This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2014-04-07 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| The Court of Appeals found the position of the union untenable. It cited this Court's ruling in St. Scholastica's College v. Torres[14] that the authority of the Secretary of Labor and Employment under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to national interest includes questions and controversies arising from the said dispute, including cases over which the Labor Arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction. Applying St. Scholastica's College, the Court of Appeals found that the 2004 CBA Official Minutes of the Meetings show that the union and the company were already discussing the economic issues when the union accused the company of bargaining in bad faith. As such, the Secretary of Labor and Employment had the authority to take cognizance of the economic issues, which issues were the necessary consequence of the alleged bad faith bargaining.[15] | |||||
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2007-06-22 |
PUNO, C.J. |
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| SO ORDERED.[10] The Labor Arbiter found the strike illegal for having been conducted in defiance of Secretary Laguesma's August 14, 1998 assumption order and for non-compliance with the procedural requirements for the conduct of a strike under the Labor Code and its implementing rules. The Labor Arbiter cited Scholastica's College v. Ruben Torres[11] which ruled that a strike undertaken despite the issuance of an assumption or certification order by the Secretary of Labor is a prohibited activity, hence, illegal under Article 264 of the Labor Code. He found that the grounds relied upon by the Union in its second notice of strike were substantially the same as those set forth in its first notice of strike. Moreover, he held that the Company's alleged refusal to turn over the checked-off union dues was not a strikeable issue as it was not a gross and blatant violation of the economic provisions of the CBA. He also held that the mass promotion of the Union's members was not tantamount to dismissal, hence, did not constitute union busting. The staging of the strike was likewise found to suffer from fatal procedural defects, to wit: a) the notice of strike was filed on the same day that the strike was conducted; b) the fifteen (15)-day cooling-off period was not observed; c) the Union failed to conduct a strike vote within the time prescribed by law; and d) the result of the strike vote was not furnished to the NCMB at least seven (7) days prior to the intended strike. Certain illegal acts were likewise found to have been committed during the strike, among which were the following: 1) striker Manny Costales prevented the Company's Director, Lilibeth Pasa, from entering the Bankers Centre Building; 2) union officers Judilyn Gamboa and Rolly Sta. Ana physically blocked the front entrance of the same building; 3) striker Aris Ablis drove a company vehicle and used it to block the driveway of PILTEL Centre II, thus, the cars inside the building were prevented from going out. The tires of said company vehicle were found deflated the following day; 4) strikers Dorothy Zulieta and Ronald Cornel prevented the Warehousing Manager assigned at the PILTEL Metropolitan Warehouse from going out of his office; 5) the strikers, led by Nelson Pineda, blocked the Detachment Supervisor of Protection Specialists and the uniformed company guards from delivering food to the non-striking employees trapped inside PILTEL Call Center at the Manila Memorial Park Building; 6) in General Santos City, some union members tied the entrance doors of the PILTEL Building and tied the company vehicles together; 7) Fe Carandang, Estrella Anonical, Zaldy Logos and Jovencio Laderas blocked the main entrance of the Boac, Marinduque office of the Company; 8) strikers Edna Carrion, Celia Mogol, Erlinda Madrid, Raul Montalan, Rolly Miraflor, Zaldy de Chavez and Dina Madla of the Company's office in Boac, Marinduque were also heard telling the Company's clients not to transact business with the company; and 9) strikers Zaldy Logos, Rizaldy de Chavez, Raul Montalan, Rolly Milaflor and Jovencio Laderas were seen preventing the free ingress and egress of the Company's office premises in Boac, Marinduque. The Labor Arbiter ruled that since the September 4, 1998 strike was illegal, the Union officers were deemed to have lost their employment status. He further ruled that the illegal acts committed during the strike were not serious enough to merit the dismissal of the erring Union members as they were merely acting at the order of their leaders. Hence, the erring union members were merely suspended for six (6) months. | |||||
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2007-03-05 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The allegation[42] that the strikers relied on their honest belief that the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order, issued by the SOLE on 24 November 1999, entitled them to participate in a strike, cannot be sustained. In the case of St. Scholastica's College v. Torres,[43] the Court reiterated the rule that a return-to-work order is immediately executory notwithstanding the filing of a motion for reconsideration. It must be strictly complied with even during the pendency of any petition questioning its validity. Citing the case Philippine Airlines Employees' Association v. Philippine Airlines, Inc.,[44] it accounted for the rationale of this rule, as thus:The very nature of a return-to-work order issued in a certified case lends itself to no other construction. The certification attests to the urgency of the matter, affecting as it does an industry indispensable to the national interest. The order is issued in the exercise of the court's compulsory power of arbitration, and therefore must be obeyed until set aside. To say that its [return-to-work order] effectivity must await affirmance on a motion for reconsideration is not only to emasculate it but indeed to defeat its import, for by then the deadline fixed for the return to work would, in the ordinary course, have already passed and hence can no longer be affirmed insofar as the time element it concerned. | |||||
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2006-06-21 |
GARCIA, J. |
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| penalty of dismissal. This disposition takes stock of the following circumstances justifying a less drastic penalty for ordinary striking workers: a) the employees who engaged in slowdown actually reported for work and continued to occupy their respective posts, or, in fine, did not abandon their jobs; b) they were only following orders of their leaders; and c) no evidence has been presented to prove their participation in the commission of illegal activities during the strike. Not to be overlooked is a factor which the CA, perhaps having in mind PAL vs. Brillantes,[25] regarded as justifying the leniency assumed by the public respondent Secretary towards the members of the Union. We refer to the fact that Nissan Motor appeared to have also exacerbated, as earlier indicated, the emerging volatile atmosphere despite the Secretarys order veritably enjoining the parties to respect the status quo prevailing when she assumed jurisdiction over the dispute. Foremost of these exacerbating acts is the en masse termination of most of the Union members, albeit it may be conceded that the employer has the prerogative of imposing disciplinary sanctions against assumption-order-defying employees. The Court has considered the cases cited by the Company to support its brief on the issue of dismissal, notably Union of Filipro Employees vs. Nestle Philippines, Inc.,[26] St. Scholasticas College vs. Torres,[27] | |||||