This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2006-08-31 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| We agree with the Court of Appeals that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not present. Treachery under paragraph 16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is defined as the deliberate employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of a crime against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the intended victim might raise. For treachery to be present, two conditions must concur: (a) the employment of means of execution which would ensure the safety of the offender from defensive and retaliatory acts of the victim, giving the victim no opportunity to defend himself; and (b) the means, method and manner of the execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the offender.[11] Treachery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence or as conclusively as the killing itself.[12] | |||||
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2000-09-20 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| Arimbuyutan who, according to the trial court, testified in a categorical, straightforward and spontaneous manner, and who remained consistent on cross-examination, is a credible witness.[8] His testimonies on the actual sales transactions may have been uncorroborated but they weathered intense cross-examination and passed the test of credibility. Moreover, accused-appellant failed to show any ill motive on the part of Arimbuyutan to testify falsely and impute a serious offense to him and Banawor. Where there is no evidence to indicate that a principal prosecution witness was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so actuated. He would not prevaricate and cause damnation to one who brought him no harm or injury.[9] | |||||