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CELESTINO TATEL v. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC

This case has been cited 5 times or more.

	AC. No. 8269 2013-12-11	PHESCHEM INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION v. ATTYS. LLOYD P. SURIGAO REYES, J.
The State, through the legislature, has delegated the exercise of police power to local government units, as agencies of the State, in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation.[36] This delegation is embodied in the general welfare clause, Section 16,[37] of R.A. No. 7160. Police power is essentially regulatory in nature, and the power to issue licenses or grant business permits, if exercised for a regulatory and not revenue-raising purpose, is within the ambit of this power.[38] Consistent with this principle, the CA held in the aforesaid petitions that the quarry permit issued by the Governor of Leyte to Pheschem is contingent on its compliance with the terms and conditions of the ECC. Thus, the quarry permit cannot be said to have vested in Pheschem an absolute, unconditional right to quarry or to mine, such that if it fails to comply with any of the terms and conditions of the ECC, there would be no right to quarry or mine to speak of. The CA stressed that a license or permit is not a contract between the sovereign and the grantee, but a special privilege, a permission or authority to do what would be within its terms; that it is neither vested nor permanent that can at no time be withdrawn or taken back by the grantor. [39]
	GR NO. 166744 2006-11-02	AC ENTERPRISES v. FRABELLE PROPERTIES CORPORATION CALLEJO, SR., J.
We agree with the ruling of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that as gleaned from the material averments of the complaint as well as the character of the relief prayed for by respondent in its complaint before the RTC, the petition is one for the judicial abatement of a private nuisance, more specifically the noise generated by the blowers of the airconditioning system of the Feliza Building owned by petitioner, with a plea for a writ of preliminary and permanent injunction, plus damages. Such action of respondent is incapable of pecuniary estimation because the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money. Although respondent prayed for judgment for temperate or moderate damages and exemplary damages, such claims are merely incidental to or as a consequence of, the principal relief sought by respondent. An action incapable of pecuniary estimation is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC as provided in Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691.[31] In Tatel v. Municipality of Virac,[32] the Court ruled that a simple suit for abatement of a nuisance is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, now the RTC.
	GR NO. 118127 2005-04-12	CITY OF MANILA v. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO TINGA, J.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.[37]
	GR No. 155746 2004-10-13	DIOSDADO LAGCAO v. JUDGE GENEROSA G. LABRA CORONA, J.
For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the city or municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law. It must be in accordance with certain well-established basic principles of a substantive nature. These principles require that an ordinance (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable.[21]
	GR No. 150763 2004-07-02	RURAL BANK OF MAKATI v. MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI QUISUMBING, J.
Indeed the Local Government Code of 1991 was not yet in effect when the municipality ordered petitioner bank's closure on July 31, 1991. However, the general welfare clause invoked by the Court of Appeals is not found on the provisions of said law alone. Even under the old Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337)[19] which was then in effect, a general welfare clause was provided for in Section 7 thereof. Municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-government and as such are endowed with police powers in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation.[20] The authority of a local government unit to exercise police power under a general welfare clause is not a recent development. This was already provided for as early as the Administrative Code of 1917.[21] Since then it has been reenacted and implemented by new statutes on the matter. Thus, the closure of the bank was a valid exercise of police power pursuant to the general welfare clause contained in and restated by B.P. Blg. 337, which was then the law governing local government units. No reversible error arises in this instance insofar as the validity of respondent municipality's exercise of police power for the general welfare is concerned.