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BA FINANCE CORPORATION v. CA

This case has been cited 3 times or more.

	GR No. 194538 2013-11-27	MORETO MIRALLOSA v. CARMEL DEVELOPMENT SERENO, C.J.
This is an appeal by way of a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] dated 6 December 2010 assailing the Decision[2] and Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 105190, which reversed the Decision[4] and Order[5] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 121, Caloocan City in Civil Case No. C-22018. The RTC had reversed the Decision[6] of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 52, Caloocan City in Civil Case No. 03-27114, ordering petitioner to vacate the subject property in this case for ejectment.
	GR NO. 142618 2007-07-12	PCI LEASING v. GIRAFFE-X CREATIVE IMAGING GARCIA, J.
In its previous holdings, however, the Court, taking into account the following mix: the imperatives of equity, the contractual stipulations in question and the actuations of parties vis-à-vis their contract, treated disguised transactions technically tagged as financing lease, like here, as creating a different contractual relationship. Notable among the Court's decisions because of its parallelism with this case is BA Finance Corporation v. Court of Appeals[10] which involved a motor vehicle. Thereat, the Court has treated a purported financial lease as actually a sale of a movable property on installments and prevented recovery beyond the buyer's arrearages. Wrote the Court in BA Finance:The transaction involved ... is one of a "financial lease" or "financial leasing," where a financing company would, in effect, initially purchase a mobile equipment and turn around to lease it to a client who gets, in addition, an option to purchase the property at the expiry of the lease period. xxx.
	GR NO. 142618 2007-07-12	PCI LEASING v. GIRAFFE-X CREATIVE IMAGING GARCIA, J.
Considering the factual findings of both the court a quo and the appellate court, the only logical conclusion is that the private respondent did opt, as he has claimed, to acquire the motor vehicle, justifying then the application of the guarantee deposit to the balance still due and obligating the petitioner to recognize it as an exercise of the option by the private respondent. The result would thereby entitle said respondent to the ownership and possession of the vehicle as the buyer thereof. We, therefore, see no reversible error in the ultimate judgment of the appellate court.[11] (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied and words in bracket added.)