This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2012-11-21 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| Notably, the Sps. Viray and Vda. de Viray, after peremptorily prevailing in their cases supportive of their claim of ownership and possession of Lots 733-A and 733-F (Fajardo Plan), cannot now be deprived of their rights by the expediency of the Sps. Usi maintaining, as here, an accion publiciana and/or accion reivindicatoria, two of the three kinds of actions to recover possession of real property. The third, accion interdictal, comprises two distinct causes of action, namely forcible entry and unlawful detainer,[44] the issue in both cases being limited to the right to physical possession or possession de facto, independently of any claim of ownership that either party may set forth in his or her pleadings,[45] albeit the court has the competence to delve into and resolve the issue of ownership but only to address the issue of priority of possession.[46] Both actions must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand to vacate following the expiration of the right to possess, in case of unlawful detainer.[47] | |||||
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2004-06-03 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Settled is the rule that the defendant's claim of ownership of the disputed property will not divest the inferior court of its jurisdiction over the ejectment case.[32] Even if the pleadings raise the issue of ownership, the court may pass on such issue to determine only the question of possession, especially if the ownership is inseparably linked with the possession.[33] The adjudication on the issue of ownership is only provisional and will not bar an action between the same parties involving title to the land.[34] This doctrine is a necessary consequence of the nature of the two summary actions of ejectment, forcible entry and unlawful detainer, where the only issue for adjudication is the physical or material possession over the real property.[35] | |||||