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ELIZALDE MALALOAN v. CA

This case has been cited 9 times or more.

2015-09-02
BRION, J.
At this point, we note the purpose for the enactment of Section 14, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court - a relatively new provision incorporated in A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC or the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (effective December 1, 2000). The provision was derived from the policy guidelines laid down by the Court in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals[47] to resolve the main issue of where motions to quash search warrants should be filed. In other words, the provision was "intended to resolve what is perceived as conflicting decisions on where to file a motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence seized by virtue thereof... ,"[48] It was certainly not intended to preclude belated objections against the search warrant's validity, especially if the grounds therefor are not immediately apparent. Thus, Malaloan instructs that "all grounds and objections then available, existent or known shall be raised in the original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed waived," and that "a motion to quash shall consequently be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not available, existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress."
2015-02-16
PERALTA, J.
Unfortunately, the foregoing reasoning of the CA, is inceptionally flawed, because as pronounced by the Court in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals,[14] and reiterated in the more recent Worldwide Web Corporation v. People of the Philippines,[15] to wit: x x x  as we held in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals, an application for a search warrant is a "special criminal process," rather than a criminal action:
2014-01-13
SERENO, C.J.
Furthermore, as we held in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals,[35] an application for a search warrant is a "special criminal process," rather than a criminal action: The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the application for and the obtention of a search warrant with the institution and prosecution of a criminal action in a trial court. It would thus categorize what is only a special criminal process, the power to issue which is inherent in all courts, as equivalent to a criminal action, jurisdiction over which is reposed in specific courts of indicated competence. It ignores the fact that the requisites, procedure and purpose for the issuance of a search warrant are completely different from those for the institution of a criminal action.
2012-12-10
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
On the contrary, what is involved here is a search warrant proceeding which is not a criminal action, much less a civil action, but a special criminal process. In the seminal case of Malaloan v. Court of Appeals,[41] we expounded on this doctrine in this wise: The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the application for and the obtention of a search warrant with the institution and prosecution of a criminal action in a trial court. It would thus categorize what is only a special criminal process, the power to issue which is inherent in all courts, as equivalent to a criminal action, jurisdiction over which is reposed in specific courts of indicated competence. It ignores the fact that the requisites, procedure and purpose for the issuance of a search warrant are completely different from those for the institution of a criminal action.
2007-03-22
QUISUMBING, J.
Citing Malaloan v. Court of Appeals,[8] where this Court clarified that a search warrant application is only a special criminal process and not a criminal action, petitioner contends that the rule on venue for search warrant application is not jurisdictional. Hence, failure to raise the objection waived it. Moreover, petitioner maintains that applying for search warrants in different courts increases the possibility of leakage and contradictory outcomes that could defeat the purpose for which the warrants were issued.
2006-10-27
CALLEJO, SR., J.
SO ORDERED.[51] The appellate court ruled that the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt of Abuan's guilt for the crime charged.  The alleged discrepancies in the testimonies of Gamboa and de Vera were peripheral matters.  Moreover, Abuan's failure to assail the legality of the search and seizure conducted by the policemen before her arraignment was equivalent to a waiver of her right to assail the search warrant.  The CA cited the ruling of this Court in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals.[52]
2006-05-04
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
We also declared in People v. Chiu,[49] citing Malaloan v. Court of Appeals,[50] that a search warrant is merely a judicial process designed by the Rules to respond only to an incident in the main case, if one has already been instituted, or in anticipation thereof.
2005-06-29
CALLEJO, SR., J.
In opposing the motion, the petitioner averred that the court which issued the search warrants was not the proper forum in which to articulate the issue of the validity of the copyrights issued to him.  Citing the ruling of the Court in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals,[11] the petitioner stated that a search warrant is merely a judicial process designed by the Rules of Court in anticipation of a criminal case.  Until his copyright was nullified in a proper proceeding, he enjoys rights of a registered owner/holder thereof.
2000-05-11
BELLOSILLO, J.
The authority to issue search warrants was not among those mentioned in the administrative orders. But the Court has consistently ruled that a search warrant is merely a process issued by the court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction and not a criminal action which it may entertain pursuant to its original jurisdiction.[12] The authority to issue search warrants is inherent in all courts and may be effected outside their territorial jurisdiction.[13] In the instant case, the premises searched located in Biasong, Talisay, Cebu, are well within the territorial jurisdiction of the respondent court.[14]