Lawyerly

GR No. 183345

2014-09-17

BRION, J.

Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense was committed by the person sought to be arrested.[41] This must be distinguished from the prosecutor's finding of probable cause which is for the filing of the proper criminal information. Probable cause for warrant of arrest is determined to address the necessity of placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.[42]

GR No. 176830

2014-02-11

SATURNINO C. OCAMPO v. EPHREM S. ABANDO

SERENO, C.J.

Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as "such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested."[110] Although the Constitution provides that probable cause shall be determined by the judge after an examination under oath or an affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses, we have ruled that a hearing is not necessary for the determination thereof.[111] In fact, the judge's personal examination of the complainant and the witnesses is not mandatory and indispensable for determining the aptness of issuing a warrant of arrest.[112]

GR No. 199082

2012-09-18

JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

PERALTA, J.

In Allado v. Diokno,[56] in a petition for certiorari assailing the propriety of the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the Court could not ignore the undue haste in the filing of the information and the inordinate interest of the government in filing the same. Thus, this Court took time to determine whether or not there was, indeed, probable cause to warrant the filing of information. This, notwithstanding the fact that information had been filed and a warrant of arrest had been issued. Petitioners therein came directly to this Court and sought relief to rectify the injustice that they suffered.

GR No. 158734

2009-10-02

ROBERTO ALBAÑA v. PIO JUDE S. BELO

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

x x x a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well founded x x x such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe or entertain an honest or strong suspicion that a thing is so. The term does not mean `actual or positive cause' nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.[22]

GR Nos. 156399-400

2008-06-27

VICTOR JOSE TAN UY v. OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN

BRION,J.

Thus, we cannot agree with the Ombudsman's position that the petitioner should controvert the identification documents because they already form part of the records of the preliminary investigation, having been introduced in various incidents of Crim. Case No. 26558 then pending with the Sandiganbayan. The rule closest to a definition of the inter-relationship between records of a preliminary investigation and the criminal case to which it relates is Section 8 (b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that the record of the preliminary investigation, whether conducted by a judge or a prosecutor, shall not form part of the record of the case; the court, on its own initiative or on motion of any party, may order the production of the record or any of its parts when necessary in the resolution of the case or any incident therein, or when it is introduced as an evidence in the case by the requesting party. This rule, however, relates to the use of preliminary investigation records in the criminal case; no specific provision in the Rules exists regarding the reverse situation. We are thus guided in this regard by the basic due process requirement that the right to know and to meet a case requires that a person be fully informed of the pertinent and material facts unique to the inquiry to which he is called as a party respondent. Under this requirement, reasonable opportunity to contest evidence as critical as the identification documents should have been given the petitioner at the Sandiganbayan-ordered preliminary investigation as part of the facts he must controvert; otherwise, there is nothing to controvert as the burden of evidence lies with the one who asserts that a probable cause exists. The Ombudsman's failure in this regard tainted its findings of probable cause with grave abuse of discretion that effectively nullifies them. We cannot avoid this conclusion under the constitutional truism that in the hierarchy of rights, the Bill of Rights takes precedence over the right of the State to prosecute, and when weighed against each other, the scales of justice tilt towards the former.[40]

GR No. 180643

2008-03-25

ROMULO L. NERI v. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

The administration of President Richard Nixon produced the most significant developments in executive privilege. Although his administration initially professed an "open" presidency in which information would flow freely from the executive to Congress to the public, executive privilege during this period was invoked not for the protection of national security interests, foreign policy decision- making or military secrets as in the past, but rather to keep under wraps politically damaging and personally embarrassing information.[87] President Nixon's resignation was precipitated by the landmark case on executive privilege, U.S. v. Nixon.[88] In view of its importance to the case at bar, its depth discussion will be made in the subsequent sections.

GR No. 147065

2008-03-14

JUANITO CHAN y LIM v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

NACHURA, J.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW AND DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN NOT NULLIFYING THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE FOR HAVING BEEN RENDERED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.[12] Petitioner argues that the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari based on the Court's ruling in Crespo v. Mogul.[13] He argues that Crespo is not applicable to the present case because it involves a different factual setting. He points out that in said case, it was the provincial fiscal who filed a motion to dismiss the criminal case pending before the trial court on the basis of the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice, whereas here, the issue involves the validity of the preliminary investigation. He avers that Crespo was superseded by Allado v. Diokno,[14] which recognized the courts' authority to nullify findings of probable cause by the prosecutor or investigating judge when due process is violated.[15]

GR NO. 158763

2006-03-31

JOSE C. MIRANDA v. VIRGILIO M. TULIAO

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

In Allado v. Diokno,[19] on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari on the ground of lack of probable cause, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining PACC from enforcing the warrant of arrest and the respondent judge therein from further proceeding with the case and, instead, to elevate the records to us. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[20] upon the accused's Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest on the ground that they filed a Petition for Review with the Department of Justice, we directed respondent judge therein to cease and desist from further proceeding with the criminal case and to defer the issuance of warrants of arrests against the accused. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,[21] on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan, we directed the Sandiganbayan to transfer the criminal cases to the Regional Trial Court even before the issuance of the warrants of arrest.

AM No. MTJ-99-1239

2005-07-29

VICENTE M. BATIC v. JUDGE VICTORIO L. GALAPON

AZCUNA, J.

Section 2, Art. III, of the Constitution lays down the requirements for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, i.e., a warrant of arrest shall issue only upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.[4] In the case at hand, the question is not even whether these requisites were met. The question is whether or not Judge Galapon abused his authority when there appeared a discrepancy between the dates the complaint and the warrant of arrest were issued in the criminal case involving the complainants.

GR No. 149453

2003-10-07

PEOPLE v. PANFILO M. LACSON

CALLEJO, SR., J.

Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. In that sense and to that extent, procedural laws are retroactive.[26] Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 had long been dismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr. before the new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. When the petitioners filed the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 on June 6, 2001, Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 and Q-99-81689 had long since been terminated. The two-year bar in the new rule should not be reckoned from the March 29, 1999 dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 but from December 1, 2000 when the new rule took effect. While it is true that the Court applied Section 8 of Rule 110[27] of the RRCP retroactively, it did so only to cases still pending with this Court and not to cases already terminated with finality.

	GR No. 183345 2014-09-17	MA. GRACIA HAO v. PEOPLE BRION, J.
Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense was committed by the person sought to be arrested.[41] This must be distinguished from the prosecutor's finding of probable cause which is for the filing of the proper criminal information. Probable cause for warrant of arrest is determined to address the necessity of placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.[42]
	GR No. 176830 2014-02-11	SATURNINO C. OCAMPO v. EPHREM S. ABANDO SERENO, C.J.
Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as "such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested."[110] Although the Constitution provides that probable cause shall be determined by the judge after an examination under oath or an affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses, we have ruled that a hearing is not necessary for the determination thereof.[111] In fact, the judge's personal examination of the complainant and the witnesses is not mandatory and indispensable for determining the aptness of issuing a warrant of arrest.[112]
	GR No. 199082 2012-09-18	JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE PERALTA, J.
In Allado v. Diokno,[56] in a petition for certiorari assailing the propriety of the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the Court could not ignore the undue haste in the filing of the information and the inordinate interest of the government in filing the same. Thus, this Court took time to determine whether or not there was, indeed, probable cause to warrant the filing of information. This, notwithstanding the fact that information had been filed and a warrant of arrest had been issued. Petitioners therein came directly to this Court and sought relief to rectify the injustice that they suffered.
	GR No. 158734 2009-10-02	ROBERTO ALBAÑA v. PIO JUDE S. BELO LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
x x x a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well founded x x x such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe or entertain an honest or strong suspicion that a thing is so. The term does not mean `actual or positive cause' nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.[22]
	GR Nos. 156399-400 2008-06-27	VICTOR JOSE TAN UY v. OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN BRION,J.
Thus, we cannot agree with the Ombudsman's position that the petitioner should controvert the identification documents because they already form part of the records of the preliminary investigation, having been introduced in various incidents of Crim. Case No. 26558 then pending with the Sandiganbayan. The rule closest to a definition of the inter-relationship between records of a preliminary investigation and the criminal case to which it relates is Section 8 (b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that the record of the preliminary investigation, whether conducted by a judge or a prosecutor, shall not form part of the record of the case; the court, on its own initiative or on motion of any party, may order the production of the record or any of its parts when necessary in the resolution of the case or any incident therein, or when it is introduced as an evidence in the case by the requesting party. This rule, however, relates to the use of preliminary investigation records in the criminal case; no specific provision in the Rules exists regarding the reverse situation. We are thus guided in this regard by the basic due process requirement that the right to know and to meet a case requires that a person be fully informed of the pertinent and material facts unique to the inquiry to which he is called as a party respondent. Under this requirement, reasonable opportunity to contest evidence as critical as the identification documents should have been given the petitioner at the Sandiganbayan-ordered preliminary investigation as part of the facts he must controvert; otherwise, there is nothing to controvert as the burden of evidence lies with the one who asserts that a probable cause exists. The Ombudsman's failure in this regard tainted its findings of probable cause with grave abuse of discretion that effectively nullifies them. We cannot avoid this conclusion under the constitutional truism that in the hierarchy of rights, the Bill of Rights takes precedence over the right of the State to prosecute, and when weighed against each other, the scales of justice tilt towards the former.[40]
	GR No. 180643 2008-03-25	ROMULO L. NERI v. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
The administration of President Richard Nixon produced the most significant developments in executive privilege. Although his administration initially professed an "open" presidency in which information would flow freely from the executive to Congress to the public, executive privilege during this period was invoked not for the protection of national security interests, foreign policy decision- making or military secrets as in the past, but rather to keep under wraps politically damaging and personally embarrassing information.[87] President Nixon's resignation was precipitated by the landmark case on executive privilege, U.S. v. Nixon.[88] In view of its importance to the case at bar, its depth discussion will be made in the subsequent sections.
	GR No. 147065 2008-03-14	JUANITO CHAN y LIM v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE NACHURA, J.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW AND DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN NOT NULLIFYING THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE FOR HAVING BEEN RENDERED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.[12] Petitioner argues that the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari based on the Court's ruling in Crespo v. Mogul.[13] He argues that Crespo is not applicable to the present case because it involves a different factual setting. He points out that in said case, it was the provincial fiscal who filed a motion to dismiss the criminal case pending before the trial court on the basis of the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice, whereas here, the issue involves the validity of the preliminary investigation. He avers that Crespo was superseded by Allado v. Diokno,[14] which recognized the courts' authority to nullify findings of probable cause by the prosecutor or investigating judge when due process is violated.[15]
	GR NO. 158763 2006-03-31	JOSE C. MIRANDA v. VIRGILIO M. TULIAO CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
In Allado v. Diokno,[19] on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari on the ground of lack of probable cause, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining PACC from enforcing the warrant of arrest and the respondent judge therein from further proceeding with the case and, instead, to elevate the records to us. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[20] upon the accused's Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest on the ground that they filed a Petition for Review with the Department of Justice, we directed respondent judge therein to cease and desist from further proceeding with the criminal case and to defer the issuance of warrants of arrests against the accused. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,[21] on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan, we directed the Sandiganbayan to transfer the criminal cases to the Regional Trial Court even before the issuance of the warrants of arrest.
	AM No. MTJ-99-1239 2005-07-29	VICENTE M. BATIC v. JUDGE VICTORIO L. GALAPON AZCUNA, J.
Section 2, Art. III, of the Constitution lays down the requirements for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, i.e., a warrant of arrest shall issue only upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.[4] In the case at hand, the question is not even whether these requisites were met. The question is whether or not Judge Galapon abused his authority when there appeared a discrepancy between the dates the complaint and the warrant of arrest were issued in the criminal case involving the complainants.
	GR No. 149453 2003-10-07	PEOPLE v. PANFILO M. LACSON CALLEJO, SR., J.
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. In that sense and to that extent, procedural laws are retroactive.[26] Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 had long been dismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr. before the new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. When the petitioners filed the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 on June 6, 2001, Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 and Q-99-81689 had long since been terminated. The two-year bar in the new rule should not be reckoned from the March 29, 1999 dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 but from December 1, 2000 when the new rule took effect. While it is true that the Court applied Section 8 of Rule 110[27] of the RRCP retroactively, it did so only to cases still pending with this Court and not to cases already terminated with finality.

DIOSDADO JOSE ALLADO v. ROBERTO C. DIOKNO