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CENTRAL BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. CA

This case has been cited 7 times or more.

	GR No. 194589 2015-09-21	BALAYAN BAY RURAL BANK v. NATIONAL LIVELIHOOD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION PEREZ, J.
In addition, the insolvent bank's legal personality is not dissolved by virtue of being placed under receivership by the Monetary Board. It must be stressed here that a bank retains its juridical personality even if placed under conservatorship; it is neither replaced nor substituted by the conservator who shall only take charge of the assets, liabilities and the management of the institution.[20]
	GR No. 158143 2011-09-21	PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK v. ANTONIO B. BALMACEDA BRION, J.
As the facts of this case bear out, PCIB did not act out of malice or bad faith when it froze Ramos' bank account and subsequently debited the amount of P251,910.96 therefrom. While PCIB may have acted hastily and without regard to its primary duty to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care and utmost fidelity,[40] we find that its actions were propelled more by the need to protect itself, and not out of malevolence or ill will. One may err, but error alone is not a ground for granting moral damages.[41]
	GR No. 165025 2011-08-31	FEDMAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. FEDERICO AGCAOILI BERSAMIN, J.
The prevailing rule is that if the correct amount of docket fees are not paid at the time of filing, the trial court still acquires jurisdiction upon full payment of the fees within a reasonable time as the court may grant, barring prescription.[27] The "prescriptive period" that bars the payment of the docket fees refers to the period in which a specific action must be filed, so that in every case the docket fees must be paid before the lapse of the prescriptive period, as provided in the applicable laws, particularly Chapter 3, Title V, Book III, of the Civil Code, the principal law on prescription of actions.[28]
	GR No. 153690 2011-02-15	DAVID LU v. PATERNO LU YM CARPIO MORALES, J.
While it is true that the Court en banc exercises no appellate jurisdiction over its Divisions, Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes opined in Firestone and concededly recognized that "[t]he only constraint is that any doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court, either rendered en banc or in division, may be overturned or reversed only by the Court sitting en banc."[17]
	GR No. 161431 2010-10-13	CALIBRE TRADERS v. BAYER PHILIPPINES DEL CASTILLO, J.
It is a settled doctrine that "although the payment of the prescribed docket fees is a jurisdictional requirement, its non-payment x x x should not result in the automatic dismissal of the case provided the docket fees are paid within the applicable prescriptive period."[46] "The prescriptive period therein mentioned refers to the period within which a specific action must be filed. It means that in every case, the docket fee must be paid before the lapse of the prescriptive period. Chapter 3, Title V, Book III of the Civil Code is the principal law governing prescription of actions."[47]
	GR No. 168332 2009-06-19	ANA MARIA A. KORUGA v. TEODORO O. ARCENAS NACHURA, J.
It is clear that the acts complained of pertain to the conduct of Banco Filipino's banking business. A bank, as defined in the General Banking Law,[21] refers to an entity engaged in the lending of funds obtained in the form of deposits.[22] The banking business is properly subject to reasonable regulation under the police power of the state because of its nature and relation to the fiscal affairs of the people and the revenues of the state. Banks are affected with public interest because they receive funds from the general public in the form of deposits. It is the Government's responsibility to see to it that the financial interests of those who deal with banks and banking institutions, as depositors or otherwise, are protected. In this country, that task is delegated to the BSP, which pursuant to its Charter, is authorized to administer the monetary, banking, and credit system of the Philippines. It is further authorized to take the necessary steps against any banking institution if its continued operation would cause prejudice to its depositors, creditors and the general public as well.[23]
	GR NO. 168639 2007-01-29	ALDERITO Z. YUJUICO v. CEZAR T. QUIAMBAO SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
To repeat, the purpose of the writ of preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the court could hear the merits of the case.[31] The status quo is the last actual peaceable uncontested status that preceded the controversy[32] which, in the instant case, is the holding of the annual stockholders' meeting on March 1, 2004 and the ensuing election of the directors and officers of STRADEC. But instead of preserving the status quo, Judge Emuslan's Order messed it up when, in compliance therewith, a special stockholders' meeting was held anew and a new set of directors and officers of STRADEC was elected. That effectively resolved respondents' principal action without even a full-blown trial on the merits since the Order impliedly ruled that the March 1, 2004 annual stockholders' meeting and election are void. Verily, the issuance of the questioned Order violates the established principle that courts should avoid granting a writ of preliminary injunction that would in effect dispose of the main case without trial.[33]