prohibit the Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM from implementing the same; and declare said Resolution and Deed of Sale invalid for having been issued and executed by the Comelec with grave abuse of discretion and for violating the provisions of R.A. 9184.[25]

GR No. 192935

2010-12-07

LOUIS 'BAROK' C. BIRAOGO v. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

MENDOZA, J.

The OSG claims that the determinants of transcendental importance[28] laid down in CREBA v. ERC and Meralco[29] are non-existent in this case. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo's assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Where the issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, they should be resolved for the guidance of all.[30] Undoubtedly, the Filipino people are more than interested to know the status of the President's first effort to bring about a promised change to the country. The Court takes cognizance of the petition not due to overwhelming political undertones that clothe the issue in the eyes of the public, but because the Court stands firm in its oath to perform its constitutional duty to settle legal controversies with overreaching significance to society.

GR No. 168387

2010-08-25

SALUN-AT MARQUEZ v. ELOISA ESPEJO

DEL CASTILLO, J.

Based on the foregoing, the resolution of the instant case necessitates an examination of the parties' respective parol evidence, in order to determine the true intent of the parties. Well-settled is the rule that in case of doubt, it is the intention of the contracting parties that prevails, for the intention is the soul of a contract,[45] not its wording which is prone to mistakes, inadequacies, or ambiguities. To hold otherwise would give life, validity, and precedence to mere typographical errors and defeat the very purpose of agreements.

GR No. 189793

2010-04-07

SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III v. COMELEC

PEREZ, J.

Anent the locus standi requirement, this Court has already uniformly ruled in Kilosbayan v. Guingona,[18] Tatad v. Executive Secretary,[19] Chavez v. Public Estates Authority[20] and Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,[21] just to name a few, that absence of direct injury on the part of the party seeking judicial review may be excused when the latter is able to craft an issue of transcendental importance. In Lim v. Executive Secretary,[22] this Court held that in cases of transcendental importance, the cases must be settled promptly and definitely, and so, the standing requirements may be relaxed. This liberal stance has been echoed in the more recent decision on Chavez v. Gonzales.[23]

GR No. 187883

2009-06-16

ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO v. SPEAKER PROSPERO C. NOGRALES

PUNO, C.J.

The rule on locus standi is not a plain procedural rule but a constitutional requirement derived from Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which mandates courts of justice to settle only "actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." As stated in Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, Jr.,[17] viz.:x x x [C]ourts are neither free to decide all kinds of cases dumped into their laps nor are they free to open their doors to all parties or entities claiming a grievance. The rationale for this constitutional requirement of locus standi is by no means trifle. It is intended "to assure a vigorous adversary presentation of the case, and, perhaps more importantly to warrant the judiciary's overruling the determination of a coordinate, democratically elected organ of government." It thus goes to the very essence of representative democracies.

GR No. 170338

2008-12-23

GARCILLANO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION

NACHURA, J.

Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No. 179275 shows that the petitioners and intervenor Sagge advance constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. The issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, and should be resolved for the guidance of all.[34]

GR No. 176951

2008-11-18

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC

CARPIO, J.

In any event, the Court in more than one instance has taken a liberal stance as far as standing is concerned. This is especially true when important constitutional issues are at stake. The cases of Philippine Constitution Association, Inc. v. Gimenez,[52] Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,[53] Guingona, Jr. v. Carague,[54] Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR),[55] Osmeña v. Commission on Elections,[56] Carpio v. Executive Secretary,[57] Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr.,[58] Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,[59] and Agan v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.,[60] bear witness to the liberal attitude of the Court on locus standi.

GR NO. 177721

2007-07-03

KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA

AZCUNA, J.

THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION HAS PREEMPTIVE LEGAL AUTHORITY OR PRIMARY ADMINISTRATIVE JURIDICTION TO MAKE A DETERMINATION AS REGARDS THE CITIZENSHIP OF RESPONDENT ONG, AND UPON SUBSEQUENT CONFIRMATION BY THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AS REQUIRED BY THE RULES, ISSUE A DECLARATION (I.E., IDENTIFICATION CERTIFICATE NO. 113878) RECOGNIZING THAT RESPONDENT ONG IS A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO, THEREBY RENDERING NONEXISTENT ANY CONTITUTIONAL IMPEDIMENT FOR HIM TO ASSUME THE POSITION OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT.[7] Petitioners, in turn, filed a Consolidated Reply, in which they asserted their standing to file this suit on the strength of previous decisions of this Court, e.g., Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona[8] and Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato,[9] on the ground that the case is one of transcendental importance. They claim that the President's appointment of respondent Ong as Supreme Court Justice violates the Constitution and is, therefore, attended with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Finally, they reiterate that respondent Ong's birth certificate, unless corrected by judicial order in non-summary proceedings for the purpose, is binding on all and is prima facie evidence of what it states, namely, that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen. The alleged naturalization of his father when he was a minor would not make him a natural-born Filipino citizen.

GR NO. 155027

2006-02-28

VETERANS FEDERATION OF PHILIPPINES v. ANGELO T. REYES

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

We also observed in the same COCOFED case that "(e)ven if the money is allocated for a special purpose and raised by special means, it is still public in character."[37] In the case at bar, some of the funds were raised by even more special means, as the contributions from affiliate organizations of the VFP can hardly be regarded as enforced contributions as to be considered taxes. They are more in the nature of donations which have always been recognized as a source of public funding. Affiliate organizations of the VFP cannot complain of their contributions becoming public funds upon the receipt by the VFP, since they are presumed aware of the provisions of Rep. Act No. 2640 which not only specifies the exclusive purposes for which VFP funds can be used, but also provides for the regulation of such funds by the national government through the Secretary of National Defense. There is nothing wrong, whether legally or morally, from raising revenues through non-traditional methods. As remarked by Justice Florentino Feliciano in his concurring opinion in Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, Jr.[38] where he explained that the funds raised by the On-line Lottery System were also public in nature, thus:x x x [T]he more successful the government is in raising revenues by non-traditional methods such as PAGCOR operations and privatization measures, the lesser will be the pressure upon the traditional sources of public revenues, i.e., the pocket books of individual taxpayers and importers.

GR NO. 157509

2005-01-18

AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY WORKERS ALLIANCE v. ALBERTO ROMULO

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

In fine, considering that the governmental act being questioned has a limited reach, its impact confined to corridors of the executive department, this is not one of those exceptional occasions where the Court is justified in sweeping aside a critical procedural requirement, rooted as it is in the constitutionally enshrined principle of separation of powers. As succinctly put by Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno in his dissenting opinion in the first Kilosbayan case:[19]

GR No. 159139

2004-01-13

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC

PANGANIBAN, J.

Contract. Nowhere in that Contract is there any mention of a consortium or joint venture, of members thereof, much less of joint and several liability. Supposedly executed sometime in May 2003,[43] the Contract bears a notarization date of June 30, 2003, and contains the signature of Willy U. Yu signing as president of MPEI (not for and on behalf of MPC), along with that of the Comelec chair. It provides in Section 3.2 that MPEI (not MPC) is to supply the Equipment and perform the Services under the Contract, in accordance with the appendices thereof; nothing whatsoever is said about any consortium or joint venture or partnership. Second, the portions of Section 1.4 of the Contract reproduced above do not have the effect of curing (much less preventing) deficiencies in the bilateral agreements entered into by MPEI with the other members of the "consortium," with respect to their joint

GR No. 155001

2003-05-05

DEMOSTHENES P. AGAN v. PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO.

PUNO, J.

Standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Although we are not unmindful of the cases of Imus Electric Co. v. Municipality of Imus[13]and Gonzales v. Raquiza[14]whereinthis Court held that appropriation must be made only on amounts immediately demandable, public interest demands that we take a more liberal view in determining whether the petitioners suing as legislators, taxpayers and citizens have locus standi to file the instant petition. In Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona,[15] this Court held "[i]n line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi, ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and even association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations were allowed to initiate and prosecute actions before this Court to question the constitutionality or validity of laws, acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government agencies or instrumentalities."[16] Further, "insofar as taxpayers' suits are concerned . . . (this Court) is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained."[17] As such ". . . even if, strictly speaking, they [the petitioners] are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised."[18] In view of the serious legal questions involved and their impact on public interest, we resolve to grant standing to the petitioners.

	GR No. 209287 2014-07-01	MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO v. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III BERSAMIN, J.
The Court has cogently observed in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.[46] that "[s]tanding is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest."
	GR No. 201112 2012-06-13	ARCHBISHOP FERNANDO R. CAPALLA v. COMELEC PERALTA, J.
In G.R. No. 201418, petitioners Tanggulang Demokrasya (Tan Dem), Inc., Evelyn L. Kilayko, Teresita D. Baltazar, Pilar L. Calderon and Elita T. Montilla pray that the Court annul Resolution No. 9376 and the March 30, 2012 Deed of Sale, and prohibit the Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM from implementing the same; and declare said Resolution and Deed of Sale invalid for having been issued and executed by the Comelec with grave abuse of discretion and for violating the provisions of R.A. 9184.[25]
	GR No. 192935 2010-12-07	LOUIS 'BAROK' C. BIRAOGO v. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010 MENDOZA, J.
The OSG claims that the determinants of transcendental importance[28] laid down in CREBA v. ERC and Meralco[29] are non-existent in this case. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo's assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Where the issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, they should be resolved for the guidance of all.[30] Undoubtedly, the Filipino people are more than interested to know the status of the President's first effort to bring about a promised change to the country. The Court takes cognizance of the petition not due to overwhelming political undertones that clothe the issue in the eyes of the public, but because the Court stands firm in its oath to perform its constitutional duty to settle legal controversies with overreaching significance to society.
	GR No. 168387 2010-08-25	SALUN-AT MARQUEZ v. ELOISA ESPEJO DEL CASTILLO, J.
Based on the foregoing, the resolution of the instant case necessitates an examination of the parties' respective parol evidence, in order to determine the true intent of the parties. Well-settled is the rule that in case of doubt, it is the intention of the contracting parties that prevails, for the intention is the soul of a contract,[45] not its wording which is prone to mistakes, inadequacies, or ambiguities. To hold otherwise would give life, validity, and precedence to mere typographical errors and defeat the very purpose of agreements.
	GR No. 189793 2010-04-07	SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III v. COMELEC PEREZ, J.
Anent the locus standi requirement, this Court has already uniformly ruled in Kilosbayan v. Guingona,[18] Tatad v. Executive Secretary,[19] Chavez v. Public Estates Authority[20] and Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,[21] just to name a few, that absence of direct injury on the part of the party seeking judicial review may be excused when the latter is able to craft an issue of transcendental importance. In Lim v. Executive Secretary,[22] this Court held that in cases of transcendental importance, the cases must be settled promptly and definitely, and so, the standing requirements may be relaxed. This liberal stance has been echoed in the more recent decision on Chavez v. Gonzales.[23]
	GR No. 187883 2009-06-16	ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO v. SPEAKER PROSPERO C. NOGRALES PUNO, C.J.
The rule on locus standi is not a plain procedural rule but a constitutional requirement derived from Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which mandates courts of justice to settle only "actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." As stated in Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, Jr.,[17] viz.:x x x [C]ourts are neither free to decide all kinds of cases dumped into their laps nor are they free to open their doors to all parties or entities claiming a grievance. The rationale for this constitutional requirement of locus standi is by no means trifle. It is intended "to assure a vigorous adversary presentation of the case, and, perhaps more importantly to warrant the judiciary's overruling the determination of a coordinate, democratically elected organ of government." It thus goes to the very essence of representative democracies.
	GR No. 170338 2008-12-23	GARCILLANO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION NACHURA, J.
Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No. 179275 shows that the petitioners and intervenor Sagge advance constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. The issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, and should be resolved for the guidance of all.[34]
	GR No. 176951 2008-11-18	LEAGUE OF CITIES OF PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC CARPIO, J.
In any event, the Court in more than one instance has taken a liberal stance as far as standing is concerned. This is especially true when important constitutional issues are at stake. The cases of Philippine Constitution Association, Inc. v. Gimenez,[52] Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,[53] Guingona, Jr. v. Carague,[54] Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR),[55] Osmeña v. Commission on Elections,[56] Carpio v. Executive Secretary,[57] Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr.,[58] Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,[59] and Agan v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.,[60] bear witness to the liberal attitude of the Court on locus standi.
	GR NO. 177721 2007-07-03	KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA AZCUNA, J.
THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION HAS PREEMPTIVE LEGAL AUTHORITY OR PRIMARY ADMINISTRATIVE JURIDICTION TO MAKE A DETERMINATION AS REGARDS THE CITIZENSHIP OF RESPONDENT ONG, AND UPON SUBSEQUENT CONFIRMATION BY THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AS REQUIRED BY THE RULES, ISSUE A DECLARATION (I.E., IDENTIFICATION CERTIFICATE NO. 113878) RECOGNIZING THAT RESPONDENT ONG IS A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO, THEREBY RENDERING NONEXISTENT ANY CONTITUTIONAL IMPEDIMENT FOR HIM TO ASSUME THE POSITION OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT.[7] Petitioners, in turn, filed a Consolidated Reply, in which they asserted their standing to file this suit on the strength of previous decisions of this Court, e.g., Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona[8] and Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato,[9] on the ground that the case is one of transcendental importance. They claim that the President's appointment of respondent Ong as Supreme Court Justice violates the Constitution and is, therefore, attended with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Finally, they reiterate that respondent Ong's birth certificate, unless corrected by judicial order in non-summary proceedings for the purpose, is binding on all and is prima facie evidence of what it states, namely, that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen. The alleged naturalization of his father when he was a minor would not make him a natural-born Filipino citizen.
	GR NO. 155027 2006-02-28	VETERANS FEDERATION OF PHILIPPINES v. ANGELO T. REYES CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
We also observed in the same COCOFED case that "(e)ven if the money is allocated for a special purpose and raised by special means, it is still public in character."[37] In the case at bar, some of the funds were raised by even more special means, as the contributions from affiliate organizations of the VFP can hardly be regarded as enforced contributions as to be considered taxes. They are more in the nature of donations which have always been recognized as a source of public funding. Affiliate organizations of the VFP cannot complain of their contributions becoming public funds upon the receipt by the VFP, since they are presumed aware of the provisions of Rep. Act No. 2640 which not only specifies the exclusive purposes for which VFP funds can be used, but also provides for the regulation of such funds by the national government through the Secretary of National Defense. There is nothing wrong, whether legally or morally, from raising revenues through non-traditional methods. As remarked by Justice Florentino Feliciano in his concurring opinion in Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, Jr.[38] where he explained that the funds raised by the On-line Lottery System were also public in nature, thus:x x x [T]he more successful the government is in raising revenues by non-traditional methods such as PAGCOR operations and privatization measures, the lesser will be the pressure upon the traditional sources of public revenues, i.e., the pocket books of individual taxpayers and importers.
	GR NO. 157509 2005-01-18	AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY WORKERS ALLIANCE v. ALBERTO ROMULO CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
In fine, considering that the governmental act being questioned has a limited reach, its impact confined to corridors of the executive department, this is not one of those exceptional occasions where the Court is justified in sweeping aside a critical procedural requirement, rooted as it is in the constitutionally enshrined principle of separation of powers. As succinctly put by Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno in his dissenting opinion in the first Kilosbayan case:[19]
	GR No. 159139 2004-01-13	INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC PANGANIBAN, J.
Contract. Nowhere in that Contract is there any mention of a consortium or joint venture, of members thereof, much less of joint and several liability. Supposedly executed sometime in May 2003,[43] the Contract bears a notarization date of June 30, 2003, and contains the signature of Willy U. Yu signing as president of MPEI (not for and on behalf of MPC), along with that of the Comelec chair. It provides in Section 3.2 that MPEI (not MPC) is to supply the Equipment and perform the Services under the Contract, in accordance with the appendices thereof; nothing whatsoever is said about any consortium or joint venture or partnership. Second, the portions of Section 1.4 of the Contract reproduced above do not have the effect of curing (much less preventing) deficiencies in the bilateral agreements entered into by MPEI with the other members of the "consortium," with respect to their joint
	GR No. 155001 2003-05-05	DEMOSTHENES P. AGAN v. PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO. PUNO, J.
Standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Although we are not unmindful of the cases of Imus Electric Co. v. Municipality of Imus[13]and Gonzales v. Raquiza[14]whereinthis Court held that appropriation must be made only on amounts immediately demandable, public interest demands that we take a more liberal view in determining whether the petitioners suing as legislators, taxpayers and citizens have locus standi to file the instant petition. In Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona,[15] this Court held "[i]n line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi, ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and even association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations were allowed to initiate and prosecute actions before this Court to question the constitutionality or validity of laws, acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government agencies or instrumentalities."[16] Further, "insofar as taxpayers' suits are concerned . . . (this Court) is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained."[17] As such ". . . even if, strictly speaking, they [the petitioners] are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised."[18] In view of the serious legal questions involved and their impact on public interest, we resolve to grant standing to the petitioners.

KILOSBAYAN v. TEOFISTO GUINGONA