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MARIANO F. OCAMPO v. OMBUDSMAN

This case has been cited 9 times or more.

	GR No. 208170 2014-08-20	PEOPLE v. PETRUS YAU MENDOZA, J.
On September 11, 2013, the Court issued a resolution[12] notifying the parties that they could file their respective supplemental briefs if they so desire. The People of the Philippines, represented by the OSG, opted not to file any supplemental brief, maintaining its positions and arguments in its brief earlier filed in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03446.[13] Petrus filed his Supplemental Brief[14] on December 27, 2013 in amplification of his arguments raised in his brief filed before the CA.
	GR No. 169042 2011-10-05	ERDITO QUARTO v. OMBUDSMAN SIMEON MARCELO BRION, J.
The Constitution and RA No. 6770 have endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory powers, freed, to the extent possible within our governmental system and structure, from legislative, executive, or judicial intervention, and insulated from outside pressure and improper influence.[86] Consistent with this purpose and subject to the command of paragraph 2, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution,[87] the Court reiterates its policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers (among them, the power to grant immunity to witnesses[88]), and respects the initiative and independence inherent in the Ombudsman who, "beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of the public service."[89] Ocampo IV v. Ombudsman[90] best explains the reason behind this policy: The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.
	GR Nos. 172476-99 2010-09-15	BRIG. GEN. JOSE RAMISCAL v. SANDIGANBAYAN CARPIO, J.
In Ocampo, IV v. Ombudsman,[32] the Court explained the rationale behind this policy, thus: The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.[33]
	GR NO. 135687 2007-07-24	PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS v. OMBUDSMAN ANIANO DESIERTO AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
As a rule, the Court shall not unduly interfere in the Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers, as provided in the Constitution, without good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise.[21] The basis for this rule was provided in the case of Ocampo IV v. Ombudsman[22] where the Court held as follows:The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they would be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.[23]
	GR NO. 156652 2005-10-13	DR. BENITA F. OSORIO v. ANIANO A. DESIERTO CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
The consistent and general policy of the Court is not to interfere with the Office of the Ombudsman's exercise of its investigatory and prosecutory powers.[12] The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well.[13] Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they would be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an Information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.[14] The Court cannot interfere with the Office of the Ombudsman's discretion in determining the adequacy or inadequacy of the evidence before it. The investigation is advisedly called preliminary, as it is yet to be followed by the trial proper. The occasion is not for the full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence but for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-founded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty of the offense.[15] Hence, in the absence of a clear case of abuse of discretion, this Court will not interfere with the Office of the Ombudsman's discretion in the conduct of preliminary investigation.
	GR NO. 134509 2005-04-12	VENANCIO R. NAVA v. NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION TINGA, J.
(11) Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of the petitioners.[61]
	GR NO. 144692 2005-01-31	CELSA P. ACUÑA v. DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON CARPIO, J.
We reiterate this Court's policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman's exercise of his constitutionally mandated prosecutory powers.[19] We explained the reason for such policy in Ocampo, IV v. Ombudsman:[20]
	GR No. 119990 2004-06-21	REMBERTO C. KARA-AN v. OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN CARPIO, J.
xxx The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they would be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.[14] Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman's grave abuse of discretion lies in his failure to conduct the appropriate investigation in breach of constitutional, statutory and administrative mandates. Petitioner also points out that EPIB Head Arnau, in his 1st Indorsement/Letter dated 29 March 1994, named as respondents "the former chairman and incumbent board members of Islamic Bank" instead of those who processed and approved the anomalous P250,000 loan to CAMEC in 1986. Petitioner asserts that Arnau could have easily determined the directors who approved the CAMEC loan by issuing a subpoena duces tecum to Islamic Bank to produce a copy of the minutes of meeting of the Bank's Board that approved the loan.