This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2004-12-10 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| The Court has repeatedly held that when the circumstances shown to exist yield at least two inferences -- one of which is consistent with the presumption of innocence and the other with the finding of guilt -- the Court must acquit the accused, because the evidence does not then fulfill the test of moral certainty or suffice to support a judgment of conviction.[43] | |||||
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2003-06-25 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| ATTY PAZZIUAGGAN So you could not see what was happening from outside to the inside? A Yes, ma'am. Q So you have no personal knowledge of what transpired inside when your informant went inside the house? A No. Q And you merely relied on the information told to you afterwards? A Yes, ma'am. Q You had no way of checking the truth? A We trusted our informant.[13] The foregoing testimony reveals that the NBI agents had no personal knowledge that herein appellant was peddling shabu. In fact, they did not know the identity of the appellant before December 10, 1996, when they served the search warrant.[14] Only the informant who transacted the test buy saw the alleged pushers. This notwithstanding, the prosecution did not present the confidential informant as witness. We have held in many cases[15] that the testimony of the poseur-buyer becomes material and indispensable when the appellant denies having committed the prohibited act. Without the testimony of the poseur-buyer, more often than not, there is no convincing evidence that she did sell or possess the prohibited or regulated drug.[16] Especially if there are no other eyewitness to the illicit transaction, the non-presentation of the poseur buyer can be fatal to the case of the prosecution.[17] In fine, what they reportedly learned from the informant was indubitably hearsay as the latter was never called to appear and testify at the trial.[18] | |||||