This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2014-03-24 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| The trial court in Civil Case No. 5703-R committed grave abuse of discretion in terminating or dismissing the case for failure of the parties to submit a compromise agreement. In Goldloop Properties, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[40] the Court held that dismissing the action without allowing the parties to present evidence and after ordering them to compromise is tantamount to deprivation of due process, and the "dismissal of an action for failure to submit a compromise agreement, which is not even required by any rule, is definitely a harsh action."[41] The Court likewise held therein that "the fact that negotiations for a compromise agreement persisted even up to the time of the dismissal of the case strongly demonstrates their earnest efforts to abide by the trial court's order to settle their dispute amicably";[42] thus, "dismissing an action on account of the failure of the parties to compromise, would be to render nugatory the pronounced policy of the law to encourage compromises, and thus open the floodgates to parties refusing to agree upon an amicable settlement by simply railroading their opposing parties' position, or even defeating the latter's claim by the expedient of an outright dismissal."[43] | |||||
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2009-01-20 |
PUNO, C.J. |
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| Petitioners' fourth argument, that private respondents' motion for reconsideration before the Shari'a District Court is defective for lack of a notice of hearing, must fail as the unique circumstances in the present case constitute an exception to this requirement. The Rules require every written motion to be set for hearing by the applicant and to address the notice of hearing to all parties concerned.[45] The Rules also provide that "no written motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the court without proof of service thereof."[46] However, the Rules allow a liberal construction of its provisions "in order to promote [the] objective of securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding."[47] Moreover, this Court has upheld a liberal construction specifically of the rules of notice of hearing in cases where "a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein."[48] In these exceptional cases, the Court considers that "no party can even claim a vested right in technicalities," and for this reason, cases should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits rather than on technicalities.[49] | |||||
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2007-10-19 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| While a court can dismiss a case on the ground of failure to prosecute, the true test for the exercise of such power is whether, under the prevailing circumstances, the plaintiff is culpable for want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude.[30] As to what constitutes an "unreasonable length of time," within the purview of the above-quoted provision, the Court has ruled that it "depends upon the circumstances of each particular case," and that "the sound discretion of the court" in the determination of said question "will not be disturbed, in the absence of patent abuse"; and that "the burden of showing abuse of judicial discretion is upon the appellant since every presumption is in favor of the correctness of the court's action."[31] Likewise, the concept of promptness is a relative term and must not unnecessarily be an inflexible one. It connotes an action without hesitation and loss of time. As to what constitutes the term is addressed to the consideration of the trial court, bearing in mind that while actions must be disposed of with dispatch, the essential ingredient is the administration of justice and not mere speed.[32] | |||||
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2007-06-26 |
GARCIA, J. |
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| The summary judgment sought to be annulled in this case was rendered on 15 March 1993, which is before the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The CA took cognizance of the subject petition for annulment by authority of Section 9, paragraph 2 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which states that "[t]he Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) shall exercise: x x x (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of the Regional Trial Courts x x x." Under existing jurisprudence on the matter, "certain requisites must first be established before a final and executory judgment can be subject of an action for annulment. It must either be void for want of jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law, or it has been obtained by fraud."[7] These are the same grounds allowed under Section 2, Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure applied by the CA in dismissing the subject petition for annulment of judgment. | |||||
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2005-08-11 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| While a court can dismiss a case on the ground of failure to prosecute, the true test for the exercise of such power is whether, under the prevailing circumstances, the plaintiff is culpable for want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude.[48] As to what constitutes an "unreasonable length of time," within the purview of the above-quoted provision, the Court has ruled that it "depends upon the circumstances of each particular case" and that "the sound discretion of the court" in the determination of said question "will not be disturbed, in the absence of patent abuse;" and that "the burden of showing abuse of judicial discretion is upon the appellant since every presumption is in favor of the correctness of the court's action."[49] Likewise, the concept of promptness is a relative term and must not unnecessarily be an inflexible one. It connotes an action without hesitation and loss of time. As to what constitutes the term is addressed to the consideration of the trial court, bearing in mind that while actions must be disposed of with dispatch, the essential ingredient is the administration of justice and not mere speed.[50] | |||||
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2003-05-05 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| In the instant case, petitioner maintains that the trial court cannot coerce the parties in Civil Case No. 99-518 to execute a compromise agreement and penalize their failure to do so by refusing to go forward with the pre-trial conference. To hold otherwise, so petitioner avers, would violate Art. 2029 of the Civil Code which provides that "[t]he court shall endeavor to persuade the litigants in a civil case to agree upon some fair compromise," and this Court's ruling in Goldloop Properties, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[23] where it was held that the trial court cannot dismiss a complaint for failure of the parties to submit a compromise agreement. | |||||