Lawyerly

GR No. 175723

2014-02-04

CITY OF MANILA v. CARIDAD H. GRECIA-CUERDO

PERALTA, J.

Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly conferred on them. These inherent powers are such powers as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or are essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the courts, as well as to the due administration of justice; or are directly appropriate, convenient and suitable to the execution of their granted powers; and include the power to maintain the court's jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the litigants.[38]

GR No. 194994

2013-04-16

EMMANUEL A. DE CASTRO v. EMERSON S. CARLOS

SERENO, J.

A direct invocation of this Court's jurisdiction is allowed only when there are special and important reasons that are clearly and specifically set forth in a petition.[19] The rationale behind this policy arises from the necessity of preventing (1) inordinate demands upon the time and attention of the Court, which is better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction; and (2) further overcrowding of the Court's docket.[20]

GR No. 155996

2012-06-27

PCGG CHAIRMAN MAGDANGAL B. ELMA v. REINER JACOBI

BRION, J.

In Vergara, Sr. v. Judge Suelto,[112] the Court laid down the judicial policy expressly disallowing a direct recourse to this Court because it is a court of last resort. The Court stressed that "[w]here the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of [another court], it [must be in that court] that the specific action for the writ's procurement must be presented." The rationale behind the policy arises from the necessity of preventing (i) inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and (ii) further overcrowding of the Court's docket.[113]

GR No. 176579

2011-06-28

WILSON P. GAMBOA v. FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO B. TEVES

CARPIO, J.

In particular, respondent Nazareno's Memorandum, consisting of 73 pages, harps mainly on the procedural infirmities of the petition and the supposed violation of the due process rights of the "affected foreign common shareholders." Respondent Nazareno does not deny petitioner's allegation of foreigners' dominating the common shareholdings of PLDT. Nazareno stressed mainly that the petition "seeks to divest foreign common shareholders purportedly exceeding 40% of the total common shareholdings in PLDT of their ownership over their shares." Thus, "the foreign natural and juridical PLDT shareholders must be impleaded in this suit so that they can be heard."[34] Essentially, Nazareno invokes denial of due process on behalf of the foreign common shareholders.

GR No. 170146

2010-08-25

WALDO Q. FLORES v. ATTY. ANTONIO F. MONTEMAYOR

VILLARAMA, JR., J.

We find nothing irregular with the PAGC's decision to proceed with its investigation notwithstanding the pendency of Montemayor's petition for certiorari before the CA. The filing of a petition for certiorari with the CA did not divest the PAGC of its jurisdiction validly acquired over the case before it. Elementary is the rule that the mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari, commenced in relation to a case pending before a lower court or an administrative body such as the PAGC, does not interrupt the course of the latter where there is no writ of injunction restraining it.[27] For as long as no writ of injunction or restraining order is issued in the special civil action for certiorari, no impediment exists, and nothing prevents the PAGC from exercising its jurisdiction and proceeding with the case pending before its office.[28] And even if such injunctive writ or order is issued, the PAGC continues to retain jurisdiction over the principal action[29] until the question on jurisdiction is finally determined.

GR No. 167239

2010-05-05

HICOBLINO M. CATLY v. WILLIAM NAVARRO

PERALTA, J.

Further, the petition should be denied for violation of hierarchy of courts as prior recourse should have been made to the Court of Appeals, instead of directly with this Court. A direct invocation of the Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent over-crowding of the Court's docket.[52] As aptly pronounced in Santiago v. Vasquez,[53] the observance of the hierarchy of courts should be respected as the Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate court. Thus,

GR No. 176951

2008-11-18

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC

CARPIO, J.

The Constitution[62] grants to the Court original jurisdiction over petitions for prohibition. Although this original jurisdiction over petitions for prohibition (together with petitions for certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus) is concurrent with that of the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals, the established policy is that this Court allows the direct invocation of its original jurisdiction "if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant,"[63] or "in the interest of speedy justice and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an end to the present controversy."[64] This policy has been applied by the Court in exceptional cases, among them, People v. Cuaresma,[65] Santiago v. Vasquez,[66] Manalo v. Gloria,[67] Philippine National Bank v. Sayo, Jr.,[68] Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,[69] Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora,[70] and Government of the United States of America v. Purganan.[71]

GR No. 141020

2008-06-12

CASINO LABOR ASSOCIATION v. CA

PUNO, CJ.

We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower courts in the exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.[21]

GR No. 146769

2007-08-17

SPS. MAXIMO ABADILLA AND ENGRACIA C. ABADILLA v. VIRGINIA HOFILEÑA-EUROPA

NACHURA, J.

As we held in Santiago v. Vasquez,[26] and reiterated in cases subsequent to it, the propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court must be put to a halt for two reasons: (1) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of this Court; and (2) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases which, in numerous instances have to be remanded or referred to the lower court, the latter being the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or being better equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is not a trier of facts.[27] In the case at bench, we again apply, as well as remind litigants and lawyers of, the said policy.

GR No. 164527

2007-08-15

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY

VELASCO, JR., J.

While direct recourse to this Court is generally frowned upon and discouraged, we have however ruled in Santiago v. Vasquez that such resort to us may be allowed in certain situations, wherein this Court ruled that petitions for certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus, though cognizable by other courts, may directly be filed with us if "the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of [this Court's] primary jurisdiction."[52]

AM NO. 06-6-8-CA

2007-03-20

RE: COMPLAINT v. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE ELVI JOHN S. ASUNCION

PER CURIAM

"Complainant Padilla contends that respondent Justice Asuncion committed gross ignorance of the law in issuing the October 30, 2001 resolution which extended indefinitely the duration of the TRO issued on July 24, 2001, by ordering the parties to maintain the status quo, pending resolution of the PNB's motion for reconsideration, in violation of Rule 58, Section 5 of the Rules of Court. Atty. Padilla further contends that respondent's failure to speedily resolve PNB's motion for reconsideration dated June 13, 2001, Archinas' motion for reconsideration dated November 5, 2001 and her numerous motions for early resolution thereof constitute culpable dereliction of duty. Atty. Padilla stressed that respondent Justice's reliance on Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[16] decided in 1988, to justify the issuance of the two resolutions constitutes gross ignorance of the law, considering that the ruling thereon was set aside by the Supreme Court in 1993 in the case of Santiago v. Vasquez[17]. Further, he averred that the Eternal Gardens ruling was superseded by Rule 65, Section 7 of the Rules of Court (1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) which states that "the petition [in the Supreme Court or in the Court of Appeals] shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case."

GR NO. 166501

2006-11-16

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO v. BAYANI F. FERNANDO

CARPIO, J.

Lastly, petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts when he filed this petition directly with us. This Court's jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, while concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals, does not give litigants unrestrained freedom of choice of forum from which to seek such relief.[10] We relax this rule only in exceptional and compelling circumstances.[11] This is not the case here.

AM No. MTJ-00-1321

2004-03-10

VICTORY LINER v. JUDGE REYNALDO B. BELLOSILLO

DAVIDE JR., CJ.

In the same vein, this administrative case is not the right forum to determine the issue of the legality of respondent's order requiring VLI to post a cash bond for the release of its impounded vehicle. VLI should have raised that issue in the proper courts and not directly to us, and much less by way of an administrative case. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. As we have said in Santiago v. Vasquez,[16] the propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking a ruling directly from us must be put to a halt.[17]

GR No. 154599

2004-01-21

LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY NATIONAL v. CITY MAYOR OF MANILA

DAVIDE JR., CJ.

As we have said in Santiago v. Vasquez,[17] the propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court must be put to a halt for two reasons: (1) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of this Court; and (2) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is not a trier of facts.

GR No. 155001

2003-05-05

DEMOSTHENES P. AGAN v. PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO.

PUNO, J.

The rule on hierarchy of courts will not also prevent this Court from assuming jurisdiction over the cases at bar. The said rule may be relaxed when the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of this Court's primary jurisdiction.[19]

	GR No. 175723 2014-02-04	CITY OF MANILA v. CARIDAD H. GRECIA-CUERDO PERALTA, J.
Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly conferred on them. These inherent powers are such powers as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or are essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the courts, as well as to the due administration of justice; or are directly appropriate, convenient and suitable to the execution of their granted powers; and include the power to maintain the court's jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the litigants.[38]
	GR No. 194994 2013-04-16	EMMANUEL A. DE CASTRO v. EMERSON S. CARLOS SERENO, J.
A direct invocation of this Court's jurisdiction is allowed only when there are special and important reasons that are clearly and specifically set forth in a petition.[19] The rationale behind this policy arises from the necessity of preventing (1) inordinate demands upon the time and attention of the Court, which is better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction; and (2) further overcrowding of the Court's docket.[20]
	GR No. 155996 2012-06-27	PCGG CHAIRMAN MAGDANGAL B. ELMA v. REINER JACOBI BRION, J.
In Vergara, Sr. v. Judge Suelto,[112] the Court laid down the judicial policy expressly disallowing a direct recourse to this Court because it is a court of last resort. The Court stressed that "[w]here the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of [another court], it [must be in that court] that the specific action for the writ's procurement must be presented." The rationale behind the policy arises from the necessity of preventing (i) inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and (ii) further overcrowding of the Court's docket.[113]
	GR No. 176579 2011-06-28	WILSON P. GAMBOA v. FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO B. TEVES CARPIO, J.
In particular, respondent Nazareno's Memorandum, consisting of 73 pages, harps mainly on the procedural infirmities of the petition and the supposed violation of the due process rights of the "affected foreign common shareholders." Respondent Nazareno does not deny petitioner's allegation of foreigners' dominating the common shareholdings of PLDT. Nazareno stressed mainly that the petition "seeks to divest foreign common shareholders purportedly exceeding 40% of the total common shareholdings in PLDT of their ownership over their shares." Thus, "the foreign natural and juridical PLDT shareholders must be impleaded in this suit so that they can be heard."[34] Essentially, Nazareno invokes denial of due process on behalf of the foreign common shareholders.
	GR No. 170146 2010-08-25	WALDO Q. FLORES v. ATTY. ANTONIO F. MONTEMAYOR VILLARAMA, JR., J.
We find nothing irregular with the PAGC's decision to proceed with its investigation notwithstanding the pendency of Montemayor's petition for certiorari before the CA. The filing of a petition for certiorari with the CA did not divest the PAGC of its jurisdiction validly acquired over the case before it. Elementary is the rule that the mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari, commenced in relation to a case pending before a lower court or an administrative body such as the PAGC, does not interrupt the course of the latter where there is no writ of injunction restraining it.[27] For as long as no writ of injunction or restraining order is issued in the special civil action for certiorari, no impediment exists, and nothing prevents the PAGC from exercising its jurisdiction and proceeding with the case pending before its office.[28] And even if such injunctive writ or order is issued, the PAGC continues to retain jurisdiction over the principal action[29] until the question on jurisdiction is finally determined.
	GR No. 167239 2010-05-05	HICOBLINO M. CATLY v. WILLIAM NAVARRO PERALTA, J.
Further, the petition should be denied for violation of hierarchy of courts as prior recourse should have been made to the Court of Appeals, instead of directly with this Court. A direct invocation of the Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent over-crowding of the Court's docket.[52] As aptly pronounced in Santiago v. Vasquez,[53] the observance of the hierarchy of courts should be respected as the Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate court. Thus,
	GR No. 176951 2008-11-18	LEAGUE OF CITIES OF PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC CARPIO, J.
The Constitution[62] grants to the Court original jurisdiction over petitions for prohibition. Although this original jurisdiction over petitions for prohibition (together with petitions for certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus) is concurrent with that of the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals, the established policy is that this Court allows the direct invocation of its original jurisdiction "if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant,"[63] or "in the interest of speedy justice and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an end to the present controversy."[64] This policy has been applied by the Court in exceptional cases, among them, People v. Cuaresma,[65] Santiago v. Vasquez,[66] Manalo v. Gloria,[67] Philippine National Bank v. Sayo, Jr.,[68] Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,[69] Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora,[70] and Government of the United States of America v. Purganan.[71]
	GR No. 141020 2008-06-12	CASINO LABOR ASSOCIATION v. CA PUNO, CJ.
We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower courts in the exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.[21]
	GR No. 146769 2007-08-17	SPS. MAXIMO ABADILLA AND ENGRACIA C. ABADILLA v. VIRGINIA HOFILEÑA-EUROPA NACHURA, J.
As we held in Santiago v. Vasquez,[26] and reiterated in cases subsequent to it, the propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court must be put to a halt for two reasons: (1) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of this Court; and (2) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases which, in numerous instances have to be remanded or referred to the lower court, the latter being the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or being better equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is not a trier of facts.[27] In the case at bench, we again apply, as well as remind litigants and lawyers of, the said policy.
	GR No. 164527 2007-08-15	FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY VELASCO, JR., J.
While direct recourse to this Court is generally frowned upon and discouraged, we have however ruled in Santiago v. Vasquez that such resort to us may be allowed in certain situations, wherein this Court ruled that petitions for certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus, though cognizable by other courts, may directly be filed with us if "the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of [this Court's] primary jurisdiction."[52]
	AM NO. 06-6-8-CA 2007-03-20	RE: COMPLAINT v. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE ELVI JOHN S. ASUNCION PER CURIAM
"Complainant Padilla contends that respondent Justice Asuncion committed gross ignorance of the law in issuing the October 30, 2001 resolution which extended indefinitely the duration of the TRO issued on July 24, 2001, by ordering the parties to maintain the status quo, pending resolution of the PNB's motion for reconsideration, in violation of Rule 58, Section 5 of the Rules of Court. Atty. Padilla further contends that respondent's failure to speedily resolve PNB's motion for reconsideration dated June 13, 2001, Archinas' motion for reconsideration dated November 5, 2001 and her numerous motions for early resolution thereof constitute culpable dereliction of duty. Atty. Padilla stressed that respondent Justice's reliance on Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[16] decided in 1988, to justify the issuance of the two resolutions constitutes gross ignorance of the law, considering that the ruling thereon was set aside by the Supreme Court in 1993 in the case of Santiago v. Vasquez[17]. Further, he averred that the Eternal Gardens ruling was superseded by Rule 65, Section 7 of the Rules of Court (1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) which states that "the petition [in the Supreme Court or in the Court of Appeals] shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case."
	GR NO. 166501 2006-11-16	ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO v. BAYANI F. FERNANDO CARPIO, J.
Lastly, petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts when he filed this petition directly with us. This Court's jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, while concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals, does not give litigants unrestrained freedom of choice of forum from which to seek such relief.[10] We relax this rule only in exceptional and compelling circumstances.[11] This is not the case here.
	AM No. MTJ-00-1321 2004-03-10	VICTORY LINER v. JUDGE REYNALDO B. BELLOSILLO DAVIDE JR., CJ.
In the same vein, this administrative case is not the right forum to determine the issue of the legality of respondent's order requiring VLI to post a cash bond for the release of its impounded vehicle. VLI should have raised that issue in the proper courts and not directly to us, and much less by way of an administrative case. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. As we have said in Santiago v. Vasquez,[16] the propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking a ruling directly from us must be put to a halt.[17]
	GR No. 154599 2004-01-21	LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY NATIONAL v. CITY MAYOR OF MANILA DAVIDE JR., CJ.
As we have said in Santiago v. Vasquez,[17] the propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court must be put to a halt for two reasons: (1) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of this Court; and (2) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is not a trier of facts.
	GR No. 155001 2003-05-05	DEMOSTHENES P. AGAN v. PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO. PUNO, J.
The rule on hierarchy of courts will not also prevent this Court from assuming jurisdiction over the cases at bar. The said rule may be relaxed when the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of this Court's primary jurisdiction.[19]

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO v. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ