This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2007-12-12 |
PUNO, CJ. |
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| In their Supplemental Memorandum,[23] petitioners contend that the nature of their complaints, as denominated therein and as borne by their allegations, are suits for reconveyance, or annulment or cancellation of OCTs and damages. The cases allegedly involve more than just the issue of title and possession since the nullity of the OCTs issued to respondents and the reconveyance of the subject properties were also raised as issues. Thus, the RTC has jurisdiction under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, which provides that the RTC has jurisdiction "[i]n all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation." Petitioners cited: a) Raymundo v. CA[24] which set the criteria for determining whether an action is one not capable of pecuniary estimation; b) Swan v. CA[25] where it was held that an action for annulment of title is under the jurisdiction of the RTC; c) Santos v. CA[26] where it was similarly held that an action for annulment of title, reversion and damages was within the jurisdiction of the RTC; and d) Commodities Storage and ICE Plant Corporation v. CA[27] where it was held that "[w]here the action affects title to the property, it should be filed in the RTC where the property is located." Petitioners also contend that while it may be argued that the assessed values of the subject properties are within the original jurisdiction of the municipal trial court (MTC), they have included in their prayers "any interest included therein" consisting of 49 felled natural grown trees illegally cut by respondents. Combining the assessed values of the properties as shown by their respective tax declarations and the estimated value of the trees cut, the total amount prayed by petitioners exceeds twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). Hence, they contend that the RTC has jurisdiction under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129. | |||||
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2007-12-12 |
PUNO, CJ. |
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| In a number of cases, we have held that actions for reconveyance[44] of or for cancellation of title[45] to or to quiet title[46] over real property are actions that fall under the classification of cases that involve "title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein." | |||||
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2006-08-10 |
CORONA, J. |
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| The issuance of a preliminary injunction rests entirely on the discretion of the court and is generally not interfered with except in cases of manifest abuse.[10] There was no such abuse in the case at bar, especially because petitioner was given all the opportunity to oppose the application for injunction. The fact was, it failed to convince the court why the injunction should not be issued. Thus, in Santos v. Court of Appeals,[11] we held that no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to a judge or body issuing a writ of preliminary injunction where a party has not been deprived of its day in court as it was heard and it exhaustively presented all its arguments and defenses. | |||||
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2005-03-31 |
TINGA, J. |
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| Petitioner sought the review of the order of the trial court dismissing the petitions and denying its motion for reconsideration, on the ground that the trial court failed to adhere to this Court's rulings in Amistoso v. Ong[21] and Santos v. Court of Appeals,[22] which upheld the regular court's jurisdiction over disputes which involve not the settlement of water rights but the enjoyment of the right to water use for which a permit had already been granted. | |||||
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2001-01-30 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| After a consideration of the evidence presented, the trial court issued the assailed Order stating in part that petitioner Savellano had clearly established his right to a preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction. The court heavily relied on Santos v. Court of Appeals[6] which held that the general rule prohibiting the use of injunction to transfer possession or control of property from one party to the other does not obtain when (a) the applicant has clearly established his rights over the disputed property, and (b) the defendant is merely an intruder; or (c) where the action seeks to prevent a purchaser at an auction sale from molesting the rights of a debtor's co-owner whose rights have not been affected by the sale. | |||||