This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2010-02-05 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| A close scrutiny of Section 6, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,[27] which grants discretionary authority to the CA in ordering parties to file responsive and other pleadings in petitions for certiorari filed before it, will reveal that such rule is merely directory in nature. This is so because the word "may" employed by the rule shows that it is not mandatory but discretionary on the part of the CA to require the filing of pleadings which it deems necessary to assist it in resolving the controversies.[28] In the same way, the admission of any responsive pleading filed by party-litigants is a matter that rests largely on the sound discretion of the court. At any rate, rules of procedure may be relaxed in the interest of substantial justice and in order to afford litigants maximum opportunity for the proper and just determination of their causes.[29] Strict adherence to technical adjective rules should never be unexceptionally required because a contrary precept would result in a failure to decide cases on their merits.[30] The CA could not have erred in admitting the comment, albeit filed late, when it viewed that the interest of justice would be better served by the policy of liberality. | |||||
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2006-08-18 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| Petitioner claimed that under Article 192 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603, as well as A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC (otherwise known as the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law), the benefit of a suspended sentence does not apply to a juvenile who is convicted of an offense punishable by death,[6] reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Citing the ruling of this Court in People v. Ondo,[7] petitioner avers that since Bansales was charged with murder punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, he is disqualified from availing the benefits of a suspended sentence. | |||||
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2005-08-29 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| Prior to this Order, Department of Justice Opinion No. 44 dated March 16, 1990, which was addressed to then DAR Secretary Florencio Abad, recognized the fact that before the date of the law's effectivity on June 15, 1988, the reclassification or conversion of lands was not exclusively done by the DAR.[13] Rather, it was a "coordinated effort" of all concerned agencies; namely, the Department of Local Governments and Community Development, the Human Settlements Commission and the DAR.[14] Then Justice Secretary Franklin M. Drilon explained the coordination in this wise:"x x x. Under R.A. No. 3844,[15] as amended by R.A. No. 6389,[16] an agricultural lessee may, by order of the court, be dispossessed of his landholding if after due hearing, it is shown that the 'landholding is declared by the [DAR] upon the recommendation of the National Planning Commission to be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban purposes.'[17] | |||||
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2005-07-29 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| Prior to this Order, Department of Justice Opinion No. 44 dated March 16, 1990, which was addressed to then DAR Secretary Florencio Abad, recognized the fact that before the date of the law's effectivity on June 15, 1988, the reclassification or conversion of lands was not exclusively done by the DAR.[13] Rather, it was a "coordinated effort" of all concerned agencies; namely, the Department of Local Governments and Community Development, the Human Settlements Commission and the DAR.[14] Then Justice Secretary Franklin M. Drilon explained the coordination in this wise:"x x x. Under R.A. No. 3844,[15] as amended by R.A. No. 6389,[16] an agricultural lessee may, by order of the court, be dispossessed of his landholding if after due hearing, it is shown that the 'landholding is declared by the [DAR] upon the recommendation of the National Planning Commission to be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban purposes.'[17] | |||||