Lawyerly

GR No. 180147

2014-06-04

SARA LEE PHILIPPINES v. EMILINDA D. MACATLANG

PEREZ, J.

In the same vein, the Court in Blancaflor v. NLRC,[50] excused the failure of appellant to post a bond due to the failure of the Labor Arbiter to state the exact amount of back wages and separation pay due.

GR No. 196047

2014-01-15

LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING CORPORATION v. BELIO ICAO

SERENO, C.J.

Moreover, this Court has liberally applied the NLRC Rules and the Labor Code provisions on the posting of an appeal bond in exceptional cases. In Your Bus Lines v. NLRC,[25] the Court excused the appellant's failure to post a bond, because it relied on the notice of the decision. While the notice enumerated all the other requirements for perfecting an appeal, it did not include a bond in the list. In Blancaflor v. NLRC,[26] the failure of the appellant therein to post a bond was partly caused by the labor arbiter's failure to state the exact amount of monetary award due, which would have been the basis of the amount of the bond to be posted. In Cabalan Pastulan Negrito Labor Association v. NLRC,[27] petitioner-appellant was an association of Negritos performing trash-sorting services in the American naval base in Subic Bay. The plea of the association that its appeal be given due course despite its non-posting of a bond, on account of its insolvency and poverty, was granted by this Court. In UERM-Memorial Medical Center v. NLRC,[28] we allowed the appellant-employer to post a property bond in lieu of a cash or surety bond. The assailed judgment involved more than P17 million; thus, its execution could adversely affect the economic survival of the employer, which was a medical center.

GR Nos. 178034 & 178117

2013-10-17

ANDREW JAMES MCBURNIE v. EULALIO GANZON

REYES, J.

In Blancaflor v. NLRC,[91] the Court also emphasized that while Article 223[92] of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6715, which requires a cash or surety bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from may be considered a jurisdictional requirement for the perfection of an appeal, nevertheless, adhering to the principle that substantial justice is better served by allowing the appeal on the merits to be threshed out by the NLRC, the foregoing requirement of the law should be given a liberal interpretation.

GR No. 147961

2007-09-07

FOREVER SECURITY v. ROMEO FLORES

AZCUNA, J.

Also, in Blancaflor v. NLRC,[45] it was noted that the failure of the appellant to post a bond was in part due to the failure of the Labor Arbiter to state the exact amount of back wages and separation pay due; thus, no basis existed for the computation of the amount of the bond to be filed.

GR NO. 159372

2007-07-27

RONALDO NICOL v. FOOTJOY INDUSTRIAL CORP.

CARPIO MORALES, J.

This ruling reiterated earlier pronouncements in Blancaflor v. NLRC,[38] Rada v. NLRC,[39] and YBL (Your Bus Line) v. NLRC,[40] in which the NLRC was cautioned to give Article 223 of the Labor Code, particularly the provisions on requiring a bond on appeals involving monetary awards, a liberal interpretation in line with the desired objective of resolving controversies on the merits.

GR NO. 156379

2005-09-16

EMMA CORDOVA v. KEYSA'S BOUTIQUE AND SPS. CRIS AND ELEANOR ALBARAN

PUNO, J.

In Your Bus Lines vs. NLRC,[17] this Court excused the appellant for its failure to post the bond because it relied on the notice of the decision which, while stating the requirements for perfecting an appeal, did not mention that a bond must be filed. In Blancaflor vs. NLRC,[18] it was noted that the failure of appellant to post a bond was in part due to the failure of the Labor Arbiter to state the exact amount of back wages and separation pay due; thus, no basis exists for the computation of the amount of the bond to be filed. In Cabalan Pastulan Negrito Labor Association vs. NLRC,[19] this Court granted petitioner-appellant's plea to give due course to its appeal despite non-posting of a supersedeas bond on account of its insolvency and poverty. Petitioner-appellant is an association of Negritos performing trash sorting services in the American naval base in Subic Bay. Further, the existence of an employer-employee relationship between petitioner-appellant and private respondent was not established. In UERM-Memorial Medical Center vs. NLRC,[20] the appellant-employer was allowed to post a property bond in lieu of a cash or surety bond. In this case, the judgment involved more than P17M and its precipitate execution could adversely affect the existence of the employer medical center. It also appeared that the real property bond was worth more than P102M, hence, the posting of a real property bond was sufficient compliance with the requirements of Art. 223.

GR NO. 155207

2005-04-29

WILHELMINA S. OROZCO v. FIFTH DIVISION OF CA

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

In YBL v. NLRC,[26] the appeal was interposed by the employers on 11 September 1989, or only six (6) days from the effectivity of the Interim Rules on Appeals which incorporated for the first time the appeal bond requirement imposed by Republic Act No. 6715, an amendatory law to the Labor Code. The Court therein considered the apparent fact that neither the counsel for the employer nor that for the employee was already aware of the then new requirement requiring the posting of a bond on appeal.[27] The same justification was cited with approval by the Court in Blancaflor v. NLRC,[28] and the same circumstance is likewise apparent in Rada v. NLRC.[29]

GR No. 129471

2000-04-28

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. CA

MENDOZA, J.

In 1972, Alvarez sold the land to the spouses Gaudencio and Rosario Beduya to whom TCT No. 10101 was issued.[13] That same year, the spouses Beduya obtained a loan from petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines for P526,000.00 and, as security, mortgaged the land covered by TCT No. 10101 to the bank.[14] In 1978, the SAAD Investment Corp., and the SAAD Agro-Industries, Inc., represented by Gaudencio Beduya, and the spouses Beduya personally executed another mortgage over the land in favor of petitioner to secure a loan of P1,430,000.00.[15]

GR No. 129471

2000-04-28

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. CA

MENDOZA, J.

Private respondent's loan application was later approved by petitioner.[19] However after releasing the amount of the loan to private respondent, petitioner found that the land mortgaged by private respondent was included in the land covered by TCT No. 10101 in the name of the spouses Beduya. Petitioner, therefore, cancelled the loan and demanded immediate payment of the amount.[20] Private respondent paid the loan to petitioner for which the former was issued a Cancellation of Mortgage, dated March 18, 1981, releasing the property in question from encumbrance.[21]

GR No. 129471

2000-04-28

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. CA

MENDOZA, J.

As to the question of estoppel, we do not find petitioner to be estopped from questioning private respondent's title. "Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or admission, or by his own silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts."[56] In the case at bar, upon learning that the land occupied by private respondent was also covered by TCT No. 10101, petitioner immediately demanded full payment of the loan and thereafter cancelled the mortgage contract, a fact that is admitted by private respondent himself.[57] Indeed, nothing in record indicates that petitioner impliedly acquiesced to the validity of private respondent's title when it found out that the latter was occupying a portion of the land covered by TCT No. 10101.

GR No. 129471

2000-04-28

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. CA

MENDOZA, J.

As to the question of estoppel, we do not find petitioner to be estopped from questioning private respondent's title. "Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or admission, or by his own silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts."[56] In the case at bar, upon learning that the land occupied by private respondent was also covered by TCT No. 10101, petitioner immediately demanded full payment of the loan and thereafter cancelled the mortgage contract, a fact that is admitted by private respondent himself.[57] Indeed, nothing in record indicates that petitioner impliedly acquiesced to the validity of private respondent's title when it found out that the latter was occupying a portion of the land covered by TCT No. 10101.

	GR No. 180147 2014-06-04	SARA LEE PHILIPPINES v. EMILINDA D. MACATLANG PEREZ, J.
In the same vein, the Court in Blancaflor v. NLRC,[50] excused the failure of appellant to post a bond due to the failure of the Labor Arbiter to state the exact amount of back wages and separation pay due.
	GR No. 196047 2014-01-15	LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING CORPORATION v. BELIO ICAO SERENO, C.J.
Moreover, this Court has liberally applied the NLRC Rules and the Labor Code provisions on the posting of an appeal bond in exceptional cases. In Your Bus Lines v. NLRC,[25] the Court excused the appellant's failure to post a bond, because it relied on the notice of the decision. While the notice enumerated all the other requirements for perfecting an appeal, it did not include a bond in the list. In Blancaflor v. NLRC,[26] the failure of the appellant therein to post a bond was partly caused by the labor arbiter's failure to state the exact amount of monetary award due, which would have been the basis of the amount of the bond to be posted. In Cabalan Pastulan Negrito Labor Association v. NLRC,[27] petitioner-appellant was an association of Negritos performing trash-sorting services in the American naval base in Subic Bay. The plea of the association that its appeal be given due course despite its non-posting of a bond, on account of its insolvency and poverty, was granted by this Court. In UERM-Memorial Medical Center v. NLRC,[28] we allowed the appellant-employer to post a property bond in lieu of a cash or surety bond. The assailed judgment involved more than P17 million; thus, its execution could adversely affect the economic survival of the employer, which was a medical center.
	GR Nos. 178034 & 178117 2013-10-17	ANDREW JAMES MCBURNIE v. EULALIO GANZON REYES, J.
In Blancaflor v. NLRC,[91] the Court also emphasized that while Article 223[92] of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6715, which requires a cash or surety bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from may be considered a jurisdictional requirement for the perfection of an appeal, nevertheless, adhering to the principle that substantial justice is better served by allowing the appeal on the merits to be threshed out by the NLRC, the foregoing requirement of the law should be given a liberal interpretation.
	GR No. 147961 2007-09-07	FOREVER SECURITY v. ROMEO FLORES AZCUNA, J.
Also, in Blancaflor v. NLRC,[45] it was noted that the failure of the appellant to post a bond was in part due to the failure of the Labor Arbiter to state the exact amount of back wages and separation pay due; thus, no basis existed for the computation of the amount of the bond to be filed.
	GR NO. 159372 2007-07-27	RONALDO NICOL v. FOOTJOY INDUSTRIAL CORP. CARPIO MORALES, J.
This ruling reiterated earlier pronouncements in Blancaflor v. NLRC,[38] Rada v. NLRC,[39] and YBL (Your Bus Line) v. NLRC,[40] in which the NLRC was cautioned to give Article 223 of the Labor Code, particularly the provisions on requiring a bond on appeals involving monetary awards, a liberal interpretation in line with the desired objective of resolving controversies on the merits.
	GR NO. 156379 2005-09-16	EMMA CORDOVA v. KEYSA'S BOUTIQUE AND SPS. CRIS AND ELEANOR ALBARAN PUNO, J.
In Your Bus Lines vs. NLRC,[17] this Court excused the appellant for its failure to post the bond because it relied on the notice of the decision which, while stating the requirements for perfecting an appeal, did not mention that a bond must be filed. In Blancaflor vs. NLRC,[18] it was noted that the failure of appellant to post a bond was in part due to the failure of the Labor Arbiter to state the exact amount of back wages and separation pay due; thus, no basis exists for the computation of the amount of the bond to be filed. In Cabalan Pastulan Negrito Labor Association vs. NLRC,[19] this Court granted petitioner-appellant's plea to give due course to its appeal despite non-posting of a supersedeas bond on account of its insolvency and poverty. Petitioner-appellant is an association of Negritos performing trash sorting services in the American naval base in Subic Bay. Further, the existence of an employer-employee relationship between petitioner-appellant and private respondent was not established. In UERM-Memorial Medical Center vs. NLRC,[20] the appellant-employer was allowed to post a property bond in lieu of a cash or surety bond. In this case, the judgment involved more than P17M and its precipitate execution could adversely affect the existence of the employer medical center. It also appeared that the real property bond was worth more than P102M, hence, the posting of a real property bond was sufficient compliance with the requirements of Art. 223.
	GR NO. 155207 2005-04-29	WILHELMINA S. OROZCO v. FIFTH DIVISION OF CA CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
In YBL v. NLRC,[26] the appeal was interposed by the employers on 11 September 1989, or only six (6) days from the effectivity of the Interim Rules on Appeals which incorporated for the first time the appeal bond requirement imposed by Republic Act No. 6715, an amendatory law to the Labor Code. The Court therein considered the apparent fact that neither the counsel for the employer nor that for the employee was already aware of the then new requirement requiring the posting of a bond on appeal.[27] The same justification was cited with approval by the Court in Blancaflor v. NLRC,[28] and the same circumstance is likewise apparent in Rada v. NLRC.[29]
	GR No. 129471 2000-04-28	DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. CA MENDOZA, J.
In 1972, Alvarez sold the land to the spouses Gaudencio and Rosario Beduya to whom TCT No. 10101 was issued.[13] That same year, the spouses Beduya obtained a loan from petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines for P526,000.00 and, as security, mortgaged the land covered by TCT No. 10101 to the bank.[14] In 1978, the SAAD Investment Corp., and the SAAD Agro-Industries, Inc., represented by Gaudencio Beduya, and the spouses Beduya personally executed another mortgage over the land in favor of petitioner to secure a loan of P1,430,000.00.[15]
	GR No. 129471 2000-04-28	DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. CA MENDOZA, J.
Private respondent's loan application was later approved by petitioner.[19] However after releasing the amount of the loan to private respondent, petitioner found that the land mortgaged by private respondent was included in the land covered by TCT No. 10101 in the name of the spouses Beduya. Petitioner, therefore, cancelled the loan and demanded immediate payment of the amount.[20] Private respondent paid the loan to petitioner for which the former was issued a Cancellation of Mortgage, dated March 18, 1981, releasing the property in question from encumbrance.[21]
	GR No. 129471 2000-04-28	DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. CA MENDOZA, J.
As to the question of estoppel, we do not find petitioner to be estopped from questioning private respondent's title. "Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or admission, or by his own silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts."[56] In the case at bar, upon learning that the land occupied by private respondent was also covered by TCT No. 10101, petitioner immediately demanded full payment of the loan and thereafter cancelled the mortgage contract, a fact that is admitted by private respondent himself.[57] Indeed, nothing in record indicates that petitioner impliedly acquiesced to the validity of private respondent's title when it found out that the latter was occupying a portion of the land covered by TCT No. 10101.
	GR No. 129471 2000-04-28	DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. CA MENDOZA, J.
As to the question of estoppel, we do not find petitioner to be estopped from questioning private respondent's title. "Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or admission, or by his own silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts."[56] In the case at bar, upon learning that the land occupied by private respondent was also covered by TCT No. 10101, petitioner immediately demanded full payment of the loan and thereafter cancelled the mortgage contract, a fact that is admitted by private respondent himself.[57] Indeed, nothing in record indicates that petitioner impliedly acquiesced to the validity of private respondent's title when it found out that the latter was occupying a portion of the land covered by TCT No. 10101.

ABRAHAM B. BLANCAFLOR v. NLRC