This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2014-11-25 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| In interpreting the meaning of the phrase "if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for its investigation," this Court has, as early as 1992 in People v. Duque,[8] held that in cases where the illegality of the activity is not known to the complainant at the time of its commission, Act No. 3326, Section 2 requires that prescription, in such a case, would begin to run only from the discovery thereof, i.e. discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts.[9] | |||||
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2014-11-25 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| An evaluation of the foregoing jurisprudence[24] on the matter reveals the following guidelines in the determination of the reckoning point for the period of prescription of violations of RA 3019, viz: As a general rule, prescription begins to run from the date of the commission of the offense. | |||||
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2011-04-13 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day the crime is committed. That an aggrieved person "entitled to an action has no knowledge of his right to sue or of the facts out of which his right arises," does not prevent the running of the prescriptive period.[29] An exception to this rule is the "blameless ignorance" doctrine, incorporated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326. Under this doctrine, "the statute of limitations runs only upon discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which will support a cause of action. In other words, the courts would decline to apply the statute of limitations where the plaintiff does not know or has no reasonable means of knowing the existence of a cause of action."[30] It was in this accord that the Court confronted the question on the running of the prescriptive period in People v. Duque[31] which became the cornerstone of our 1999 Decision in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130149),[32] and the subsequent cases[33] which Ombudsman Desierto dismissed, emphatically, on the ground of prescription too. Thus, we held in a catena of cases,[34] that if the violation of the special law was not known at the time of its commission, the prescription begins to run only from the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts. | |||||
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2006-07-28 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| In the case of People v. Duque,[24] we construed the aforequoted provision, specifically the rule on the running of the prescriptive period as follows:In our view, the phrase "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment" may be either disregarded as surplusage or should be deemed preceded by the word "until." Thus, Section 2 may be read as: | |||||
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2004-10-21 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| The case before us is not of first impression. On all fours is Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans vs. Hon. Aniano A. Desierto, et al.,[11] also involving a complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman for an alleged behest loan obtained by the Philippine Seeds, Inc. during the Marcos administration. We ruled therein that since the law alleged to have been violated is Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, the applicable rule in the computation of the prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, cited earlier. Under Section 2 of this Act, there are two (2) rules for determining when the period of prescription shall commence: First, on the day of the commission of the violation, if such commission is known. Second, if the commission of the violation is not known at the time, then, from discovery thereof and institution of judicial proceedings for investigation and punishment.[12] | |||||