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WALTER T. YOUNG v. OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN

This case has been cited 10 times or more.

2013-06-10
DEL CASTILLO, J.
The CA held that decisions of the Ombudsman in cases absolving the respondent of the charge are deemed final and unappealable, pursuant to the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, specifically Section 7, [24] Rule III of Administrative Order No. 7, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17 dated September 15, 2003.  The appellate court added that absent compelling reasons, it may not disturb the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman in keeping with the principle of non-interference with the investigatory and prosecutorial powers of the office. Citing Young v. Ombudsman,[25] the CA held that practical considerations called for the application of this principle of non-interference, or else the courts will be swamped with petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman or compelling judicial review of the exercise of its otherwise discretionary functions.
2008-12-18
NACHURA, J.
The Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), contends that, in effect, petitioner is asking this Court to review the pieces of evidence gathered by the Ombudsman during the preliminary investigation. This is not proper.  In Espinosa v. Office of the Ombudsman[10] and Young v. Office of the Ombudsman,[11] this Court accorded highest respect for the factual findings of the Ombudsman, absent a clear case of grave abuse of discretion. The OSP claims that the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion because the respondents, based on their counter-affidavits, have valid and legal justifications, sufficient for the Ombudsman to exculpate them from the charges.[12]
2007-07-24
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
While the Court has previously held that it may interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman in case of clear abuse of discretion,[24] the Ombudsman is not guilty of abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint against Golden River insofar as the two 1982 loan transactions are concerned.
2006-12-06
CALLEJO, SR., J.
Section 27(2) of R.A No. 6770 provides that findings of facts by the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence. Thus, as long as there is substantial evidence to support the Ombudsman's decision, it will not be reversed. The rationale of the rule was enunciated in Young v. Office of the Ombudsman:[37]
2005-12-16
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONER WAS PART OF ANY CONSPIRACY RELATIVE TO THE EVALUATION AND GRANT OF THE LOANS SUBJECT OF THE CRIMINAL CASES BEFORE THE RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN. In dealing with cases of this kind, we have invariably refused to interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman. The act of the Ombudsman in finding probable cause to indict petitioner is an exercise of his powers based upon constitutional mandate and the courts should not interfere with such exercise, unless clothed with grave abuse of discretion.[11] The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well.[12] Otherwise, the functions of the Court will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the findings by the Ombudsman with respect to complaints filed before him.[13]
2005-04-21
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
The truth of the matter is that petitioners were not denied due process of law.  The order of the Ombudsman for the filing of the necessary information is not a case of a total absence of factual and legal bases nor a failure to appreciate the evidence presented.  It may appear that the Ombudsman's one-line note lacks any factual or evidentiary grounds as it did not set forth the same.  The state of affairs, however, is that the Ombudsman's note stems from his review of the findings of fact reached by the investigating prosecutor.[15] The Ombudsman, contrary to the investigating prosecutor's conclusion, was of the conviction that petitioners are probably guilty of the offense charged, and for this, he is not required to conduct an investigation anew.[16] He is merely determining the propriety and correctness of the recommendation by the investigating prosecutor, i.e., whether probable cause actually exists or not, on the basis of the findings of fact of the latter.  He may agree, fully or partly, or disagree completely with the investigating prosecutor.  Whatever course of action that the Ombudsman may take, whether to approve or to disapprove the recommendation of the investigating prosecutor, is but an exercise of his discretionary powers based upon constitutional mandate.[17] Generally, courts should not interfere in such exercise.  It is beyond the ambit of this Court to review the exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it, save in cases where there is clear showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Ombudsman which is absent in the case at hand.[18] Such initiative and independence are inherent in the Ombudsman who, beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and preserver of the integrity of the public service.[19]
2005-04-07
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
It is well-settled that in the absence of a clear case of abuse of discretion, courts will not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman, who, depending on his finding and considered evaluation of the case, either dismisses a complaint or proceeds with it.[21]
2004-12-09
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
We do not perceive any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the public respondents when they issued the aforecited rulings. We, thus, defer to the policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations. We have invariably stated that it is not sound practice to depart from the policy of non-interference in the Ombudsman's exercise of discretion to determine whether or not to file information against an accused. The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well.[33] Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be absolutely swamped if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decided to file an information in court or dismissed a complaint by a private complainant.[34] Thus, in the absence of a clear case of abuse of discretion, this Court will not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman, who, depending on his own findings and considered evaluation of the case, either dismisses a complaint or proceeds with it.[35]
2004-07-27
QUISUMBING, J.
A policy of non-interference by the courts in the exercise of the Ombudsman's constitutionally mandated powers is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well.[18] Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they were compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals, or prosecuting attorneys, each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.[19]