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ALBINO S. CO v. CA

This case has been cited 5 times or more.

	GR No. 203928 2015-07-22	CE CASECNAN WATER v. CIR LEONEN, J.
In its Reply,[29] petitioner contends that the doctrine of prospectivity has been applied even in cases of first impression, such as Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon[30] on equitable considerations and Co v. Court of Appeals,[31] in order not to prejudice those who had relied on a contrary administrative interpretation before the adoption of the new doctrine. Petitioner stresses that in San Roque, this court did not adopt an iron-clad application of Aichi. Rather, it carved out an exception from the rule that the one hundred twenty (120)- and thirty (30)-day periods are mandatory and jurisdictional, such that judicial claims filed by taxpayers who relied on BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 (BIR Ruling)—from its issuance on December 10, 2003 to its reversal by Aichi on October 6, 2010—are shielded from the vice of prematurity. In this regard, petitioner submits that the benefits of the BIR Ruling should also be extended to judicial claims filed beyond the thirty (30)-day period set forth in Section 112 of the Tax Code because the import of the BIR Ruling was that it was the two-year prescriptive period under Section 229 that had jurisdictional significance. Petitioner adds that the BIR Ruling reflected a long-standing practice in tax litigation, which included various administrative issuances and Court of Tax Appeals decisions where, with respect to VAT refunds, the only requirement was that both administrative and judicial claims be filed within the two-year prescriptive period.[32]
	GR No. 176579 2012-10-09	HEIRS OF WILSON P. GAMBOA v. FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO B. TEVES CARPIO, J.
Lex prospicit, non respicit "laws have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided."[157] As a necessary corollary, judicial rulings should not be accorded retroactive effect since "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines."[158] It has been the constant holding of the Court that a judicial decision setting a new doctrine or principle ("precedent-setting decision") shall not retroactively apply to parties who relied in good faith on the principles and doctrines standing prior to the promulgation thereof ("old principles/doctrines"), especially when a retroactive application of the precedent-setting decision would impair the rights and obligations of the parties. So it is that as early as 1940, the Court has refused to apply the new doctrine of jus sanguinis to persons who relied in good faith on the principle of jus soli adopted in Roa v. Collector of Customs.[159] Similarly, in Co v. Court of Appeals,[160] the Court sustained petitioner Co's bona fide reliance on the Minister of Justice's Opinion dated December 15, 1981 that the delivery of a "rubber" check as guarantee for an obligation is not a punishable offense despite the Court's pronouncement on September 21, 1987 in Que v. People that Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 22 nonetheless covers a check issued to guarantee the payment of an obligation. In so ruling, the Court quoted various decisions applying precedent-setting decisions prospectively. We held: Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines," according to Article 8 of the Civil Code. "Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided," declares Article 4 of the same Code, a declaration that is echoed by Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code: "Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal . . ."
	GR No. 156225 2008-01-29	LETRAN CALAMBA FACULTY AND EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION v. NLRC AND COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN CALAMBA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
The petitioner's claim that the DOLE Order should not be made to apply to the present case because said Order was issued only in 1996, approximately four years after the present case was initiated before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC, is not without basis. The general rule is that administrative rulings and circulars shall not be given retroactive effect.[27]
	GR NOS. 151809-12 2005-04-12	PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT v. SANDIGANBAYAN PUNO, J.
In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account with the Central Bank.[1] It was later found by the Central Bank that GENBANK had approved various loans to directors, officers, stockholders and related interests totaling P172.3 million, of which 59% was classified as doubtful and P0.505 million as uncollectible.[2] As a bailout, the Central Bank extended emergency loans to GENBANK which reached a total of P310 million.[3] Despite the mega loans, GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. On March 25, 1977, the Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering its liquidation.[4] A public bidding of GENBANK's assets was held from March 26 to 28, 1977, wherein the Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid.[5] Subsequently, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court of First Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK's liquidation as mandated by Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265.