Lawyerly

GR Nos. 217126-27

2015-11-10

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Meanwhile, the CA issued a Resolution[90] dated April 6, 2015, after the oral arguments before it were held,[91] granting Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a WPI, which further enjoined the implementation of the preventive suspension order. In so ruling, the CA found that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for, namely, the nullification of the preventive suspension order, in view of the condonation doctrine, citing Aguinaldo v. Santos.[92] Particularly, it found that the Ombudsman can hardly impose preventive suspension against Binay, Jr. given that his re-election in 2013 as City Mayor of Makati condoned any administrative liability arising from anomalous activities relative to the Makati Parking Building project from 2007 to 2013.[93] In this regard, the CA added that, although there were acts which were apparently committed by Binay, Jr. beyond his first term — namely, the alleged payments on July 3, July 4, and July 24, 2013,[94] corresponding to the services of Hillmarc's and MANA - still, Binay, Jr. cannot be held administratively liable therefor based on the cases of Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.,[95] and Mayor Garcia v. Mojica[96] wherein the condonation doctrine was still applied by the Court although the payments were made after the official's re-election, reasoning that the payments were merely effected pursuant to contracts executed before said re-election.[97] To this, the CA added that there was no concrete evidence of Binay, Jr.'s participation for the alleged payments made on July 3, 4, and 24, 2013.[98]

GR Nos. 217126-27

2015-11-10

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES v. CA

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit[10] was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas "Ching" Enciso VI before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati (Binay, Jr., et al), accusing them of Plunder[11] and violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019,[12] otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," in connection with the five (5) phases of the procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati Parking Building).[13]

GR Nos. 217126-27

2015-11-10

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES v. CA

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

On September 9, 2014, the Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of Investigators[14] to conduct a fact-finding investigation, submit an investigation report, and file the necessary complaint, if warranted (1st Special Panel).[15] Pursuant to the Ombudsman's directive, on March 5, 2015, the 1st Special Panel filed a complaint[16] (OMB Complaint) against Binay, Jr., et al, charging them with six (6) administrative cases[17] for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and six (6) criminal cases[18] for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds, and Falsification of Public Documents (OMB Cases).[19]

GR No. 180917

2010-04-23

ATTY. VICENTE E. SALUMBIDES v. OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN

CARPIO MORALES, J.

Ingco v. Sanchez, et al. [22] clarified that the condonation doctrine does not apply to a criminal case.[23] Luciano v. The Provincial Governor, et al., [24] Olivarez v. Judge Villaluz, [25] and Aguinaldo v. Santos [26] echoed the qualified rule that reelection of a public official does not bar prosecution for crimes committed by him prior thereto.

GR No. 168309

2008-09-25

OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN v. MARIAN D. TORRES

NACHURA, J.

On the alleged absence of criminal intent or malice on the part of private respondents to falsify their respective DTRs during the subject periods of government employment, the argument that there was no damage caused the government by their acts, the error of the Office of the Ombudsman in not dismissing the complaint outright, and the supposed applicability of Aguinaldo v. Santos[5] to Maricar's case, this Court observes that these were the very same arguments that we already passed upon in our Decision[6] promulgated on January 29, 2008.

GR No. 179817

2008-06-27

ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV v. OSCAR PIMENTEL

CARPIO MORALES, J.

Petitioner's contention hinges on the doctrine in administrative law that "a public official can not be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor."[42]

GR No. 168766

2008-05-22

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. HENRY A. SOJOR

REYES, R.T., J.

Lastly, We do not agree with respondent's contention that his appointment to the position of president of NORSU, despite the pending administrative cases against him, served as a condonation by the BOR of the alleged acts imputed to him. The doctrine this Court laid down in Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.[47] and Aguinaldo v. Santos[48] are inapplicable to the present circumstances. Respondents in the mentioned cases are elective officials, unlike respondent here who is an appointed official. Indeed, election expresses the sovereign will of the people.[49] Under the principle of vox populi est suprema lex, the re-election of a public official may, indeed, supersede a pending administrative case. The same cannot be said of a re-appointment to a non-career position. There is no sovereign will of the people to speak of when the BOR re-appointed respondent Sojor to the post of university president.

GR No. 171500

2008-04-30

FERNANDO C. PARMA v. OFFICE OF DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON and MAYOR LOURDES SEÑAR

VELASCO JR., J.

(2) By Joint-Resolution of November 16, 2005,[23] the Ombudsman also dismissed the third complaint for falsification of official document and dishonesty, docketed as OMB-L-C-05-0244-C and OMB-L-A-05-0175-C, respectively. The Ombudsman found no probable cause to charge Parma with falsification and ruled, vis-à-vis OMB-L-A-05-0175-C, that a re-elected official is not amenable for an administrative offense committed during a previous term.[24]

GR No. 168309

2008-01-29

OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN v. MARIAN D. TORRES and MARICAR D. TORRES

NACHURA, J.

After due proceedings held in the Office of the Ombudsman, Graft Investigation Officer (GIO) Moreno F. Generoso, in the Decision[4] dated November 9, 2001, found Maricar and Marian administratively guilty of Dishonesty and Falsification of Official Document and recommended the imposition of the penalty of dismissal from the service. The charge against Edilberto was dismissed, having become moot and academic in view of his re-election on May 14, 2001 in accordance with the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos[5] that "a public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor." Upon recommendation of Deputy Special Prosecutor Robert E. Kallos, Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto affirmed the findings of GIO Generoso but tempered the penalty to one (1) year suspension from service without pay.

GR Nos. 157419-20

2004-12-13

LIBRADO M. CABRERA v. SIMEON V. MARCELO

TINGA, J,

An examination though of the Orders of the Ombudsman dismissing the administrative complaint reveal that the dismissal was warranted not because the charges had no merit. In disposing of the administrative complaint, the Office of the Ombudsman noted that since Fe Cabrera was no longer the Mayor of Taal, the administrative complaint against her should be dismissed because the Ombudsman could no longer acquire jurisdiction over her person.[34] In the cases of Librado Cabrera and Luther Leonor, it was observed that since both were subsequently reelected to their incumbent positions in 2001, their reelection, concordant to Aguinaldo v. Santos,[35] operates as a condonation of whatever administrative infraction or misconduct they may have committed during their previous terms.[36] Clearly then, these complaints were dismissed not because the charges were unfounded, but because of prevailing doctrines peculiar to administrative complaints. Besides, it is well settled that condonation of an officer's fault or misconduct during a previous expired term by virtue of his reelection to office for a new term can be deemed to apply only to his administrative and not to his criminal guilt.[37]

	GR Nos. 217126-27 2015-11-10	CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES v. CA PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Meanwhile, the CA issued a Resolution[90] dated April 6, 2015, after the oral arguments before it were held,[91] granting Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a WPI, which further enjoined the implementation of the preventive suspension order. In so ruling, the CA found that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for, namely, the nullification of the preventive suspension order, in view of the condonation doctrine, citing Aguinaldo v. Santos.[92] Particularly, it found that the Ombudsman can hardly impose preventive suspension against Binay, Jr. given that his re-election in 2013 as City Mayor of Makati condoned any administrative liability arising from anomalous activities relative to the Makati Parking Building project from 2007 to 2013.[93] In this regard, the CA added that, although there were acts which were apparently committed by Binay, Jr. beyond his first term — namely, the alleged payments on July 3, July 4, and July 24, 2013,[94] corresponding to the services of Hillmarc's and MANA - still, Binay, Jr. cannot be held administratively liable therefor based on the cases of Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.,[95] and Mayor Garcia v. Mojica[96] wherein the condonation doctrine was still applied by the Court although the payments were made after the official's re-election, reasoning that the payments were merely effected pursuant to contracts executed before said re-election.[97] To this, the CA added that there was no concrete evidence of Binay, Jr.'s participation for the alleged payments made on July 3, 4, and 24, 2013.[98]
	GR Nos. 217126-27 2015-11-10	CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES v. CA PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit[10] was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas "Ching" Enciso VI before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati (Binay, Jr., et al), accusing them of Plunder[11] and violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019,[12] otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," in connection with the five (5) phases of the procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati Parking Building).[13]
	GR Nos. 217126-27 2015-11-10	CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES v. CA PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
On September 9, 2014, the Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of Investigators[14] to conduct a fact-finding investigation, submit an investigation report, and file the necessary complaint, if warranted (1st Special Panel).[15] Pursuant to the Ombudsman's directive, on March 5, 2015, the 1st Special Panel filed a complaint[16] (OMB Complaint) against Binay, Jr., et al, charging them with six (6) administrative cases[17] for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and six (6) criminal cases[18] for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds, and Falsification of Public Documents (OMB Cases).[19]
	GR No. 180917 2010-04-23	ATTY. VICENTE E. SALUMBIDES v. OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN CARPIO MORALES, J.
Ingco v. Sanchez, et al. [22] clarified that the condonation doctrine does not apply to a criminal case.[23] Luciano v. The Provincial Governor, et al., [24] Olivarez v. Judge Villaluz, [25] and Aguinaldo v. Santos [26] echoed the qualified rule that reelection of a public official does not bar prosecution for crimes committed by him prior thereto.
	GR No. 168309 2008-09-25	OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN v. MARIAN D. TORRES NACHURA, J.
On the alleged absence of criminal intent or malice on the part of private respondents to falsify their respective DTRs during the subject periods of government employment, the argument that there was no damage caused the government by their acts, the error of the Office of the Ombudsman in not dismissing the complaint outright, and the supposed applicability of Aguinaldo v. Santos[5] to Maricar's case, this Court observes that these were the very same arguments that we already passed upon in our Decision[6] promulgated on January 29, 2008.
	GR No. 179817 2008-06-27	ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV v. OSCAR PIMENTEL CARPIO MORALES, J.
Petitioner's contention hinges on the doctrine in administrative law that "a public official can not be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor."[42]
	GR No. 168766 2008-05-22	CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. HENRY A. SOJOR REYES, R.T., J.
Lastly, We do not agree with respondent's contention that his appointment to the position of president of NORSU, despite the pending administrative cases against him, served as a condonation by the BOR of the alleged acts imputed to him. The doctrine this Court laid down in Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.[47] and Aguinaldo v. Santos[48] are inapplicable to the present circumstances. Respondents in the mentioned cases are elective officials, unlike respondent here who is an appointed official. Indeed, election expresses the sovereign will of the people.[49] Under the principle of vox populi est suprema lex, the re-election of a public official may, indeed, supersede a pending administrative case. The same cannot be said of a re-appointment to a non-career position. There is no sovereign will of the people to speak of when the BOR re-appointed respondent Sojor to the post of university president.
	GR No. 171500 2008-04-30	FERNANDO C. PARMA v. OFFICE OF DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON and MAYOR LOURDES SEÑAR VELASCO JR., J.
(2) By Joint-Resolution of November 16, 2005,[23] the Ombudsman also dismissed the third complaint for falsification of official document and dishonesty, docketed as OMB-L-C-05-0244-C and OMB-L-A-05-0175-C, respectively. The Ombudsman found no probable cause to charge Parma with falsification and ruled, vis-à-vis OMB-L-A-05-0175-C, that a re-elected official is not amenable for an administrative offense committed during a previous term.[24]
	GR No. 168309 2008-01-29	OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN v. MARIAN D. TORRES and MARICAR D. TORRES NACHURA, J.
After due proceedings held in the Office of the Ombudsman, Graft Investigation Officer (GIO) Moreno F. Generoso, in the Decision[4] dated November 9, 2001, found Maricar and Marian administratively guilty of Dishonesty and Falsification of Official Document and recommended the imposition of the penalty of dismissal from the service. The charge against Edilberto was dismissed, having become moot and academic in view of his re-election on May 14, 2001 in accordance with the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos[5] that "a public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor." Upon recommendation of Deputy Special Prosecutor Robert E. Kallos, Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto affirmed the findings of GIO Generoso but tempered the penalty to one (1) year suspension from service without pay.
	GR Nos. 157419-20 2004-12-13	LIBRADO M. CABRERA v. SIMEON V. MARCELO TINGA, J,
An examination though of the Orders of the Ombudsman dismissing the administrative complaint reveal that the dismissal was warranted not because the charges had no merit. In disposing of the administrative complaint, the Office of the Ombudsman noted that since Fe Cabrera was no longer the Mayor of Taal, the administrative complaint against her should be dismissed because the Ombudsman could no longer acquire jurisdiction over her person.[34] In the cases of Librado Cabrera and Luther Leonor, it was observed that since both were subsequently reelected to their incumbent positions in 2001, their reelection, concordant to Aguinaldo v. Santos,[35] operates as a condonation of whatever administrative infraction or misconduct they may have committed during their previous terms.[36] Clearly then, these complaints were dismissed not because the charges were unfounded, but because of prevailing doctrines peculiar to administrative complaints. Besides, it is well settled that condonation of an officer's fault or misconduct during a previous expired term by virtue of his reelection to office for a new term can be deemed to apply only to his administrative and not to his criminal guilt.[37]

RODOLFO E. AGUINALDO v. LUIS SANTOS