This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2011-03-29 |
BRION, J. |
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| Even the petitioner's citation of Justice Puno's[58] dissenting opinion in Teodoro B. Pangilinan v. Guillermo T. Maglaya, etc.[59] is inapt. Like the petitioner, Pangilinan was merely appointed in an acting capacity and unarguably enjoyed no security of tenure. He was relieved from the service after exposing certain anomalies involving his superiors. Upon hearing his plea for reinstatement, the Court unanimously observed that Pangilinan's relief was a punitive response from his superiors. The point of disagreement, however, is whether Pangilinan's lack of security of tenure deprives him of the right to seek reinstatement. Considering that the law (Administrative Code of 1987) allows temporary appointments only for a period not exceeding twelve (12) months, the majority considered Pangilinan to be without any judicial remedy since at the time of his separation, he no longer had any right to the office. Justice Puno dissented, arguing that Pangilinan's superiors' abuse of his temporary appointment furnishes the basis for the relief he seeks. | |||||
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2009-12-21 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| To be sure, courts, regardless of doubts they might be entertaining, cannot question the wisdom of the congressional classification, if reasonable, or the motivation underpinning the classification.[54] By the same token, they do not sit to determine the propriety or efficacy of the remedies Congress has specifically chosen to extend. That is its prerogative. The power of the Legislature to make distinctions and classifications among persons is, to reiterate, neither curtailed nor denied by the equal protection clause. A law can be violative of the constitutional limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis. | |||||
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2007-04-27 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| In the more recent case of Pangilinan v. Maglaya,[26] this Court clarified the doctrine in Gray as follows:Although Gray was holding a highly confidential position, the Court regarded his separation as a removal and so applied the constitutional prohibition against the suspension or dismissal of an officer or member of the civil service without cause as provided by law. That was a rather loose interpretation of the term "dismissal,"which is defined as the ouster of the incumbent before the expiration of his term. Subsequent decisions have made it clear that where a person holds his position at the pleasure of a superior or subject to some supervening event, his separation from office is not removal. It is effected by the will of the superior or by the happening of the contingency, resulting in another and different mode of terminating official relations known as expiration of the term.[27] | |||||
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2006-02-16 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| Petitioner further contends that although respondent's appointment was denominated as permanent, it was in reality temporary because of the express qualification that she did not have security of tenure unless she obtained a CES eligibility; and that following the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 which provides that temporary appointments shall not exceed twelve months, respondent's appointment ceased on March 8, 2000, citing Pangilinan v. Maglaya.[12] | |||||