Lawyerly

You're currently signed in as:
User

ORIEL MAGNO v. CA

This case has been cited 9 times or more.

	AC. No. 10179 2014-03-04	BENJAMIN Q. ONG v. ATTY. WILLIAM F. DELOS SANTOS BERSAMIN, J.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 has been enacted in order to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the legitimate public checking account users.[13] The gravamen of the offense defined and punished by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, according to Lozano v. Martinez,[14] is the act of making and issuing a worthless check, or any check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment and putting it in circulation; the law is designed to prohibit and altogether eliminate the deleterious and pernicious practice of issuing checks with insufficient funds, or with no credit, because the practice is deemed a public nuisance, a crime against public order to be abated. The Court has observed in Lozano v. Martinez:The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.[15] xxx
	GR No. 167461 2008-02-19	VICKY MOSTER v. PEOPLE QUISUMBING, J.
In Cabrera v. People, we ruled that it is not enough for the prosecution to prove that a notice of dishonor was sent to the drawee of the check. The prosecution must also prove actual receipt of said notice because the fact of service provided for in the law is reckoned from receipt of such notice of dishonor by the drawee of the check.[24] We even held in Ting v. Court of Appeals that possibilities cannot replace proof beyond reasonable doubt. When there is insufficient proof of receipt of notice of dishonor, as in this case, the presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds cannot arise.[25] A notice of dishonor personally sent to and received by the accused is necessary before one can be held liable under B.P. Blg. 22.[26] The failure of the prosecution to prove the receipt by petitioner of the requisite written notice of dishonor and that she was given at least five banking days within which to settle her account constitutes sufficient ground for her acquittal. We must emphasize, as we held in King v. People, the prosecution has the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt each element of the crime as its case will rise or fall on the strength of its own evidence.[27] Any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the accused.[28]
	GR No. 154438 2007-09-05	ALICIA F. RICAFORTE v. LEON L. JURADO AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
In a Resolution[4] dated November 24, 1997, Assistant City Prosecutor Luis Zenon Q. Maceren dismissed the complaint for estafa and B.P. Blg. 22 for insufficiency of evidence. The prosecutor found that petitioner did not have any business transaction with respondent; that the subject checks were issued only to accommodate Aguilar; that these were delivered to respondent not as payment but as a guarantee and on condition that Aguilar will replace petitioner's checks with her own, which Aguilar did prior to the maturity of petitioner's checks; that upon maturity of Aguilar's replacement checks and after respondent presented them for payment and were subsequently dishonored, it was then that petitioner's checks were also presented by respondent for encashment; that Aguilar's replacement checks are now subject of another litigation pending in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City; that the sequence of events showed that indeed petitioner's checks were not intended as payment to respondent because petitioner had no obligation to respondent; that the checks were not issued to account or for value; thus, there can be no finding of prima facie evidence of the charges against him relying on Magno v. Court of Appeals.[5]
	GR NO. 164358 2006-12-20	THERESA MACALALAG v. PEOPLE CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Only a full payment of the face value of the second check at the time of its presentment or during the five-day grace period[15] could have exonerated her from criminal liability. A contrary interpretation would defeat the purpose of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, that of safeguarding the interest of the banking system and the legitimate public checking account user,[16] as the drawer could very well have himself exonerated by the mere expediency of paying a minimal fraction of the face value of the check.
	GR NO. 140425 2005-03-10	JESSE YOUNG v. CA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
We note that we have held in previous cases that the drawer's act of notifying the payee at the time of the issuance of the check that he does not have sufficient funds to cover the amount of such check may operate to absolve the drawer from liability under BP Blg. 22.[38] However, it must be emphasized that in said cases, the checks were drawn and issued in good faith and without intention on the part of their respective drawers to apply said checks for account or for value. In Magno vs. Court of Appeals,[39] the rubber checks were simply issued to cover a warranty deposit in a lease contract returnable to the drawer upon the satisfactory completion of the entire period of lease. The drawer did not benefit from the deposit since the checks were used only as a deposit to serve as security for the faithful performance of the drawer's obligation as a lessee of an equipment.[40] On the other hand, in Idos vs. Court of Appeals,[41] the subject check was issued for the mere purpose of evidencing the private complainant's share or interest in a partnership he entered into with the drawer of the check. The check was simply meant to show the drawer's commitment that when the receivables of the partnership are collected and goods are sold and only when such collection and sale were realized, would the drawer give to the private complainant the net amount due him representing his interest in the partnership; it did not involve a debt of or any amount due and payable by the drawer.[42] Thus, the operative facts in the present case are different. Herein petitioner issued the subject check in exchange for cash given to him and his mother and sister by private complainant. Hence, as distinguished from Magno and Idos, it is clear that in the instant case the check was intended to apply for account or for value.
	GR NO. 160328 2005-02-04	TERESITA ALCANTARA VERGARA v. PEOPLE YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
In Magno v. Court of Appeals,[27] it was held that Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the legitimate public checking account user. It was not intended to shelter or favor nor encourage users of the system to enrich themselves through the manipulation and circumvention of the noble purpose and objectives of the law. Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in criminal law affirms that the primary function of punishment is the protection of the society against actual and potential wrong doers.
	GR No. 149275 2004-09-27	VICKY C. TY v. PEOPLE TINGA, J.
In addition, Ty invokes our ruling in Magno v. Court of Appeals[49] wherein this Court inquired into the true nature of transaction between the drawer and the payee and finally acquitted the accused, to persuade the Court that the circumstances surrounding her case deserve special attention and do not warrant a strict and mechanical application of the law.
	GR No. 125297 2003-06-06	ELVIRA YU OH v. CA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
For these reasons, we reverse the ruling of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's conviction of petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. This is without prejudice, however, to her civil liability towards private complainant Solid Gold in the amount of P500,000.00 plus interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum from date of finality of herein judgment.[55]
	GR No. 129764 2002-03-12	GEOFFREY F. GRIFFITH v. CA QUISUMBING, J.
The Bouncing Checks Law "was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the legitimate public checking account user."[25] It was not designed to favor or encourage those who seek to enrich themselves through manipulation and circumvention of the purpose of the law.[26] Noteworthy, in Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, this Court has expressed a policy preference for fine as penalty in cases of B.P. 22 violations rather than imprisonment to "best serve the ends of criminal justice."