This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2005-08-18 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| In Legarda v. Court of Appeals,[22] where the Court initially held that the counsel's failure to file pleadings at the trial court and later on appeal amounted to gross negligence, the Court, on respondent's motion, granted reconsideration and applied the general rule binding the litigant to her counsel's negligence. The Court noted that the proceedings which led to the filing of the petition in that case "were not attended by any irregularity." The same observation squarely applies here. Neither can petitioners rely on Boyer-Roxas v. Court of Appeals[23] because there, as here, the Court held that the petitioners' counsel was not grossly negligent. | |||||
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2004-12-16 |
TINGA, J, |
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| As a legal entity, a corporation has a personality distinct and separate from its individual stockholders or members and from that of its officers who manage and run its affairs.[30] The rule is that obligations incurred by the corporation, acting through its directors, officers and employees, are its sole liabilities.[31] Thus, property belonging to a corporation cannot be attached to satisfy the debt of a stockholder and vice versa, the latter having only an indirect interest in the assets and business of the former.[32] Thus, as summed by the IBP investigator, respondent is the lawyer of SANDAMA, but SANDAMA is not a party litigant in all of the expropriation cases; thus respondent had no basis to interfere in the court proceedings involving the members. But things are not as simple as that. | |||||
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2004-03-01 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| We note from the records, however, that the Church, despite knowledge that its intended contract of sale with the NHA had not been perfected, proceeded to introduce improvements on the disputed land. On the other hand, the NHA knowingly granted the Church temporary use of the subject properties and did not prevent the Church from making improvements thereon. Thus, the Church and the NHA, who both acted in bad faith, shall be treated as if they were both in good faith.[28] In this connection, Article 448 of the Civil Code provides: The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land and if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof. Pursuant to our ruling in Depra v. Dumlao,[29] there is a need to remand this case to the trial court, which shall conduct the appropriate proceedings to assess the respective values of the improvements and of the land, as well as the amounts of reasonable rentals and indemnity, fix the terms of the lease if the parties so agree, and to determine other matters necessary for the proper application of Article 448, in relation to Articles 546 and 548, of the Civil Code. | |||||
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2000-02-17 |
PURISIMA, J. |
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| A perusal of his affidavit-complaint reveals that at the time he filed the same on June 24, 1974, petitioner Co was the vice-president of the Corporation. As a corporate officer, his power to bind the Corporation as its agent must be sought from statute, charter, by-laws, a delegation of authority to a corporate officer, or from the acts of the board of directors formally expressed or implied from a habit or custom of doing business.[46] In this case, no such sources of petitioner's authority from which to deduce whether or not he was acting beyond the scope of his responsibilities as corporate vice-president are mentioned, much less proven. It is thus logical to conclude that the board of directors or by laws- of the corporation vested petitioner Co with certain executive duties[47]one of which is a case for the Corporation. | |||||