This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2010-12-15 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| In the case at bar, Robles is an indispensable party. He stands to be injured or benefited by the outcome of the petition. He has an interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect his rights, such that the courts cannot proceed without his presence.[7] Moreover, as provided for under the aforequoted Section 5, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, Robles is interested in sustaining the assailed CA Decision, considering that he would benefit from such judgment. As such, his non-inclusion would render the petition for certiorari defective.[8] | |||||
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2005-02-17 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The preference created by the levy on attachment is not diminished even by the subsequent registration of the prior sale. This is so because an attachment is a proceeding in rem.[19] It is against the particular property, enforceable against the whole world. The attaching creditor acquires a specific lien on the attached property which nothing can subsequently destroy except the very dissolution of the attachment or levy itself.[20] Such a proceeding, in effect, means that the property attached is an indebted thing and a virtual condemnation of it to pay the owner's debt.[21] The lien continues until the debt is paid, or sale is had under execution issued on the judgment, or until the judgment is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated in some manner provided by law. | |||||
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2003-10-15 |
VITUG, J. |
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| When respondent judge uttered the statement that he could issue a writ of preliminary injunction ex parte (during the hearing on 20 March 2001), complainants, unfortunately, mistook that to mean that he could rule on plaintiffs' prayer for preliminary injunction without hearing the evidence. Judge Quilala explained that he was simply stating a procedural fact. Indeed, under the rules, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ex parte could be issued without it being necessarily conditioned on prior notice and hearing.[6] Where the delay would prevent an effective relief or might result in serious damage, hearing could justifiably be dispensed with,[7] although, as a matter of course, such a rule, considering the peremptory nature of the extraordinary remedy, must be strictly and restrictively applied.[8] | |||||